Re: [bitcoin-dev] Tainting, CoinJoin, PayJoin, CoinSwap

From: Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail•com>
To: nopara73 <adam.ficsor73@gmail•com>,
	 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Tainting, CoinJoin, PayJoin, CoinSwap
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 09:48:55 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAB3F3DtceGQmyJzEzXHuYVrGtNE3ASq1=Sq6Bps0hE+wn7Dy5w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEPKjgfbQoXkB=cEp5Jc28ZihRSQe50M2x7k6=AjW+Vo5f=79g@mail.gmail.com>

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A major point of defeating the common input heuristic and others is to make
"super-clusters". A small number of users that "don't care" about possibly
touching tainted coins can render many chain analysis techniques unworkable
in practice for enforcement. You don't need 100% coverage to defeat the
heuristic.

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 9:40 AM nopara73 via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> The problem with CoinJoins is that desire for privacy is explicitly
> signalled by them, so adversaries can consider them "suspicious." PayJoin
> and CoinSwap solve this problem, because they are unnoticeable. I think
> this logic doesn't stand for scrutiny.
>
> From here on let's use the terminology of a typical adversary: there are 3
> kinds of coin histories: "clean", "dirty" and "suspicious".
> The aftermath of you using a "dirty" coin is knocks on your door. You
> using a "suspicious" coin is uncomfortable questions and you using a
> "clean" coin is seamless transfer.
>
> In scenario 1, you start out with a "clean" history. By using CoinJoins
> you make your new coin's history "suspicious" so you have no incentive to
> CoinJoin. By using CoinSwap/PayJoin your new coin can be either "clean" or
> "dirty". What would a "clean" coin owner prefer more? Take the risk of
> knocking on the door or answering uncomfortable questions?
>
> In scenario 2, you start out with a "dirty" history. By using CoinJoins
> you make your new coin's history "suspicious" so you have an incentive to
> CoinJoin. By using CoinSwap/PayJoin your new coin can either be "clean" or
> "dirty". What would a "dirty" coin owner prefer more? And here's an
> insight: you may get knocks on your door for a dirty coin that you have
> nothing to do with. And you can prove this fact to the adversary, but by
> doing so, you'll also expose that you started out with a "dirty" coin to
> begin with and now the adversary becomes interested in you for a different
> reason.
>
> You can also examine things assuming full adoption of PJ/CS vs full
> adoption of CJ, but you'll see that full adoption of any of these solves
> the tainting issue.
>
> So my current conclusion is that PJ/CS does not only not solve the taint
> problem, it just alters it and ultimately very similar problems arise for
> the users. Maybe the goal of unobservable privacy is a fallacy in this
> context as it is based on the assumption that desiring privacy is
> suspicious, so you want to hide the fact that you desire privacy. And the
> solution to the taint issue is either protocol change or social change
> (decent adoption.)
>
> PS.: Please try to keep the conversation to the Taint Issue as this email
> of mine isn't supposed to be discussing general pros and cons of various
> privacy techniques.
>
> Any thoughts?
>
> --
> Best,
> Ádám
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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