From: "Jorge Timón" <jtimon@jtimon•cc>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Relative CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (was CLTV proposal)
Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2015 13:35:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABm2gDo22grffq4j+Jy_HBD-VrROh32Dbseoa=g-5HXA9Uud1w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150421075912.GA25282@savin.petertodd.org>
On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 9:59 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> wrote:
> Thus we have a few possibilities:
>
> 1) RCLTV against nLockTime
>
> Needs a minimum age > COINBASE_MATURITY to be safe.
>
>
> 2) RCLTV against current block height/time
>
> Completely reorg safe.
Yes, can we call this one OP_MATURITY to distinguish it from RCLTV?
> 3) GET_TXOUT_HEIGHT/TIME <diff> ADD CLTV
>
> To be reorg safe GET_TXOUT_HEIGHT/TIME must fail if minimum age <
> COINBASE_MATURITY. This can be implemented by comparing against
> nLockTime.
Mhmm, interesting.
> All three possibilities require us to make information about the
> prevout's height/time available to VerifyScript(). The only question is
> if we want VerifyScript() to also take the current block height/time - I
> see no reason why it can't. As for the mempool, keeping track of what
> transactions made use of these opcodes so they can be reevaluated if
> their prevouts are re-organised seems fine to me.
I'm totally fine with changing the interface to:
int bitcoinconsensus_verify_script(const unsigned char
*scriptPubKey, unsigned int scriptPubKeyLen,
const unsigned char *txTo
, unsigned int txToLen, unsigned nHeight,
unsigned int nIn, unsigned int
flags, bitcoinconsensus_error* err);
I prefer op_maturity over RCLTV and there are also gains for absolute
CLTV as you explain later.
When you validate the script inputs of a transaction you already have
a height, either the real final nHeight in ConnectBlock and the miner,
or nSpendHeight in AcceptToMemoryPool.
The costs are meaningless in my opinion, specially when we will
already have to change the interface to add libsecp256k1's context.
I'm infinitely more worried about the other assumption that the 3
solutions are already making.
Changing to
int bitcoinconsensus_verify_script(const unsigned char
*scriptPubKey, unsigned int scriptPubKeyLen,
const unsigned char *txTo
, unsigned int txToLen, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs,
unsigned int nIn, unsigned int
flags, bitcoinconsensus_error* err);
Is simply not possible because CCoinsViewCache is a C++.
You could solve it in a similar way in which you could solve that
dependency for VerifyTransaction.
For example:
typedef const CTxOut& (*TxOutputGetter)(const uint256& txid, uint32_t n);
int bitcoinconsensus_verify_script(const unsigned char
*scriptPubKey, unsigned int scriptPubKeyLen,
const unsigned char *txTo
, unsigned int txToLen, TxOutputGetter utxoGetter,
unsigned int nIn, unsigned int
flags, bitcoinconsensus_error* err);
Of course, this is assuming that CTxOut becomes a C struct instead of
a C++ class and little things like that.
In terms of code encapsulation, this is still 100 times uglier than
adding the nHeight so if we're doing it, yes, please, let's do both.
There's another possibility that could keep the utxo out of Script verification:
class CTxIn
{
public:
COutPoint prevout;
CScript scriptSig;
uint32_t nSequence;
}
could turn into:
class CTxIn
{
public:
COutPoint prevout;
CScript scriptSig;
uint32_t nHeight;
}
And a new softfork rule could enforce that all new CTxIn set nHeight
to the correct height in which its corresponding prevout got into the
chain.
That would remove the need for the TxOutputGetter param in
bitcoinconsensus_verify_script, but unfortunately it is not reorg safe
(apart from other ugly implementation details).
So, in summary, I think the new interface has to be something along these lines:
int bitcoinconsensus_verify_script(const unsigned char
*scriptPubKey, unsigned int scriptPubKeyLen,
const unsigned char *txTo,
unsigned int nIn,
unsigned int txToLen,
TxOutputGetter utxoGetter, unsigned nHeight, secp256k1_context_t *ctx
unsigned int flags,
bitcoinconsensus_error* err);
> Time-based locks
> ================
>
> Do we want to support them at all? May cause incentive issues with
> mining, see #bitcoin-wizards discussion, Jul 17th 2013:
>
> https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizards/2013/07/13-07-17.log
I'm totally fine not supporting time-based locks for the new operators.
Removing them from the regular nLockTime could be more complicated but
I wouldn't mind either.
Every time I think of a contract or protocol that involves time, I do
it in terms of block heights.
I would prefer to change all my clocks to work in blocks instead of
minutes over changing nHeights for timestamps in any of those
contracts.
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000015e09479548c5b63b99a62d31b019e6479f195bf0cbd935
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-04-26 11:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-10-01 13:08 [Bitcoin-development] [BIP draft] CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY - Prevent a txout from being spent until an expiration time Peter Todd
2014-10-01 15:01 ` Gavin Andresen
2014-10-02 1:06 ` Peter Todd
2014-10-01 15:29 ` Sergio Lerner
2014-10-01 17:06 ` Peter Todd
2014-10-01 18:23 ` Luke Dashjr
2014-10-01 20:58 ` Gavin Andresen
2014-10-01 21:04 ` Alan Reiner
2014-10-01 21:34 ` Gavin Andresen
2014-10-02 0:12 ` Peter Todd
2014-10-02 0:05 ` Peter Todd
2014-10-02 0:55 ` Luke Dashjr
2014-10-02 1:09 ` Peter Todd
2014-10-02 15:05 ` Flavien Charlon
2014-10-03 14:28 ` Matt Whitlock
2014-10-03 14:30 ` Matt Whitlock
2014-10-03 16:17 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-10-03 17:50 ` Luke Dashjr
2014-10-03 20:58 ` Mike Hearn
2014-10-03 23:12 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-10-04 0:38 ` Peter Todd
2014-10-04 12:58 ` Mike Hearn
2014-10-07 15:50 ` Gavin Andresen
2014-10-07 16:08 ` Mike Hearn
2014-10-08 10:26 ` Wladimir
2014-10-09 3:13 ` Alan Reiner
2014-10-09 6:14 ` Adam Back
2014-10-09 6:28 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-10-09 6:33 ` Peter Todd
2014-10-09 6:40 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-10-08 4:07 ` Tom Harding
2014-10-08 10:15 ` Mike Hearn
2015-03-16 22:22 ` [Bitcoin-development] Relative CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (was CLTV proposal) Matt Corallo
2015-03-19 17:39 ` Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
2015-04-21 7:59 ` Peter Todd
2015-04-26 11:35 ` Jorge Timón [this message]
2015-04-26 12:20 ` Jorge Timón
2015-04-27 19:35 ` Peter Todd
2015-04-28 7:44 ` Jorge Timón
2015-05-04 2:15 ` Matt Corallo
2015-05-04 11:24 ` Jorge Timón
2015-05-05 0:41 ` Btc Drak
2015-05-05 19:19 ` Jorge Timón
2015-05-05 20:38 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-06 7:37 ` Jorge Timón
2015-05-06 22:09 ` Tier Nolan
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