From: Chris Pacia <ctpacia@gmail•com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Incentives to run full nodes
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2015 17:44:56 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAB+qUq79BgiTGFS1yLxxogg8907jCUtNDmBhnikLWc1fqofNyg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150817212912.GA15817@muck>
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On Aug 17, 2015 5:29 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
From the point of view of a
> wallet, it's not very secure to use Hearn-style SPV mode, and volunteers
> running full nodes doesn't help things. Sybil attacking the IP address
> space is pretty easy in comparison to aquiring hashing power sufficient
> to create false confirmations, so any attacker able to do the former
> will likely be running the full node you're connecting too anyway.
> Ultimately, Hearn-style SPV is a close approximation to just trusting
> anyone with a non-trivial amount of hashing power. (and getting that is
> surprisingly easy, e.g. w/ SPV mining)
Can you explain how the spv node fails against an attacker with a
non-trivial amount of hash power where a full node doesn't? To attack an
spv wallet that is waiting for 6 or 10 confirmations, you would not only
need to Sybil them but also summon a massive amount of hashing power to
create a chain of headers (while forgoing the opportunity to mine valid
blocks with that hash power).
But could someone with that much hash power not Sybil a full node and give
them a chain for valid blocks (but on an orphan fork)? The failure model
doesn't seem specific to spv to me.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-08-17 21:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-08-15 17:43 [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin XT Fork Satoshi Nakamoto
2015-08-15 19:08 ` Laszlo Hanyecz
2015-08-15 19:10 ` jl2012
2015-08-17 11:40 ` Oliver Egginger
2015-08-17 11:44 ` Jorge Timón
2015-08-17 11:51 ` Oliver Egginger
2015-08-17 16:32 ` Jorge Timón
2015-08-17 17:01 ` Oliver Egginger
2015-08-17 17:15 ` Jorge Timón
2015-08-17 17:30 ` Btc Drak
2015-08-17 17:18 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-08-17 19:14 ` Peter Todd
2015-08-17 17:28 ` Jeff Garzik
2015-08-17 19:03 ` Warren Togami Jr.
2015-08-17 20:37 ` Oliver Egginger
2015-08-18 5:16 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-08-18 9:15 ` Warren Togami Jr.
2015-08-18 11:52 ` Micha Bailey
2015-08-18 18:57 ` Oliver Egginger
2015-08-18 20:59 ` Anon Moto
2015-08-19 1:03 ` Sergio Demian Lerner
2015-08-17 19:02 ` Anon Moto
2015-08-17 19:40 ` Marcel Jamin
2015-08-17 19:16 ` Hector Chu
2015-08-17 19:28 ` Gregory Maxwell
2015-08-17 19:39 ` Jorge Timón
2015-08-17 21:29 ` [bitcoin-dev] Incentives to run full nodes Peter Todd
2015-08-17 21:44 ` Chris Pacia [this message]
2015-08-18 0:20 ` Joseph Poon
2015-08-19 5:21 ` odinn
2015-10-04 6:46 ` odinn
2015-10-04 6:59 ` odinn
2015-08-19 2:54 ` [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin XT Fork odinn
2015-08-19 2:59 ` Angel Leon
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