From: Wladimir <laanwj@gmail•com>
To: Chris Beams <chris@beams•io>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] PSA: Please sign your git commits
Date: Wed, 21 May 2014 19:10:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+s+GJC8=OHmmF7fc-fT8fQDWE1uNcCS8-ELEKr0MjQ4CpbPBA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7B48B9D4-5FB0-42CA-A462-C20D3F345A9A@beams.io>
Hello Chris,
On Wed, May 21, 2014 at 6:39 PM, Chris Beams <chris@beams•io> wrote:
> I'm personally happy to comply with this for any future commits, but wonder
> if you've considered the arguments against commit signing [1]? Note
> especially the reference therein to Linus' original negative opinion on
> signed commits [2].
Yes, I've read it. But would his alternative, signing tags, really
help us more here? How would that work? How would we have to structure
the process?
At least signed commits are easy to integrate into the current
development process with github - only a different way of merging has
to be used.
> I came across these when searching for a way to enable signing by default,
> e.g. a `git config` option that might allow for this. Unfortunately, there
> isn't one, meaning it's likely that most folks will forget to do this most
> of the time.
I'll remind people if they forget to do it, but I won't require it. As
you say, that would be an extra barrier, and I'm not suggesting this
because I to see people jumping through bureaucratic hoops.
But it is a pretty simple thing to do...
> If you're really serious about it, you should probably reject pull requests
> without signed commits; otherwise, signing becomes meaningless because only
> honest authors do it, and forgetful or malicious ones can avoid it without
> penalty.
This is not because I'm afraid of malicious authors, but because I
want to reduce the risk that github hacks would pose.
Something to watch for would be authors that normally sign pull
requests/merges and suddenly don't. Someone malicious may have gained
access to their github account. This just adds an extra layer of
protection.
Cheers,
Wladimir
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-05-21 17:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-05-21 12:23 Wladimir
2014-05-21 16:39 ` Chris Beams
2014-05-21 17:10 ` Wladimir [this message]
2014-05-21 20:30 ` Mark Friedenbach
2014-05-21 21:02 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-05-22 18:06 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-05-23 0:25 ` Peter Todd
2014-05-23 7:12 ` Wladimir
2014-05-23 16:38 ` Mark Friedenbach
2014-05-23 16:48 ` Kyle Jerviss
2014-05-23 17:32 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-05-23 10:23 ` Wladimir
2014-06-09 15:34 ` Chris Beams
2014-05-21 20:25 ` David A. Harding
2014-05-22 1:09 ` Chris Beams
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