From: Jean-Paul Kogelman <jeanpaulkogelman@me•com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Proposal: Base58 encoded HD Wallet root key with optional encryption
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 20:17:50 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <A6F382CD-01F7-47DF-84F4-20F81BB64259@me.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <682B9F30-7DDC-4A9D-886E-5454D5F45665@me.com>
[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 25143 bytes --]
Hi everyone,
We've been hard at work updating the spec to include features that were requested. We've removed the Scrypt dependency that was present in the initial drafts, added new KDFs, added plausible deniability and have a reference implementation.
Kind regards,
Jean-Paul Kogelman
---
Recent changes:
15-02-2014 - Updated wording of various parts.
06-02-2014 - Added Will Yager's implementation as reference.
05-02-2014 - Changed prefix to 2 bytes, 'RK' and 'rk' for clear version and encrypted version respectively.
05-02-2014 - Added entropy field to encrypted version, moved KDF field from prefix into entropy field.
05-02-2014 - Changed computation of H to use PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 instead of Scrypt.
05-02-2014 - Changed checksum field to bloom field in encrypted version. Now supports 2 passwords.
27-12-2013 - Added some clarifications such as password character set (UTF-8) and endianness of fields.
26-12-2013 - Changed checksum to double SHA256 of private key, added 3rd party KDF support.
01-10-2013 - Expanded the salt to be prefix + date + checksum and renamed 'master seed' to 'root key'.
24-07-2013 - Added user selectable KDF + parameters, encoded in the prefix.
22-07-2013 - Added 2 byte creation date field, as a result, the prefix is expanded to 3 bytes.
BIP:
Title: Base58 encoded HD Wallet root key with optional encryption
Author: Jean-Paul Kogelman
Status: Draft
Type: Informational
Created: 18-07-2013
Abstract
This proposal describes a method for encoding and optionally encrypting a Bitcoin Hierarchical Deterministic (HD) Wallet root key. Encoded root keys are intended for use on paper wallets. Each string contains all the information needed to verify and reconstitute an HD wallet except for the optional passphrases. The encrypted version uses salting and a user selectable key derivation function (KDF) + parameters to resist brute-force attacks at varying degrees and optionally a second password for plausible deniability.
The method provides two encoding methodologies in 3 lengths each (16, 32 and 64 byte root keys). One is a clear version of the root key with verification information for integrity checking and the other is an encrypted representation.
Additionally a 2 byte compressed date field is present to limit the block chain rescan on wallet import.
Motivation
The extended private keys proposed in BIP 0032 are long, fixed length records and don't offer any form of security. The root key used to generate the HD wallet is typically shorter than the extended master private key that results from it.
A compact representation of the root key is easier to handle and a 2-factor version of the root key record allows for safe storage and the creation of paper wallets by 3rd parties. The KDF and its parameters are user selectable, allowing for a varying level of resistance against brute force attacks. This proposal currently defines 5 sets of parameters with room for 27 more that can be defined at a later date. Implementors are advised to contact the author with new KDF proposals.
Copyright
This proposal is hereby placed in the public domain.
Rationale
User story: As a Bitcoin user who uses HD wallets, I would like the ability to store my wallet root key in a compact form as a paper wallet.
User story: As a Bitcoin user who uses HD wallets, I would like the ability to have a 3rd party create a paper wallet with my root key in it, without having access to the funds stored in the wallet.
User story: As a Bitcoin user who uses HD wallets, I would like the ability to choose the strength of the root key depending on my security requirements and how I wish to store it.
User story: As a Bitcoin user who uses HD wallets, I would like the ability to import a root key into a simplified payment verification (SPV) client without having to redownload the entire block chain, but rater a limited range, to find associated transactions.
User story: As a Bitcoin user who uses HD wallets, I would like to choose the KDF and its parameters that is used to hash the passphrase that protects my root key to fit my security needs and available processing power.
User story: As a Bitcoin user who uses HD wallets, I would like to outsource the KDF computation to a 3rd party with more processing power.
User story: As a Bitcoin user who uses HD wallets, I would like to have a second password that can decrypt a second root key.
Specification
This proposal makes use of the following functions and definitions:
All input/output text is to be UTF-8 encoded
AES256Encrypt, AES256Decrypt: The AES block cipher, applied in ECB mode.
SHA256, SHA512: The hash algorithms of the same name.
HMAC-SHA512: The HMAC message authentication code algorithm, using SHA512 as the hash function
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512: The PBKDF2 key derivation algorithm, described in PKCS #5 v2.0 and RFC 2898, using HMAC-SHA512 as the pseudorandom function
Scrypt: The key stretching algorithm of the same name
Base58Check: The textual data encoding frequently used by various Bitcoin-related systems
"Root Key": The 16/32/64 byte value encoded in the wallet. This value is used to derive the private keys for addresses in the Bitcoin Wallet
"Master Key": The primary Bitcoin private key, which is derived from the Root Key
"||" refers to concatenation, not the logical OR operation
"G", "N": Constants defined as part of the secp256k1 elliptic curve. G is an elliptic curve point, and N is a large positive integer.
Prefix
The Base58Check representation of the wallet will start with "RK" (Root Key) if the wallet is unencrypted, and will start with "rk" if the wallet is encrypted.
Proposed specification
Unencrypted wallet:
Prefixes:
0x28C1: 16 byte root key, no encryption. 24 byte total length
0x4AC5: 32 byte root key, no encryption. 40 byte total length
0xFBB3: 64 byte root key, no encryption. 72 byte total length
These are constant bytes that appear at the beginning of the Base58Check-encoded record, and their presence causes the resulting string to have a predictable prefix.
"date" is a 2-byte, little endian field containing the number of weeks since jan 1st 2013. It is used to optimize blockchain scan upon wallet import.
"checksum" is the first 4 bytes of SHA256(SHA256(master_secret)), where master_secret is the "Master Secret Key (IL)" from the BIP32 specification. In other words, "checksum"=SHA256(SHA256(HMAC-SHA512("Bitcoin seed", root_key)[0:32]))[0:4].
"root_key" is the 16/32/64 byte root key used for the HD wallet
In summary, the clear wallet looks like this:
[prefix, 2 bytes][date, 2 bytes][checksum, 4 bytes][root_key, 16/32/64 bytes]
Range in Base58Check encoding for clear 16 byte root key (prefix RK):
Minimum value: RK52zvuD3xRhwto8JDTonxhru6awsFfNqKCTmT (based on 0x28 0xC1 plus twenty-two 0x00's)
Maximum value: RKCsfF9RpLnrxo1kp2o7mfWYeAV1NNYxWSMRym (based on 0x28 0xC1 plus twenty-two 0xFF's)
Range in Base58Check encoding for clear 32 byte root key (prefix RK):
Minimum value: RK15fXAj9BEMooghtx2gY5YrSh23LYKS8mZnaz8oYf1EDnqAwtAADGMVUDHG (based on 0x4A 0xC5 plus thirty-eight 0x00's)
Maximum value: RK5MUEoFU24QARcsX5HR2ieCjem468hDeQm4J2aH5zsCVJXUCGn6nsVQEFhN (based on 0x4A 0xC5 plus thirty-eight 0xFF's)
Range in Base58Check encoding for clear 64 byte root key (prefix RK):
Minimum value: RK1uXsCQAKqaa2s7YBDeaLS2KTqZcNjjQSgdSfDv4fqGkTw8KBfZ2ND4Cp7vHdzhjJ2C2Jtf4CwgScRnXvpzuQT2W4Vj2SgCyfBgpTzF (based on 0xFB 0xB3 plus seventy 0x00's)
Maximum value: RK3B9TMn55dey3an1oHpwB81FPZboakivYtqFvCaeknPzPK4iTvoFKzxVWKcD9YfJwjkyS36bqnSqjibUurcQ7J2EsQww5zPpJNzqjkw (based on 0xFB 0xB3 plus seventy 0xFF's)
Encrypted wallet:
Prefixes:
0xF83F: 16 byte root key, encrypted. 26 byte total length
0x6731: 32 byte root key, encrypted. 43 byte total length
0x4EB4: 64 byte root key, encrypted. 76 byte total length
These are constant bytes that appear at the beginning of the Base58Check-encoded record, and their presence causes the resulting string to have a predictable prefix.
"date" is a 2-byte, little endian field containing the number of weeks since jan 1st 2013. It is used to optimize blockchain scan upon wallet import. The maximum value of 0xFFFF results in: jan 1st 3269
"entropy" is a 2/3/4 byte (corresponding to whether the key is 16/32/64 bytes) field. The first five bits contain the KDF type, and all other bits contain random data. This is used as a salt to make cracking the wallet password harder.
"bloom_filter" is a 4 byte little-endian field containing a bloom filter to check that the user entered their password correctly.
"encrypted_root_key" is the 16/32/64 byte encrypted root key used for the HD wallet
In summary, the encrypted wallet looks like this:
[prefix, 2 bytes][date, 2 bytes][entropy, 2/3/4 bytes][bloom_filter, 4 bytes][encrypted_root_key, 16/32/64 bytes]
Range in Base58Check encoding for encrypted 16 byte root key (prefix rk):
Minimum value: rk2V4R2ys91WigNPL5nots6a97rfMnwTkPAb2XgNo (based on 0xF8 0x3F plus twenty-four 0x00's)
Maximum value: rk57mv9oertBLsHfncAvqnbetCBdNS1gFHQaFsD3p (based on 0xF8 0x3F plus twenty-four 0xFF's)
Range in Base58Check encoding for encrypted 32 byte root key (prefix rk):
Minimum value: rk1CYsqKjsbXa7uvncEaW4XSeVzcpq1U9yDMxd2cWwfkGf1FMjENaVThYpLRNwqo (based on 0x67 0x31 plus fourty-one 0x00's)
Maximum value: rk7Xw5b6fidaCk489LhaiMqHkZo7RYGTmzvJY9A5joxe8KXAn8BC66cmQPYYYvy8 (based on 0x67 0x31 plus fourty-one 0xFF's)
Range in Base58Check encoding for encrypted 64 byte root key (prefix rk):
Minimum value: rk48BmQWeQbATSXbP5U6XVsXRJTs4Ea1TVZBbHLPPsboCFyxDj2Jaz2JAJno97hq6dq2bANLuWydY8QSZgKVGhPRZazXt1swPXwzVLw1QnVAz (based on 0x4E 0xB4 plus seventy-four 0x00's)
Maximum value: rkCRtT9R9kuAapCaLQFif5uo8gUrjgKsvYmGGTpX2ZTjTfwe9M7A6KezTh7f4FDxfZFVbHypodMNnNdmWYb8mzTokHXVR1u7KicrLLFFu7GJW (based on 0x4E 0xB4 plus seventy-four 0xFF's)
Encoding of KDF + parameters:
A number of KDF functions are available, to accommodate a wide range of possible use cases. The KDFs are defined as follows:
ID KDF Parameters
0x00 scrypt n = 2^14, r = 8, p = 8
0x01 scrypt n = 2^16, r = 16, p = 16
0x02 scrypt n = 2^18, r = 16, p = 16
0x08 PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 iterations = 216
0x09 PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 iterations = 221
All other possible values (3-7 and 10-31) are reserved.
Please note that KDFs 1 and 2 will probably not run on mobile devices. KDFs 8 and 9 are very memory efficient.
Generation of date:
The purpose of the date field is to make scanning the blockchain for transactions to/from this wallet faster. The date *must* be on or before the date of the first transaction to/from the wallet. If the date is unknown (e.g. on an embedded device) or the user does not wish to reveal the wallet creation date, this field can be set to zero (which may incur a performance penalty for the wallet software). When importing, it is advised to start scanning from a few days before the encoded date. The date field is a little-endian integer containing the number of weeks, rounded down, since Jan 1st 2013.
Examples:
sep 18th 2013 - jan 1st 2013 = 260 days = 37 weeks 1 day = rounded down becomes 0x0025
mar 3rd 2027 - jan 1st 2013 = 5174 days = 739 weeks 1 day = rounded down becomes 0x02E3
Derivation of Master Key from Root Key (please see BIP 0032 for a full description of HD wallets):
1. Take 16/32/64 byte Root Key. Call it S
2. Calculate I = HMAC-SHA512(key = "Bitcoin seed", msg = S)
3. Let IL = I[0:32]. IL is the Master Key
4. If IL is 0 or IL >= N, where N is the curve order of Secp256k1 (the elliptic curve used by Bitcoin), the Root Key is invalid and a new one should be chosen.
Encryption:
Let "passphrase" be the user's chosen passphrase
Let "fake_passphrase" be the user's chosen second passphrase, or a randomly generated string if the user chose not to use a second passphrase
Let "KDF" be the chosen key derivation function
Let "root_key" be the 16/32/64 byte Root Key
1. Create the correct "Prefix" and "Date" field
2. Create the random "Entropy" field and encode the KDF number in the top 5 bits
3. Let "salt" = Prefix || Date || Entropy
4. Calculate "preH" = HMAC-SHA512(key = salt, msg = passphrase)
5. Calculate "strongH" = KDF(msg = preH, salt = preH, output_len = 64) This step can be outsourced to a 3rd party, if desired.
6. Calculate "postH" = HMAC-SHA512(key = passphrase, msg = salt)
7. Calculate "H" = PBKDF-HMAC-SHA512(msg = postH, salt = strongH, iterations = 210, output_len = len(root_key) + 32)
8. Calculate "whitened_key" = root_key XOR H[0:len(root_key)]
9. Calculate "encrypted_key" = AES256Encrypt(message = whitened_key, key = HR), where HR is the last 32 bytes of H
10. Calculate "fake_key" by decrypting encrypted_key with fake_passphrase
11. Calculate "bloom_filter", containing root_key and fake_key. See the "Bloom Filter" section for more info.
encrypted_wallet = Prefix || Date || Entropy || bloom_filter || encrypted_key
Decryption of Root Key:
Let "passphrase" be the passphrase provided by the user
1. Extract "Prefix", "Date", "Entropy", "bloom_filter", and "encrypted_key" from the encrypted wallet
2. Determine the correct KDF from the top 5 bits of Entropy.
3. Let "salt" = Prefix || Date || Entropy
4. Perform steps 4 through 7 of Encryption to derive "H"
5. Calculate "whitened_key" = AES256Decrypt(message = encrypted_key, key = HR), where HR is the last 32 bytes of H
6. Calculate "root_key" = whitened_key XOR H[0:len(whitened_key)]
7. Verify that root_key is a member of bloom_filter
Bloom Filter:
The Bloom Filter is a data structure that allows us to check, within a range of probability, whether or not some piece of data has been added to it. In this case, we want to make sure that the user entered their password correctly, so we're checking that the decrypted root_key corresponds to the one that was added to the bloom filter when the wallet was created.
Bloom Filter Creation:
1. Let "bloom_filter" be an empty (set to all zeros) 32-bit, little-endian integer
2. To add an element "X" to bloom_filter,
3. Calculate "E" = SHA256(SHA256(HMAC-SHA512("Bitcoin seed", X)[0:32]))[0:11]. Note, this corresponds to the same algorithm used as a checksum for un-encrypted wallets. It also corresponds to the double-SHA of the Master Key.
4. For each of the 11 bytes in E (call each byte "B"):
4a. calculate "N" = B & 0x1F. N will range from 0 to 31. Set the Nth bit in bloom_filter to 1
You can add more items to the bloom filter, if desired. However, the filter parameters are optimized for 2 items (one "real" password/wallet, and one "fake" password/wallet). Please note that adding more items will drastically increase the chance of a false positive when entering a password. The chance of a password similar to a correct password passing the filter becomes more likely. This will generate a different Root Key and not the original one the user intended to decrypt.
Bloom Filter Verification:
Let "X" be some item
Let "bloom_filter" be the Bloom Filter you want to check if X belongs to
1. Calculate "x_only_filter", which is a Bloom Filter with X added to it
2. Ensure that any bit that is set in x_only_filter is also set in bloom_filter (i.e. x_only_filter & bloom_filter == x_only_filter)
3. If all bits set in x_only_filter are also set in bloom_filter, you know X is probably a member of bloom_filter. If not, X is definitely *not* a member of bloom_filter.
Suggestions for implementers of proposal with alt-chains
This proposal is network and coin agnostic (so long as the coin in question uses SECP256K1 ECC). Alt-coin implementors are advised to change the prefixes so that encoded root keys do not start with “RK" or “rk”.
Reference implementation
Python reference implementation: https://github.com/wyager/Encrypted-HD-wallet
Acknowledgements
Will Yager for the Python reference implementation and rewording of parts of this specification.
Mike Caldwell for BIP 0038, which this proposal borrows heavily from.
See Also
BIP 0032 Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/BIP_0032
BIP 0038 Passphrase-protected private key: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/BIP_0038
Test vectors
The primary password will always decrypt the same root key, regardless of KDF selection, however, the secondary password will generate a different root key for every KDF.
Test 1:
Root Key 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
Creation 04-02-2014
Clear RK6nEaou4eFQC4SfrHtdh9jpnEme4K9dt2jBmG
Password Satoshi
Public Address 15mKKb2eos1hWa6tisdPwwDC1a5J1y9nma
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K3QTDL4LXw2F7HEK3wJUD2nW2nRk4stbPy6cq3jPPqjiChkVvvNKmPGJxWUtg6LnF5kejMRNNU3TGtRBeJgk33yuGBxrMPHi
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcFtXgS5sYJABqqG9YLmC4Q1Rdap9gSE8NqtwybGhePY2gZ29ESFjqJoCu1Rupje8YtGqsefD265TMg7usUDFdp6W1EGMcet8
Second password Alpaca
Encrypted (KDF0) rk354bXH1JsXTwWmuvRskFWoeUX8hMjQiseNM7wj6
Public Address 1Ndr6DnQm5EefVhTdKjXC3vH5qGRa1FCng
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K3TxQaa6hd8mPR9Bw2ue1H5TMjUYuUEPEDUTxK7PZ191poMob8zbU5hsckCQoBFYtQZzbgxtYz1acbLmFQtjcbWSYhQ7kSZE
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcFx2sgbdhzGi7yB2RSNMreJNxXrxX2ZvD6Go6rehoYwLJecVAuhHhMPSuMStnLHbzQ4CCyPqbVyLP4F2SmiLTcE3oicmA81M
Encrypted (KDF1) rk354bq4dXW8VB67XSZzQdVLFJFz64v1Dh1i12VTY
Public Address 12cbi9vTjpZ8RjinLc2fJp1iDkL96xMQoe
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K4JxBYKwi5dGE59G4vtRGLiyinEPxMdgYdPe6UqMrgJneacME8JQuoskvEzEZ1vnHwW8i1h4Mwm5wj5BUPJWf764QfkkvFAQ
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcGo2eeMUiSmCxdB6ZLM97hwuKacoZuyDXWByF2Ng7E778RrYidat9n9Ht5cYrdS4gwVBA2g8VHAro7b4Gbvo2NKTLP9STuvP
Encrypted (KDF8) rk354dUN5yrKvrMQRneKJvdJFf77WDJw5ZfeeRt4H
Public Address 14z6Vm4TRxd9ueasFahwBxYJ8jfhwhX4bt
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K2AaodGyHvDBQFrFcDdHVJj15zqJUkU1wuLS5kFxgE9rGBvh8rAUeenfhhwC91efxn8kHbhKGeTaQkkyGFvbKiAuLcx8t8qP
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcEefGjJWJHM88ot66d61LfwvgoDi6JoYvn8mEHoGvmxAk3DfcWWuDBqMUmPoXA28pa2uMnQFxKQe21Df5uQAGADCpcdZHAGe
Encrypted (KDF9) rk354dedikaytYJ7D4btpcVfGuakfixf5yj2SnTcX
Public Address 17tzY2huzjbcRNV7e7BshxQ8UPrZhznBgn
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K3Xt1wRGXFZ6D76dGLyGTWxvPv1QhkRcyPCbi6kM7WJG9dH6X9UMmzoTwoix3BsnzKf7ZkkpinPw8hyGaNLWzmcbemJVUWTj
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcG1xV3SoXch2wf8TkkRzJtBqziPpKJm9xFzvreHfN46adUXfeFiVokTrKsBvK3zBgDJcUThjDtXAZ2dw9SYg74YMFjENB4aa
Test 2:
Root Key 7f0ad7d595be13e6fe4cf1fa0fbb6ae9c26c5d9b09920709414982b6363d5844
Creation 04-02-2014
Clear RK22qqMb3CozsQfTTbSVsLEgXcjekut99SuSHn6urU4vWxjiQneHWVYabWgv
Password Nakamoto
Public Address 1A54ECavJaJAoLGqqNrPd9Y3cvSvkL2Roz
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K3f9hMVvcbY4EX4CfxsEtc6C5BMkZtgGpTGpxAscoq7SLSAcL6k5dxaZ9s4SChrtfSFoKpijuwAnhuPn76eva6W8bDr118t3
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcG9EATXTcxfzy563ANKxjyK7fykABT1ooL5A6iQw4NukpHShDxYgeso4NHscFmqcVEtdUt61c8RCf7FqXK9z6sgfkQvYBQPP
Second password hunter2
Encrypted (KDF0) rk2cMHki73WbrYgo7XK9kSr6CGBPsMjU3uZf3f3qxCv4QoGy63DkBoGJKhPdvUtp
Public Address 16UCUo31Y7qDMWSs68FBAW759X4K3PZ9kN
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K2dojoDyxmK7SLnyqSvn56oysqu2Ctf24Rdux6JFLReRgcH5KAM1GxCTVxjpc13Mh18kSmYqUep5EkbDvQJfEEVeLZXhyuYj
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcF7tCuFWy8T4AtppKrPVvU2uUeHRpSzZ3JSF6dqZaySkATZEZWFcAMxqhD7oTdcaufofFy1WGLF7U21rztvTv6qmGrPq7s2W
Encrypted (KDF1) rk2cMJ1KizRTPbBv8zaECpcQEY66SiZcfM2yAuCpdjDbJsdgZu9xdoFDpGuTVRYe
Public Address 15PXuaVAiU2fEEAsUjxWYHtzoM4D6FaC5F
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K35ajB7SFjQJAzrmGbAJyp7iBYxhB3DcY9CC8XW5GkAHXDe2HXG6hUS3iquPbGAPuZygXm43BgYamWxiDN5sFm7w12db4uvU
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcFZfCH8yG6YEuYtbkzd2qBLdnMM6nbZ9X1zXH53PXHxc14vcMHtfJRGTZVgj2gz8sc6sUuYoFub9HaBzkfaxguH4Byqo9NhK
Encrypted (KDF8) rk2cMNSiQsAATQ19Y12nhGuL2uksZVASxNXAdjqrU3KaVcLH71No442sH1YvcwDL
Public Address 13jQ3pnGznGNTC2LVxJz1m27opav8WPVvH
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K3aA9djUAAX1ASAcdqtuHEXmypDNd8gNy5PH4nm7y4QrieVdw7iQgA46LCJJAxdcN4qrP87Tp8XzJQbw7aeH3LPK8G7Zj6YT
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcG4Ecjm1AXewtzCT8FMd8bkhacbnEh1uwxBcDLJSDcDBCVnvvrsENPhxpCZ3FYVokSvwfJJFVU9KF3ctQQJp229pgcFLavKJ
Encrypted (KDF9) rk2cMPALytexkDuxm6QREojvgzoKcgKNeURPXDTVzPdZmbfzM2R3RX75Qqu4Yk5r
Public Address 1NBQsYC1vhfbkEoiPWmUb1QN36cCsMxcti
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K4X6wJWAQbDawhqb2DaQT7mjbPhqNBHmspzrD1J5kcnb5syHr9LQggN3PtmvkjbMVs4zgTyjWmqKS4ix7J92z59cvbkF5W1s
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcH1BQQXhQxMXgFsRWd38JUzfCC6EyjdJrhoBMYqQ1AauZjGev413kscEPLn4s3XmiDoL1pevGUKACx5ZhhPHvujKaVpe5TRt
Test 3:
Root Key fffcf9f6f3f0edeae7e4e1dedbd8d5d2cfccc9c6c3c0bdbab7b4b1aeaba8a5a29f9c999693908d8 a8784817e7b7875726f6c696663605d5a5754514e4b484542
Creation 04-02-2014
Clear RK2BvY13FUD6bX25tA7XDyfAn7zbXSL8pR6TRE3EHZZ8qBm9qEyZRih8x1XhhcZwjcTfpe1Qjydn4KU dia8Wf1NshUusP1D38i88MLU9
Password Vires In Numeris
Public Address 1JEoxevbLLG8cVqeoGKQiAwoWbNYSUyYjg
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K31xYSDQpPDxsXRTUcvj2iNHm5NUtrGiGG5e2DtALGdso3pGz6ssrdK4PFmM8NSpSBHNqPqm55Qn3LqFtT2emdEXVYsCzC2U
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcFW31YEwpkMuc5THy2PSt5bDMsktWQcFF8syAmRUapSCGu8ED9W6oDMSgv6Zz8idoc4a6mr8BDzTJY47LJhkJ8UB7WEGuduB
Second password Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
Encrypted (KDF0) rk5ySVmNtFzgWZFXAehk6Akvf5PanApA5Y12arynxXZF7Lhc1YqaudukJFngEBXkpc4RGqqkM3ZW4RjE7HwhWTB5Uxi7pXy7vuKouQuZZzoTP
Public Address 1AbB8okTm3SgcHnqKskQFfBd1MndDq1G75
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K4PUz4iSDMmUE9uovNGnZE6jZdKPDqozk8nBHBk3FRXo3tJEt4TFfo7Tkhnc9TAzUFvg7hsg7M1SddHF6nX9bBw9Tn968Aki
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcGsZTAjyDiuQxhweQmjWQbKfARhnqQ9Xj1aWRjHMVyL7XjaDV9SNrb7S8YvGtTGUkrRLS3kTDbRKRq26khyJDyKDuquaBqRM
Encrypted (KDF1) rk5ySWZriEipJWKyL6X8Rd86cgKn9qgGC7C4QYLVCjhyuBZiKXezzf6vjyJBXtFmP1f4qzaAAP5baRhKP4yCGo6LAU9keJCvRXoU77SUNmg1o
Public Address 1Fzh1NoMtYUBAoKQ2Lsb6rA81bKFfNx2az
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K4KmLN9WLjPsVmKgVXPUfAScqkGeifQpTeXFw2X4ijfWNMDMtu4qfbbHZ69VSLcCMiGLHSLaQQY7Rb3PzHMRLLqVN6mjrGHP
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcGoqoUB3M6XpEKMWyvrCWXfYSYf4LDkMSXKb5a4NyHTprCW3JAJ66rn947iM9iyzUoS4CSXhsDZyuaks5hueT9wtDSdm91ga
Encrypted (KDF8) rk5ySbwggFoh8MZ1CnxqSeKwzag9ifrECtToowiRYKRgcueyMGX39yBGwxbY7ExKeTSmCRHokToThN8pxYWA9WQKrouVuatCMjcvX8PZ16tPf
Public Address 1AiALvRHrWwjViJn5Q6oki4qVZ5p7SepfB
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K3CHptaD7aNZBUAYhjmCe5ceDLttwqKoQ3F73DRHNrSAVphAX2okZDWK82Eznf4bpmv9qjHZ7nzQjv2qNqXV8YwCWQEw2jiA
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcFgNHzbk7wWVv2CPC9DvVSqZp9HJZPfLNv3SBkxbdQEUyfwf9rtzBwBvKTV2WDejdPupDmihidJmDTTgXpar3r48kNiGhEzC
Encrypted (KDF9) rk5ySd2iHrVJ1CZ86Pyt6zerNzzBHfZo2rcBAX4MKNzX7doCZnNpBMc3pPf6igTCnk796isqtaEdcfagrN8Pced9VAtENVBtpugBLnjiGd28h
Public Address 1Gazv3FH8oDxUUzgrRmWL14X3oBY5myDdQ
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K3YMD7T6LoFVGttrMKj9jxGAxfCv3pv6ZQfWcuBV5pqdcjyooGrqa8NeraYUuiTWJSWuz4fVMiCuEK8tWggZ6yMZZK7xLBkx
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcG2RgDUdMAPS1SvgqjBsbKV6ZTbKfPFdYHTqmSioLNdx6bH6v4uA4MWygDxbDDbVGPCurrTm5RwMnh14jEaswhA6nFK1bFd2
Test 4:
Root Key 6ca4a27ac660c683340f59353b1375a9
Creation 04-02-2014
Clear RK6nEmXZj2nqgtCVWk3s7Suvz2XtWrdhDPpJqS
Password 聡中本
Public Address 1JVncPbsdB2s4zHim3VdAWNkZ8JANBZ1U9
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K3mJ4upPSDfXdA34yNjem6PSsXT63vm8dq8ikUJv4iiTD3PrSKtdGZXFVD689z5T7knXo55BjcHS2WL3Syp2DbGgnbgxw2QA
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcGFNY1qvSaoUMi4uTnCNcTcNUKqVfV6fchw3u1rEKGWmgtfUMRKLgUHNZ7dfsh8Ys6SLwUojZqScFBQL3dFGF3QywNLJVZ2o
Second password Bitcoin
Encrypted (KDF0) rk354bYQBax15mmBSLTpaVuLRb9nDuaVbEseqBWpG
Public Address 1AGXnLksHQgovEyQvj8kY9QtFV2x8D1Nm
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K3BMoPfivq74do9mxCnKRTZHWScTvVyrxGtCNvGd8bCZJk1Npwnds3ghiy4TTwmwtbSkpzTFcqLup57AWqm3NvRr6sNs7ZVt
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcFfSGVhFwCF1NMBcScF3GpnD7EzsY4KPw9gXXTowP8zsnbJTDhU9o9Sj9M63Qx6bZhZ7gS6AzNjNehPUbqdhc6th1VA1FGVg
Encrypted (KDF1) rk354bi6JiGeb5suvydsNtTosocEbpWcjoK7VL9Xv
Public Address 1DkoSDVN7aYZnGe3wUCXAjqc3cXT9oiHhG
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K2Su2mQR7u6pweA8kwv4y3bKkvUeJUanC4eT7VVp64VxNH5uzwY12wE315rZMMf5XJQLcNLPBF7zcgoFv29UM3R9ctDqdshr
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcEvyVsRx8GEmgCByFMNnpQpFMis3v2vKAwSnG338LcJGr8NDyhCcF7QV65cmybwrhCkYre87pkG3NCpckbc2itaJknWnwGGX
Encrypted (KDF8) rk354dLtDHN3mPNSFABTNrhKmweKPZ55LJ31EM3k6
Public Address 1QShZTrKPJPBcstuYX5JKRHPs1HUtD7y8
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K43FPi9awkCScXaAY4mEJje4PhS5uk2R67QU6p7bHXbvwgRdcwU9xZozYZ9hqfjm6ccAbGgU5eN4fp7uMY59MGq8swJVQPKW
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcGXKrpB7x7LPM5c12UDxA6ryzVpVXJMx4zCoFMeuY5QFRXfg1tnVaP3Fv1tmhoV8jrRG29Gip9FwW7j3vGLNneaMepS1QuHP
Encrypted (KDF9) rk354diEYQb4EdNjyosAZGNAB8L1spefWdz7RmZfX
Public Address 1NLVhK8AQn7p2edvTtFJgTz6itrBeHZ4Wa
Private extended key xprv9s21ZrQH143K2stwSFWe4rPabNH1k1EVwQKwr7poayVZNPJup716aWVjDBVRVRh8gSgZhTP4uiaNuCkFbXXJCbDSnmvwNbnCuvQqHDDj7Ew
Public extended key xpub661MyMwAqRbcFMyQYH3eRzLK9Q7W9TxMJdFYeWER9K2YFBe4MeKM8JpD4RrrKNRrTMT9T7FvDbvWhzAXT68HxuyZGJ9BkC6G3ZiMjj1UT76
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-03-12 3:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <op.w0hd2nthyldrnw@laptop-air>
2013-07-19 18:15 ` [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Proposal: Base58 encoded HD Wallet master seed " Jean-Paul Kogelman
2013-07-22 13:14 ` Mike Hearn
2013-07-22 14:33 ` Jean-Paul Kogelman
2013-07-22 21:37 ` Jean-Paul Kogelman
2013-11-16 2:47 ` Gregory Maxwell
2013-11-16 3:09 ` Jean-Paul Kogelman
2013-12-26 11:48 ` Jean-Paul Kogelman
2014-03-12 3:17 ` Jean-Paul Kogelman [this message]
2014-03-12 13:11 ` [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Proposal: Base58 encoded HD Wallet root key " Pavol Rusnak
2014-03-12 15:45 ` Jean-Paul Kogelman
2014-03-12 15:55 ` Pavol Rusnak
2014-03-12 16:49 ` Gary Rowe
2014-03-12 18:00 ` William Yager
2014-03-12 19:35 ` Jean-Paul Kogelman
2014-03-12 19:41 ` Gary Rowe
2014-03-12 19:26 ` Jean-Paul Kogelman
2014-03-12 19:39 ` Pavol Rusnak
2014-03-12 19:55 ` William Yager
2014-03-12 20:04 ` Pavol Rusnak
2014-03-12 20:10 ` William Yager
2014-03-12 20:24 ` Pavol Rusnak
2014-03-12 20:37 ` William Yager
2014-03-12 20:42 ` Pavol Rusnak
2014-03-12 20:49 ` William Yager
2014-03-12 21:08 ` Jean-Paul Kogelman
2014-03-12 21:15 ` William Yager
2014-04-22 0:05 William Yager
2014-04-24 19:39 ` William Yager
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