From: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail•com>
To: Tim Ruffing <tim.ruffing@mmci•uni-saarland.de>,
Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Taproot: Privacy preserving switchable scripting
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 19:51:27 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAAt2M19csW3eTW_rrS+8+OuaG18EhqajWgLFotCrcVfSeVmrrQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516808291.4277.25.camel@mmci.uni-saarland.de>
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Den 24 jan. 2018 16:38 skrev "Tim Ruffing via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>:
Okay, I think my proposal was wrong...
This looks better (feel free to break again):
1. Commit (H(classic_pk, tx), tx) to the blockchain, wait until confirmed
2. Reveal classic_pk in the blockchain
Then the tx in the first valid commitment wins. If the attacker
intercepts classic_pk, it won't help him. He cannot create the first
valid commitment, because it is created already. (The reason is that
the decommitment is canonical now; for all commitments, the
decommitment is just classic_pk.)
That's not the type of attack I'm imagining. Both versions of your scheme
are essentially equivalent in terms of this attack.
Intended steps:
1: You publish a hash commitment.
2: The hash ends up in the blockchain.
3: You publish the transaction itself, and it matches the hash commitment.
4: Because it matches, miners includes it. It's now in the blockchain.
Attack:
1: You publish a hash commitment.
2: The hash ends up the blockchain.
3: You publish the transaction itself, it matches the hash commitment.
4: The attacker mess with the network somehow to prevent your transaction
from reaching the miners.
5: The attacker cracks your keypair, and makes his own commitment hash for
his own theft transaction.
6: Once that commitment is in the blockchain, he publishes his own theft
transaction.
7: The attacker's theft transaction gets into the blockchain.
8 (optionally): The miners finally see your original transaction with the
older commitment, but now the theft transaction can't be undone. There's
nothing to do about it, nor a way to know if it's intentional or not.
Anybody not verifying commitments only sees a doublespend attempt.
---
More speculation, not really a serious proposal:
I can imagine one way to reduce the probability of success for the attack
by publishing encrypted transactions as the commitment, to then publish the
key - the effect of this is that the key is easier to propagate quickly
across the network than a full transaction, making it harder to succeed
with a network based attack. This naive version by itself is however a
major DoS vector against the network.
You could, in some kind of fork, redefine how blocks are processed such
that you can prune all encrypted transactions that have not had the key
published within X blocks. The validation rules would work such that to
publish the key for an encrypted transaction in a new block, that
transaction must both be recent enough, be valid by itself, and also not
conflict with any other existing plaintext / decrypted transactions in the
blockchain.
Blocks wouldn't necessarily even need to include the encrypted transactions
during propagation. This works because encrypted transactions have zero
effect until the key is published. In this case you'd effectively be
required to publish your encrypted transaction twice to ensure the raw data
isn't lost, once to get into a block and again together with the key to get
it settled.
Since miners will likely keep at least the most recent encrypted
transactions cached to speed up validation, this is faster to settle than
to publish the committed transaction as mentioned in the beginning. This
increases your chances to get your key into the blockchain to settle your
transaction before the attacker completes his attack, versus pushing a full
transaction that miners haven't seen before.
This version would still allow DoS against miners caching all encrypted
transactions. However, if efficient Zero-knowledge proofs became practical
then you can use one to prove your encrypted transaction valid, even
against the UTXO set and in terms of not colliding with existing
commitments - in this case the DoS attack properties are nearly identical
to standard transactions.
If you want to change a committed transaction, you'd need to let the
commitment expire.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-24 18:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-23 0:30 Gregory Maxwell
2018-01-23 1:55 ` Chris Belcher
2018-01-23 2:51 ` Matt Corallo
2018-01-23 14:39 ` Mark Friedenbach
2018-01-23 21:23 ` Matt Corallo
2018-01-23 21:38 ` Gregory Maxwell
2018-01-23 6:44 ` Anthony Towns
2018-01-23 13:15 ` Gregory Maxwell
2018-01-23 22:22 ` Anthony Towns
2018-01-23 22:45 ` Gregory Maxwell
2018-01-24 1:52 ` Andrew Poelstra
2018-01-24 9:28 ` Tim Ruffing
2018-01-24 12:51 ` Natanael
2018-01-24 15:38 ` Tim Ruffing
2018-01-24 18:51 ` Natanael [this message]
2018-01-24 23:22 ` Tim Ruffing
2018-01-25 0:09 ` Natanael
2018-01-26 13:14 ` [bitcoin-dev] Recovery of old UTXOs in a post-quantum world Tim Ruffing
2018-01-27 17:07 ` [bitcoin-dev] Taproot: Privacy preserving switchable scripting Russell O'Connor
2018-01-27 17:23 ` Matt Corallo
2018-01-23 15:43 ` Greg Sanders
2018-01-26 21:34 ` Gregory Maxwell
2018-07-13 1:51 ` [bitcoin-dev] Generalised taproot Anthony Towns
2018-10-24 2:22 ` Pieter Wuille
2018-02-05 9:27 ` [bitcoin-dev] Taproot: Privacy preserving switchable scripting ZmnSCPxj
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