From: Sergej Kotliar <sergej@bitrefill•com>
To: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian•com.au>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Opt-in full-RBF] Zero-conf apps in immediate danger
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 14:37:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABZBVTBupMcBbOUtLbMaEmAiWGsMwisNW+k+bTUJGsUad2=ZZg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y1D3OkdsCq2pLduG@erisian.com.au>
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On Thu, 20 Oct 2022 at 09:22, Anthony Towns <aj@erisian•com.au> wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 04:29:57PM +0200, Sergej Kotliar via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > The
> > biggest risk in accepting bitcoin payments is in fact not zeroconf risk
> > (it's actually quite easily managed),
>
> You mean "it's quite easily managed, provided the transaction doesn't
> opt-in to rbf", right? At least, that's what I understood you saying last
> time; ie that if the tx signals rbf, then you just don't do zeroconf no
> matter what other trustworthy signals you might see:
>
> https://twitter.com/ziggamon/status/1435863691816275970
>
> (rbf txs seem to have increased from 22% then to 29% now)
>
Yeah. Our share of RBF is a bit lower than that as many RBF transactions
are something other than consumer purchases, and most consumer purchases
can't do RBF
> > it's FX risk as the merchant must
> > commit to a certain BTCUSD rate ahead of time for a purchase. Over time
> > some transactions lose money to FX and others earn money - that evens out
> > in the end.
>
> > But if there is an _easily accessible in the wallet_ feature to
> > "cancel transaction" that means it will eventually get systematically
> > abused. A risk of X% loss on many payments that's easy to systematically
> > abuse is more scary than a rare risk of losing 100% of one occasional
> > payment. It's already possible to execute this form of abuse with opt-in
> > RBF,
>
> If someone's going to systematically exploit your store via this
> mechanism, it seems like they'd just find a single wallet with a good
> UX for opt-in RBF and lowballing fees, and go to town -- not something
> where opt-in rbf vs fullrbf policies make any difference at all?
>
Sort of. But yes once this starts being abused systemically we will have to
do something else w RBF payments, such as crediting the amount in BTC to a
custodial account. But this option isn't available to your normal payment
processor type business.
Also worth keeping in mind that sometimes "opportunity makes the thief".
Currently only power-user wallet have that feature and their market share
is relatively small, mainly electrum stands out. But if this is available
to all users everywhere then it will start being abused and we'll have to
then direct all payments to custodial account, or some other convoluted
solution.
> It's not like existing wallets that don't let you set RBF will suddenly
> get a good UX for replacing transactions just because they'd be relayed
> if they did, is it?
>
> > To successfully fool (non-RBF)
> > zeroconf one needs to have access to mining infrastructure and
> probability
> > of success is the % of hash rate controlled.
>
> I thought the "normal" avenue for fooling non-RBF zeroconf was to create
> two conflicting txs in advance, one paying the merchant, one paying
> yourself, connect to many peers, relay the one paying the merchant to
> the merchant, and the other to everyone else.
>
> I'm just basing this off Peter Todd's stuff from years ago:
>
>
> https://np.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/40ejy8/peter_todd_with_my_doublespendpy_tool_with/cytlhh0/
>
>
> https://github.com/petertodd/replace-by-fee-tools/blob/master/doublespend.py
>
>
Yeah, I know the list still rehashes a single incident from 10 years ago to
declare the entire practice as unsafe, and ignores real-world data that of
the last million transactions we had zero cases of this successfully
abusing us.
> > Currently Lightning is somewhere around 15% of our total bitcoin
> payments.
>
> So, based on last year's numbers, presumably that makes your bitcoin
> payments break down as something like:
>
> 5% txs are on-chain and seem shady and are excluded from zeroconf
> 15% txs are lightning
> 20% txs are on-chain but signal rbf and are excluded from zeroconf
> 60% txs are on-chain and seem fine for zeroconf
>
Numbers are right. Shady is too strong a word, it's mostly transactions
with very low fee, or high purchase amount, or many dependent unconfirmed
transactions, stuff like that. In some cases we do a human assessment of
the support ticket and often just pass them through.
> > This is very much not nothing, and all of us here want Lightning to grow,
> > but I think it warrants a serious discussion on whether we want Lightning
> > adoption to go to 100% by means of disabling on-chain commerce.
>
> If the numbers above were accurate, this would just mean you'd go from 60%
> zeroconf/25% not-zeroconf to 85% not-zeroconf; wouldn't be 0% on-chain.
>
Point is that RBF transactions are unsafe even when waiting for a
confirmation, which Peter Todd trivially proved in the reply next to this.
The reliable solution is to reject all RBF payments and direct those users
to custodial accounts. There are other variants to solve this with varying
degree of convolutedness. RBF is a strictly worse UX as proven by anyone
accepting bitcoin payments at scale.
> > For me
> > personally it would be an easier discussion to have when Lightning is at
> > 80%+ of all bitcoin transactions.
>
> Can you extrapolate from the numbers you've seen to estimate when that
> might be, given current trends?
>
Not sure, it might be exponential growth, and the next 60% of Lightning
growth happen faster than the first 15%. Hard to tell. But we're likely
talking years here..
>
> > The benefits of Lightning are many and obvious,
> > we don't need to limit onchain to make Lightning more appealing.
>
> To be fair, I think making lightning (and coinjoins) work better is
> exactly what inspired this -- not as a "make on-chain worse so we look
> better in comparison", but as a "making lightning work well is a bunch
> of hard problems, here's the next thing we need in order to beat the
> next problem".
>
In deed. The fact that the largest non-custodial Lightning wallet started
this thread should be an indicator that despite these intentions the
solution harms more than it fixes.
Transactions being evicted from mempool is solved by requiring a minimum
fee rate, which we do and now seems to have become a standard practice.
Theoretically we can imagine them being evicted anyway but now we're
several theoreticals deep again when discussing something that will cause
massive problems right away. In emergency situations CPFP and similar can
of course be done manually in special circumstances.
Cheers
Sergej
On Thu, 20 Oct 2022 at 09:22, Anthony Towns <aj@erisian•com.au> wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 04:29:57PM +0200, Sergej Kotliar via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > The
> > biggest risk in accepting bitcoin payments is in fact not zeroconf risk
> > (it's actually quite easily managed),
>
> You mean "it's quite easily managed, provided the transaction doesn't
> opt-in to rbf", right? At least, that's what I understood you saying last
> time; ie that if the tx signals rbf, then you just don't do zeroconf no
> matter what other trustworthy signals you might see:
>
> https://twitter.com/ziggamon/status/1435863691816275970
>
> (rbf txs seem to have increased from 22% then to 29% now)
>
> > it's FX risk as the merchant must
> > commit to a certain BTCUSD rate ahead of time for a purchase. Over time
> > some transactions lose money to FX and others earn money - that evens out
> > in the end.
>
> > But if there is an _easily accessible in the wallet_ feature to
> > "cancel transaction" that means it will eventually get systematically
> > abused. A risk of X% loss on many payments that's easy to systematically
> > abuse is more scary than a rare risk of losing 100% of one occasional
> > payment. It's already possible to execute this form of abuse with opt-in
> > RBF,
>
> If someone's going to systematically exploit your store via this
> mechanism, it seems like they'd just find a single wallet with a good
> UX for opt-in RBF and lowballing fees, and go to town -- not something
> where opt-in rbf vs fullrbf policies make any difference at all?
>
> It's not like existing wallets that don't let you set RBF will suddenly
> get a good UX for replacing transactions just because they'd be relayed
> if they did, is it?
>
> > To successfully fool (non-RBF)
> > zeroconf one needs to have access to mining infrastructure and
> probability
> > of success is the % of hash rate controlled.
>
> I thought the "normal" avenue for fooling non-RBF zeroconf was to create
> two conflicting txs in advance, one paying the merchant, one paying
> yourself, connect to many peers, relay the one paying the merchant to
> the merchant, and the other to everyone else.
>
> I'm just basing this off Peter Todd's stuff from years ago:
>
>
> https://np.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/40ejy8/peter_todd_with_my_doublespendpy_tool_with/cytlhh0/
>
>
> https://github.com/petertodd/replace-by-fee-tools/blob/master/doublespend.py
>
> > Currently Lightning is somewhere around 15% of our total bitcoin
> payments.
>
> So, based on last year's numbers, presumably that makes your bitcoin
> payments break down as something like:
>
> 5% txs are on-chain and seem shady and are excluded from zeroconf
> 15% txs are lightning
> 20% txs are on-chain but signal rbf and are excluded from zeroconf
> 60% txs are on-chain and seem fine for zeroconf
>
> > This is very much not nothing, and all of us here want Lightning to grow,
> > but I think it warrants a serious discussion on whether we want Lightning
> > adoption to go to 100% by means of disabling on-chain commerce.
>
> If the numbers above were accurate, this would just mean you'd go from 60%
> zeroconf/25% not-zeroconf to 85% not-zeroconf; wouldn't be 0% on-chain.
>
> > For me
> > personally it would be an easier discussion to have when Lightning is at
> > 80%+ of all bitcoin transactions.
>
> Can you extrapolate from the numbers you've seen to estimate when that
> might be, given current trends? Or perhaps when fine-for-zeroconf txs
> drop to 20%, since opt-in-RBF txs and considered-unsafe txs would still
> work the same in a fullrbf world.
>
> > The benefits of Lightning are many and obvious,
> > we don't need to limit onchain to make Lightning more appealing.
>
> To be fair, I think making lightning (and coinjoins) work better is
> exactly what inspired this -- not as a "make on-chain worse so we look
> better in comparison", but as a "making lightning work well is a bunch
> of hard problems, here's the next thing we need in order to beat the
> next problem".
>
> > Sidenote: On the efficacy of RBF to "unstuck" stuck transactions
> > After interacting with users during high-fee periods I've come to not
> > appreciate RBF as a solution to that issue. Most users (80% or so) simply
> > don't have access to that functionality, because their wallet doesn't
> > support it, or they use a custodial (exchange) wallet etc. Of those that
> > have the feature - only the power users understand how RBF works, and
> > explaining how to do RBF to a non-power-user is just too complex, for the
> > same reason why it's complex for wallets to make sensible non-power-user
> UI
> > around it. Current equilibrium is that mostly only power users have
> access
> > to RBF and they know how to handle it, so things are somewhat working.
> But
> > rolling this out to the broad market is something else and would likely
> > cause more confusion.
> > CPFP is somewhat more viable but also not perfect as it would require
> lots
> > of edge case code to handle abuse vectors: What if users abuse a generous
> > CPFP policy to unstuck past transactions or consolidate large wallets.
> Best
> > is for CPFP to be done on the wallet side, not the merchant side, but
> there
> > too are the same UX issues as with RBF.
>
> I think if you're ruling out both merchants and users being able to add
> fees to a tx to get it to confirm, then you're going to lose either way.
> Txs will either expire because they've been stuck for more than a week,
> and be vulnerable to replacement at that point anyway, or they'll be
> dropped from mempools because they've filled up and they were the lowest
> fee tx, and be vulnerable to replacement for that reason. In the expiry
> case, the merchant can rebroadcast the original transaction to keep it
> alive, perhaps with a good chance of beating an attacker to the punch,
> but in the full mempool case, you could only do that if you were also
> CPFPing it, which you already ruled out.
>
> Cheers,
> aj
>
--
Sergej Kotliar
CEO
Twitter: @ziggamon <https://twitter.com/ziggamon>
www.bitrefill.com
Twitter <https://www.twitter.com/bitrefill> | Blog
<https://www.bitrefill.com/blog/> | Angellist <https://angel.co/bitrefill>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-20 12:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <CABZBVTC5kh7ca3KhVkFPdQjnsPhP4Kun1k3K6cPkarrjUiTJpA@mail.gmail.com>
2022-10-19 14:29 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-19 14:45 ` Erik Aronesty
2022-10-19 15:43 ` Jeremy Rubin
2022-10-19 15:51 ` Greg Sanders
2022-10-19 16:04 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-19 16:08 ` Greg Sanders
2022-10-20 1:37 ` Antoine Riard
2022-10-20 14:11 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-21 1:04 ` Antoine Riard
2022-10-20 4:05 ` Peter Todd
2022-10-21 19:35 ` Peter Todd
2022-10-20 7:22 ` Anthony Towns
2022-10-20 12:37 ` Sergej Kotliar [this message]
2022-10-20 14:14 ` Ruben Somsen
2022-10-20 14:17 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-20 19:58 ` Anthony Towns
2022-10-20 21:05 ` David A. Harding
2022-10-20 21:07 ` Greg Sanders
2022-10-20 22:02 ` Eloy
2022-10-21 12:02 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-21 14:01 ` Greg Sanders
2022-10-21 14:19 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-21 14:47 ` Greg Sanders
2022-10-21 19:43 ` Peter Todd
2022-10-24 7:55 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-20 22:13 ` Peter Todd
2022-10-21 9:34 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-21 19:33 ` Peter Todd
2022-10-24 7:45 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-21 11:56 ` Sergej Kotliar
2022-10-23 19:20 ` David A. Harding
2022-10-23 20:51 ` alicexbt
[not found] <6342098B-A548-43C9-8F92-AAD9D0BB66AB@coinspaid.com>
2022-12-03 14:06 ` Daniel Lipshitz
2022-12-01 12:27 Daniel Lipshitz
2022-12-01 22:03 ` Erik Aronesty
2022-12-02 6:34 ` Daniel Lipshitz
2022-12-02 1:52 ` Antoine Riard
2022-12-02 6:59 ` Daniel Lipshitz
2022-12-02 4:30 ` Peter Todd
2022-12-02 7:06 ` Daniel Lipshitz
2022-12-03 8:50 ` Peter Todd
2022-12-03 11:01 ` Daniel Lipshitz
2022-12-03 11:51 ` Daniel Lipshitz
2022-12-03 12:12 ` Peter Todd
2022-12-03 13:17 ` Daniel Lipshitz
2022-12-03 14:03 ` Daniel Lipshitz
2022-12-05 12:21 ` angus
[not found] <mailman.7.1665662404.16405.bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
2022-10-14 10:03 ` John Carvalho
2022-10-14 15:04 ` Peter Todd
2022-10-14 16:28 ` Erik Aronesty
2022-10-15 4:08 ` John Carvalho
2022-10-15 4:20 ` John Carvalho
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-10-07 16:20 Dario Sneidermanis
2022-10-07 17:21 ` David A. Harding
2022-10-07 17:28 ` Greg Sanders
2022-10-07 21:37 ` Dario Sneidermanis
2022-10-11 16:18 ` Pieter Wuille
2022-10-12 5:42 ` Anthony Towns
2022-10-12 16:11 ` Pieter Wuille
2022-10-12 21:44 ` Dario Sneidermanis
2022-10-13 4:35 ` Anthony Towns
2022-10-16 8:08 ` Anthony Towns
2022-10-17 14:25 ` Greg Sanders
2022-10-17 21:41 ` Antoine Riard
2022-10-18 7:00 ` Anthony Towns
2022-10-19 3:01 ` Antoine Riard
2022-10-19 3:17 ` alicexbt
2022-10-20 22:08 ` Peter Todd
2022-11-02 15:04 ` AdamISZ
2022-10-20 23:18 ` Peter Todd
2022-11-09 13:19 ` ArmchairCryptologist
2022-11-10 9:35 ` ZmnSCPxj
2022-10-07 20:56 ` Luke Dashjr
2022-10-08 20:47 ` alicexbt
2022-10-13 16:07 ` linuxfoundation.cndm1
2022-10-14 2:44 ` alicexbt
2022-10-14 15:02 ` Peter Todd
2022-10-17 20:31 ` Antoine Riard
2022-10-17 22:14 ` Antoine Riard
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