Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin vaults with anti-theft recovery/clawback mechanisms

From: Dustin Dettmer <dustinpaystaxes@gmail•com>
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>,
	Bryan Bishop <kanzure@gmail•com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin vaults with anti-theft recovery/clawback mechanisms
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2019 14:19:05 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABLeJxTE09d3ujndAhrxiVwBmXkdxyUM9QfKTE69QQcNDbr5Qg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABaSBawQhC5EDbyc8c0rk1JxjF2NJBn+mb6tPgvTwkNXOPcSGg@mail.gmail.com>

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Does revaulting vault up with the same keys, or new ones?

Are they new derivation paths on the same key?

Would love some expanded explanation on how you’re proposing this would
work.

Thanks,
Dustin

On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 1:35 PM Bryan Bishop via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> One of the biggest problems with the vault scheme (besides all of the
> setup data that has to be stored for a long time) is an attacker that
> silently steals the hot wallet private key and waits for the vault's
> owner to make a delayed-spend transaction to initiate a withdrawal
> from the vault. If the user was unaware of the theft of the key, then
> the attacker could steal the funds after the delay period.
>
> To mitigate this, it is important to choose a stipend or withdrawal
> amount per withdrawal period like x% of the funds. This limits the
> total stolen funds to x% because once the funds are stolen the user
> would know their hot key is compromised, and the user would know to
> instead use one of the other clawback paths during all of the future
> withdrawal delay periods instead of letting the delay timeout all the
> way to the (stolen) default/hot key.
>
> The reason why a loss limiter is the way to go is because there's
> currently no way (that I am aware of, without an upgrade) to force an
> attacker to reveal his key on the blockchain while also forcing the
> attacker to use a timelock before the key can spend the coins. I am
> curious about what the smallest least invasive soft-fork would be for
> enabling this kind of timelock. There are so many covenant proposals
> at this point (CHECKSIGFROMSTACK, SECURETHEBAG, CHECKOUTPUTVERIFY,
> ....). Or there's crazy things like a fork that enables a transaction
> mode where the (timelock...) script of the first output is
> automatically prefixed to any of the other scripts on any of the other
> outputs when an input tries to spend in the future. A thief could add
> his key to a new output on the transaction and try to spend (just like
> a user would with a fresh/rotated key), but the OP_CSV would be
> automatically added to his script to implement the public observation
> delay window.
>
> Also, there was other previous work that I was only informed about
> today after posting my proposal, so I should mention these as related
> work:
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-February/015793.html
>
> https://blog.oleganza.com/post/163955782228/how-segwit-makes-security-better
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=diNxp3ZTquo
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5111656
>
> - Bryan
> http://heybryan.org/
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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