Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Yesterday's Taproot activation meeting on lockinontimeout (LOT)

From: Matt Hill <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 15:12:00 -0700

Good day all, this is my first post to this mailing list. Per Adam's
comment below:

> given there are clearly people of both views, or for now don't care
but might later, it would minimally be friendly and useful if
bitcoin-core has a LOT=true option - and that IMO goes some way to
avoid the assumptive control via defaults.

Both here and elsewhere, the debate taking place is around the manner of
Taproot activation, not whether or not Taproot should be activated. The
latter seems to have widespread support. Given this favorable environment,
it seems to me this is an incredible opportunity for the developer
contingency to "take the high road" while also minimizing time to Taproot
activation using political incentives. By offering power on the left hand
to miners and and power on the right to users, neither of whom is
expressing disapproval of activation, but both of whom are able to activate
without the consent of the other, both are incentivized to signal
activation as quickly as possible to emerge as the "group that did it". All
that must be done is to include a LOT=true option to Bitcoin Core that
carries a default of LOT=false. Miners can activate at any time, users can
signal their intent to activate should miners renege, and developers emerge
as politically neutral in the eyes of both.

Extrapolating a bit, I contend this expanded agency of full node
operatorship may result in more users running a full node, which is good
and healthy. From a miner's point of view, more full nodes only increases
the likelihood of future UASFs, and so they are even further incentivized
to expedite Taproot activation. Perhaps this is a stretch, perhaps not.

To summarize: (1) this positions developers as neutral facilitators who
deferred power to the other contingencies; (2) we may see a rise in the
popularity of running a full node and the number of full node operators;
(3) miners are incentivized to activate quickly to avoid being perceived as
the "bad guys" and to avoid the spread of full nodes; and (4) even if
miners do not activate, users can organize a UASF in a grass-roots way.

Matt Hill