Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s security

From: Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail•com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>,
	 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s security
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 08:03:38 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAB3F3DtwX=nkcYPDHxFygEMZafhD3m+XuKc+BKuhwFs0J4VNUA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Yrj9N7k8osWsxhY4@petertodd.org>

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One key difference seems to be that properly punishing someone based on
mempool behavior seems much more difficult. As we all know there is no "the
mempool".

On Sun, Jun 26, 2022, 8:43 PM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 26, 2022 at 04:40:24PM +0000, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > Hi Antoine,
> >
> > Thanks for sharing the DoS attack example with alternatives.
> >
> > > - Caroll broadcasts a double-spend of her own input C, the
> double-spend is attached with a low-fee (1sat/vb) and it does _not_ signal
> opt-in RBF
> > > - Alice broadcasts the multi-party transaction, it is rejected by the
> network mempools because Alice double-spend is already present
> >
> > I think this affects almost all types of coinjoin transaction including
> coordinator based implementations. I tried a few things and have already
> reported details for an example DoS attack to one of the team but there is
> no response yet.
> >
> > It was fun playing with RBF, DoS and Coinjoin. Affected projects should
> share their opinion about full-rbf as it seems it might improve things.
> >
> > Example:
> >
> > In Wasabi an attacker can broadcast a transaction spending input used in
> coinjoin after sending signature in the round. This would result in a
> coinjoin tx which never gets relayed:
> https://nitter.net/1440000bytes/status/1540727534093905920
>
> Note that Wasabi already has a DoS attack vector in that a participant can
> stop
> participating after the first phase of the round, with the result that the
> coinjoin fails. Wasabi mitigates that by punishing participating in future
> rounds. Double-spends only create additional types of DoS attack that need
> to
> be detected and punished as well - they don't create a fundamentally new
> vulerability.
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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