From: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail•com>
To: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99•net>
Cc: bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] replace-by-fee v0.10.0rc4
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 16:32:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAAt2M1-L+3KEvWV+4UUSZX7meXkdTMPdz8SsxqsRtGhxsjHKmg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANEZrP2hAUsRfeXUo-DLiiRmG5uJcwFuP4=o1S6Fb7ts5Ud=bw@mail.gmail.com>
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Den 12 feb 2015 16:15 skrev "Mike Hearn" <mike@plan99•net>:
>
> The first is that this setup means miners can steal arbitrary payments if
they work together with the sender of the money. The model assumes this
collaboration won't happen, but it will. Because no existing wallet has a
"double spend this" button, to make the scheme work the dishonest miners
must create and distribute such a wallet that implements the whole
scorched-earth protocol. At that point it's easy for miners to reward the
payment fraudster with some of the stolen money the merchant lost, meaning
it now makes sense for the fraudster to always do this. The situation isn't
stable at all.
>
> The second is that it incentivises competitors to engage in payment fraud
against each other. A big rich coffee shop chain that is facing competition
from a small, scrappy newcomer can simply walk into the new shop and buy
things, then trigger the "scorched earth". Even with no miner
collaboration, this means the big company is down the cost of the product
but so is the little company who lost everything. Whoever can outspend the
other wins.
>
> We don't really need game theory to tell us that this plan is a bad idea.
Just imagine trying to explain it to an actual shop keeper. They would
think you were crazy. Bitcoin is already a hard enough concept to
understand without throwing into the mix "anyone can burn the money they
gave you after walking out of the shop".
I see no fundamental difference in outcome from miner collusion in
scorched-fee (which isn't guaranteed to pay the "right" pool!) and miner
collusion in knowingly mining a doublespend transaction.
Both outcomes pay the miner and thief equally when successful. The merchant
loses in both.
Zero-conf needs something else for security. A guarantee it can not be
doublespent in the relevant time frame.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-02-12 15:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-02-12 6:47 Peter Todd
2015-02-12 7:23 ` Tamas Blummer
2015-02-12 7:45 ` Peter Todd
2015-02-12 8:27 ` Tamas Blummer
2015-02-12 8:49 ` Peter Todd
2015-02-12 9:01 ` Tamas Blummer
2015-02-15 20:51 ` Troy Benjegerdes
2015-02-12 8:16 ` Alex Mizrahi
2015-02-12 11:58 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 12:23 ` Natanael
2015-02-12 12:49 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 13:02 ` Natanael
2015-02-12 13:44 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 14:36 ` Natanael
2015-02-12 14:53 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 15:20 ` Natanael
2015-02-12 15:30 ` Justus Ranvier
2015-02-12 13:36 ` Oleg Andreev
2015-02-12 12:52 ` Alex Mizrahi
2015-02-12 13:18 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 13:45 ` Alex Mizrahi
2015-02-12 13:52 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 14:04 ` Tamas Blummer
2015-02-12 14:16 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 14:25 ` Tamas Blummer
2015-02-12 23:08 ` Tom Harding
2015-02-12 14:32 ` Alex Mizrahi
2015-02-12 15:15 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 15:32 ` Natanael [this message]
2015-02-12 15:42 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 15:54 ` Natanael
2015-02-12 16:57 ` Btc Drak
2015-02-12 17:24 ` Oleg Andreev
2015-02-12 18:11 ` Justus Ranvier
2015-02-12 18:37 ` Allen Piscitello
2015-02-12 19:15 ` Alan Reiner
2015-02-12 19:34 ` Justus Ranvier
2015-02-12 19:45 ` Peter Todd
2015-02-12 19:49 ` Justus Ranvier
2015-02-12 19:47 ` Allen Piscitello
2015-02-12 19:52 ` Justus Ranvier
2015-02-12 20:02 ` Natanael
2015-02-12 20:36 ` Allen Piscitello
2015-02-14 14:47 ` Ross Nicoll
2015-02-12 20:06 ` Peter Todd
2015-02-12 19:49 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-02-12 20:18 ` Peter Todd
2015-02-13 11:34 ` Mike Hearn
2015-02-12 12:54 ` Tamas Blummer
2015-02-12 14:42 ` Alex Mizrahi
2015-02-12 15:27 ` Jeff Garzik
2015-02-15 21:25 ` Troy Benjegerdes
2015-02-15 21:40 ` Adam Gibson
2015-02-19 8:56 ` Troy Benjegerdes
2015-02-21 19:09 ` Jorge Timón
2015-02-21 20:30 ` Mark Friedenbach
2015-02-21 22:47 ` Jeff Garzik
2015-02-22 1:15 ` Peter Todd
2015-02-22 3:25 ` Jorge Timón
2015-02-22 4:06 ` Jeff Garzik
2015-02-22 11:41 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-02-22 12:06 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-02-22 13:41 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-02-22 13:53 ` Peter Todd
2015-02-22 23:29 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-02-24 1:11 ` Jeff Garzik
2015-03-01 17:59 ` Troy Benjegerdes
2015-03-01 19:05 ` Neil Fincham
2015-03-01 17:44 ` Troy Benjegerdes
2015-02-12 16:15 ` Lawrence Nahum
2015-02-12 18:14 ` Tom Harding
2015-02-12 21:40 ` Josh Lehan
2015-02-22 16:36 ` Tom Harding
2015-02-22 17:12 ` Peter Todd
2015-02-22 19:25 ` Tom Harding
2015-02-22 21:50 ` Peter Todd
2015-05-04 4:36 ` [Bitcoin-development] New release of replace-by-fee for Bitcoin Core v0.10.1 Peter Todd
2015-05-05 2:23 ` Kevin Greene
2015-05-23 18:26 ` [Bitcoin-development] Replace-by-fee v0.10.2 - Serious DoS attack fixed! - Also novel variants of existing attacks w/ Bitcoin XT and Android Bitcoin Wallet Peter Todd
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