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From: "Jonathan Toomim (Toomim Bros)" <j@toom•im>
To: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian•com.au>
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Let's deploy BIP65 CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY!
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2015 08:46:08 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <A763EBF7-4FA5-4FE4-9595-01317B264B0A@toom.im> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20151007150014.GA21849@navy>


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On Oct 7, 2015, at 8:00 AM, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> *But* a soft fork that only forbids transactions that would previously
> not have been mined anyway should be the best of both worlds, as it
> automatically reduces the liklihood of old miners building newly invalid
> blocks to a vanishingly small probability; which means that upgraded
> bitcoin nodes, non-upgraded bitcoin nodes, /and/ SPV clients *all*
> continuing to work fine during the upgrade.

I agree with pretty much everything you wrote except the above paragraph.

An attacker can create a transaction that would be valid if it were an OP_NOP, but not valid if it were any more restrictive transaction. For example, an attacker might send 1 BTC to an address with  . An old node would consider that OP_CLTV to be OP_NOP, so no signature is necessary for old nodes. Then the attacker buys something from a merchant running old node code or an SPV client, and spends the 1 BTC in that address in a way that is invalid according to OP_CLTV but valid according to OP_NOP, and includes a hefty fee. A miner on the old version includes this transaction into a block, thereby making the block invalid according to the new rules, and rejected by new-client miners. The merchant sees the 1-conf, and maybe even 2-conf, rejoices, and ships. The attacker then has until the OP_CLTV matures to double-spend the coin with new nodes using a valid signature.

Basically, it's trivial to create transactions that exploit the difference in validation rules as long as miners are still on the old version to mine them. Transactions can be created that are guaranteed to be orphaned and trivially double-spendable. Attackers never have to risk actual losses. This can be done as long as miners continue to mine old-version blocks, regardless of their frequency.

Those of you who know Script better than me: would this be an example of a transaction that would be spendable with a valid sig XOR with (far future date OR old code)?

OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <pubkeyhash> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY OP_PUSHDATA <locktime far in the future> OP_CLTV

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  reply	other threads:[~2015-10-07 15:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-09-27 18:50 Peter Todd
2015-09-27 20:26 ` jl2012
2015-09-27 20:27   ` Peter Todd
2015-09-27 20:27 ` Mark Friedenbach
2015-09-27 20:41 ` Btc Drak
2015-09-28 10:10 ` s7r
2015-09-28 10:48 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 11:00   ` Adam Back
2015-09-28 11:40     ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 12:20       ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-09-28 12:26         ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 12:44           ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-09-28 12:54             ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-29  6:17               ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-09-29 12:02                 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 14:05       ` Btc Drak
2015-09-28 14:17         ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 21:12     ` odinn
2015-09-28 22:16       ` Dave Scotese
2015-09-28 11:04   ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-09-28 12:47   ` Tier Nolan
2015-09-28 13:01   ` Gavin Andresen
2015-09-28 13:28     ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 13:43       ` Gavin Andresen
2015-09-28 14:14         ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 13:21   ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 13:41     ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 14:29       ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 14:33         ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 14:43           ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 14:51             ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 15:05               ` Peter Todd
2015-09-28 15:38                 ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 16:52                   ` jl2012
2015-09-28 17:14                     ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-28 23:17                       ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-29 12:07                         ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-29 15:09                           ` [bitcoin-dev] Why soft-forks? was: " Santino Napolitano
2015-09-29 13:30             ` [bitcoin-dev] " Jonathan Toomim (Toomim Bros)
2015-09-29 15:59               ` jl2012
2015-09-29 19:54                 ` odinn
2015-09-29 18:31   ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-09-30 17:11     ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 17:58       ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-01 14:23         ` Tom Harding
2015-09-30 18:15       ` Adam Back
2015-09-30 19:26       ` Jeff Garzik
2015-09-30 19:56         ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 20:37           ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-30 21:06             ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 22:14               ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-01  0:11                 ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-30 22:17           ` Jeff Garzik
2015-09-30 23:25             ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-09-30 20:15       ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-09-30 21:01         ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 22:59           ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-10-01  4:08           ` [bitcoin-dev] Crossing the line? [Was: Re: Let's deploy BIP65 CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY!] Tao Effect
2015-10-01 16:39             ` Jeff Garzik
2015-10-01 20:17               ` Milly Bitcoin
2015-10-02 12:23               ` Mike Hearn
2015-10-02 13:14                 ` jl2012
2015-10-02 14:10                   ` Marcel Jamin
2015-10-02 16:37                 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-10-07 15:00     ` [bitcoin-dev] Let's deploy BIP65 CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY! Anthony Towns
2015-10-07 15:46       ` Jonathan Toomim (Toomim Bros) [this message]
2015-10-07 16:02         ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-10-07 16:25           ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-10-07 16:26           ` Jonathan Toomim (Toomim Bros)
2015-10-07 16:38         ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-10  7:23       ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-12  7:02       ` digitsu
2015-10-12 16:33         ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-12 17:06         ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-13  0:08           ` digitsu
2015-09-29 20:03 ` Wladimir J. van der Laan
2015-09-30  4:05   ` Rusty Russell
2015-09-30  6:19     ` Adam Back
2015-09-30 12:30       ` Mike Hearn
2015-09-30 15:55         ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-30 19:17           ` John Winslow
2015-10-01  0:06             ` Rusty Russell
2015-09-30 17:14         ` Adam Back
2015-10-01  0:04       ` Rusty Russell
2015-10-02  1:57 NotMike Hearn
2015-10-02  2:12 ` GC
2015-10-05 10:59   ` Mike Hearn
2015-10-05 11:23     ` Jeff Garzik
2015-10-05 11:28       ` Mike Hearn
2015-10-05 12:04         ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 12:08           ` Clément Elbaz
2015-10-05 12:16             ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 12:29               ` Clément Elbaz
2015-10-05 15:42                 ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 12:10           ` Mike Hearn
2015-10-05 15:33             ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 16:46               ` Mike Hearn
2015-10-06  6:20                 ` Anthony Towns
2015-10-07  6:13                 ` Micha Bailey
2015-10-05 13:29   ` Jorge Timón
2015-10-05 13:24 ` Jorge Timón

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