* [bitcoin-dev] The first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment
@ 2016-02-26 21:42 Gregory Maxwell
2016-02-26 23:06 ` Sergio Demian Lerner
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Gregory Maxwell @ 2016-02-26 21:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bitcoin Dev
I am happy to announce the first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent
Payment (ZKCP) on the Bitcoin network.
ZKCP is a transaction protocol that allows a buyer to purchase
information from a seller using Bitcoin in a manner which is private,
scalable, secure, and which doesn’t require trusting anyone: the
expected information is transferred if and only if the payment is
made. The buyer and seller do not need to trust each other or depend
on arbitration by a third party.
Imagine a movie-style “briefcase swap” (one party with a briefcase
full of cash, another containing secret documents), but without the
potential scenario of one of the cases being filled with shredded
newspaper and the resulting exciting chase scene.
An example application would be the owners of a particular make of
e-book reader cooperating to purchase the DRM master keys from a
failing manufacturer, so that they could load their own documents on
their readers after the vendor’s servers go offline. This type of sale
is inherently irreversible, potentially crosses multiple
jurisdictions, and involves parties whose financial stability is
uncertain–meaning that both parties either take a great deal of risk
or have to make difficult arrangement. Using a ZKCP avoids the
significant transactional costs involved in a sale which can otherwise
easily go wrong.
In today’s transaction I purchased a solution to a 16x16 Sudoku puzzle
for 0.10 BTC from Sean Bowe, a member of the Zcash team, as part of a
demonstration performed live at Financial Cryptography 2016 in
Barbados. I played my part in the transaction remotely from
California.
The transfer involved two transactions:
8e5df5f792ac4e98cca87f10aba7947337684a5a0a7333ab897fb9c9d616ba9e
200554139d1e3fe6e499f6ffb0b6e01e706eb8c897293a7f6a26d25e39623fae
Almost all of the engineering work behind this ZKCP implementation was
done by Sean Bowe, with support from Pieter Wuille, myself, and Madars
Virza.
Read more, including technical details at
https://bitcoincore.org/en/2016/02/26/zero-knowledge-contingent-payments-announcement/
[I hope to have a ZKCP sudoku buying faucet up shortly. :) ]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] The first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment
2016-02-26 21:42 [bitcoin-dev] The first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment Gregory Maxwell
@ 2016-02-26 23:06 ` Sergio Demian Lerner
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgT8RE7w87Yv9Be7arH-xGCtwcq0Ynbk21ZVpqJZrEN5EQ@mail.gmail.com>
2016-02-26 23:33 ` [bitcoin-dev] " Tier Nolan
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sergio Demian Lerner @ 2016-02-26 23:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gregory Maxwell; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev
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Congratulations!
It a property of the SKCP system that the person who performed the trusted
setup cannot extract any information from a proof?
In other words, is it proven hard to obtain information from a proof by the
buyer?
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 6:42 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> I am happy to announce the first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent
> Payment (ZKCP) on the Bitcoin network.
>
> ZKCP is a transaction protocol that allows a buyer to purchase
> information from a seller using Bitcoin in a manner which is private,
> scalable, secure, and which doesn’t require trusting anyone: the
> expected information is transferred if and only if the payment is
> made. The buyer and seller do not need to trust each other or depend
> on arbitration by a third party.
>
> Imagine a movie-style “briefcase swap” (one party with a briefcase
> full of cash, another containing secret documents), but without the
> potential scenario of one of the cases being filled with shredded
> newspaper and the resulting exciting chase scene.
>
> An example application would be the owners of a particular make of
> e-book reader cooperating to purchase the DRM master keys from a
> failing manufacturer, so that they could load their own documents on
> their readers after the vendor’s servers go offline. This type of sale
> is inherently irreversible, potentially crosses multiple
> jurisdictions, and involves parties whose financial stability is
> uncertain–meaning that both parties either take a great deal of risk
> or have to make difficult arrangement. Using a ZKCP avoids the
> significant transactional costs involved in a sale which can otherwise
> easily go wrong.
>
> In today’s transaction I purchased a solution to a 16x16 Sudoku puzzle
> for 0.10 BTC from Sean Bowe, a member of the Zcash team, as part of a
> demonstration performed live at Financial Cryptography 2016 in
> Barbados. I played my part in the transaction remotely from
> California.
>
> The transfer involved two transactions:
>
> 8e5df5f792ac4e98cca87f10aba7947337684a5a0a7333ab897fb9c9d616ba9e
> 200554139d1e3fe6e499f6ffb0b6e01e706eb8c897293a7f6a26d25e39623fae
>
> Almost all of the engineering work behind this ZKCP implementation was
> done by Sean Bowe, with support from Pieter Wuille, myself, and Madars
> Virza.
>
>
> Read more, including technical details at
>
> https://bitcoincore.org/en/2016/02/26/zero-knowledge-contingent-payments-announcement/
>
> [I hope to have a ZKCP sudoku buying faucet up shortly. :) ]
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: The first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgT8RE7w87Yv9Be7arH-xGCtwcq0Ynbk21ZVpqJZrEN5EQ@mail.gmail.com>
@ 2016-02-26 23:23 ` Gregory Maxwell
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Gregory Maxwell @ 2016-02-26 23:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bitcoin Dev
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:06 PM, Sergio Demian Lerner
<sergio.d.lerner@gmail•com> wrote:
> Congratulations!
>
> It a property of the SKCP system that the person who performed the trusted
> setup cannot extract any information from a proof?
>
> In other words, is it proven hard to obtain information from a proof by the
> buyer?
Yes, the secrecy is information theoretic (assuming no implementation
bugs); beyond the truth of the outcome. This holds even if the
initialization is malicious.
The soundness of this scheme is computational-- we're trusting a deep
stack of cryptographic assumptions that the proofs cannot be forged.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] The first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment
2016-02-26 23:06 ` Sergio Demian Lerner
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgT8RE7w87Yv9Be7arH-xGCtwcq0Ynbk21ZVpqJZrEN5EQ@mail.gmail.com>
@ 2016-02-26 23:33 ` Tier Nolan
2016-02-26 23:45 ` Gregory Maxwell
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tier Nolan @ 2016-02-26 23:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: Bitcoin Dev
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That is very interesting.
There has been some recent discussion about atomic cross chain transfers
between Bitcoin and legacy altcoins. For this purpose a legacy altcoin is
one that has strict IsStandard() rules and none of the advanced script
opcodes.
It has a requirement that Bob sends Alice a pair [hash_of_bob_private_key,
bob_public_key]. Bob has to prove that the hash is actually the result of
hashing the private key that matches bob_public_key.
This can be achieved with a cut-and-choose scheme. It uses a fee so that
an attacker loses money on average. It is vulnerable to an attacker who
doesn't mind losing money as long as the target loses money too.
Bob would have to prove that he has an x such that
xG = <bob_public_key>
hash(x) = hash_of_bob_private_key
Is the scheme fast enough such that an elliptic curve multiply would be
feasible? You mention 20 seconds for 5 SHA256 operations, so I am guessing
no?
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:06 PM, Sergio Demian Lerner via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Congratulations!
>
> It a property of the SKCP system that the person who performed the trusted
> setup cannot extract any information from a proof?
>
> In other words, is it proven hard to obtain information from a proof by
> the buyer?
>
> On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 6:42 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> I am happy to announce the first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent
>> Payment (ZKCP) on the Bitcoin network.
>>
>> ZKCP is a transaction protocol that allows a buyer to purchase
>> information from a seller using Bitcoin in a manner which is private,
>> scalable, secure, and which doesn’t require trusting anyone: the
>> expected information is transferred if and only if the payment is
>> made. The buyer and seller do not need to trust each other or depend
>> on arbitration by a third party.
>>
>> Imagine a movie-style “briefcase swap” (one party with a briefcase
>> full of cash, another containing secret documents), but without the
>> potential scenario of one of the cases being filled with shredded
>> newspaper and the resulting exciting chase scene.
>>
>> An example application would be the owners of a particular make of
>> e-book reader cooperating to purchase the DRM master keys from a
>> failing manufacturer, so that they could load their own documents on
>> their readers after the vendor’s servers go offline. This type of sale
>> is inherently irreversible, potentially crosses multiple
>> jurisdictions, and involves parties whose financial stability is
>> uncertain–meaning that both parties either take a great deal of risk
>> or have to make difficult arrangement. Using a ZKCP avoids the
>> significant transactional costs involved in a sale which can otherwise
>> easily go wrong.
>>
>> In today’s transaction I purchased a solution to a 16x16 Sudoku puzzle
>> for 0.10 BTC from Sean Bowe, a member of the Zcash team, as part of a
>> demonstration performed live at Financial Cryptography 2016 in
>> Barbados. I played my part in the transaction remotely from
>> California.
>>
>> The transfer involved two transactions:
>>
>> 8e5df5f792ac4e98cca87f10aba7947337684a5a0a7333ab897fb9c9d616ba9e
>> 200554139d1e3fe6e499f6ffb0b6e01e706eb8c897293a7f6a26d25e39623fae
>>
>> Almost all of the engineering work behind this ZKCP implementation was
>> done by Sean Bowe, with support from Pieter Wuille, myself, and Madars
>> Virza.
>>
>>
>> Read more, including technical details at
>>
>> https://bitcoincore.org/en/2016/02/26/zero-knowledge-contingent-payments-announcement/
>>
>> [I hope to have a ZKCP sudoku buying faucet up shortly. :) ]
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] The first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment
2016-02-26 23:33 ` [bitcoin-dev] " Tier Nolan
@ 2016-02-26 23:45 ` Gregory Maxwell
2016-02-26 23:56 ` Tier Nolan
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Gregory Maxwell @ 2016-02-26 23:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tier Nolan; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:33 PM, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> That is very interesting.
>
> There has been some recent discussion about atomic cross chain transfers
> between Bitcoin and legacy altcoins. For this purpose a legacy altcoin is
> one that has strict IsStandard() rules and none of the advanced script
> opcodes.
One might wonder why anyone would want to own coins that couldn't keep
up technologically, but to each his own. (especially one defunct
enough that it can't even update IsStandard rules...)
I don't think it's infeasible to do the EC multiply in a snark, but an
efficient implementation would be a lot of work. You'd probably want
to build a circuit for the field operations using 128 bit operations.
Fortunately the overall operation is pretty easy to directly convert
into a circuit (e.g. no branching).
Why not use the single-show-signature scheme I came up with a while
back on the Bitcoin side to force the bitcoin side to reveal a private
key?
http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2015-November/000344.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] The first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment
2016-02-26 23:45 ` Gregory Maxwell
@ 2016-02-26 23:56 ` Tier Nolan
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tier Nolan @ 2016-02-26 23:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gregory Maxwell; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 360 bytes --]
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:45 PM, Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph•org> wrote:
> Why not use the single-show-signature scheme I came up with a while
> back on the Bitcoin side to force the bitcoin side to reveal a private
> key?
>
>
> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2015-November/000344.html
>
Thanks for the info, I will give it a look.
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2016-02-26 21:42 [bitcoin-dev] The first successful Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment Gregory Maxwell
2016-02-26 23:06 ` Sergio Demian Lerner
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgT8RE7w87Yv9Be7arH-xGCtwcq0Ynbk21ZVpqJZrEN5EQ@mail.gmail.com>
2016-02-26 23:23 ` [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: " Gregory Maxwell
2016-02-26 23:33 ` [bitcoin-dev] " Tier Nolan
2016-02-26 23:45 ` Gregory Maxwell
2016-02-26 23:56 ` Tier Nolan
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