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From: "Jorge Timón" <jtimon@jtimon•cc>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Relative CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (was CLTV proposal)
Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2015 14:20:04 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABm2gDovFzpL_7KFqPXxhu4VohRfcE5S_PLAUgjgo_b84GaYeQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABm2gDo22grffq4j+Jy_HBD-VrROh32Dbseoa=g-5HXA9Uud1w@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 1:35 PM, Jorge Timón <jtimon@jtimon•cc> wrote:
> There's another possibility that could keep the utxo out of Script verification:
>
> class CTxIn
> {
> public:
>     COutPoint prevout;
>     CScript scriptSig;
>     uint32_t nSequence;
> }
>
> could turn into:
>
> class CTxIn
> {
> public:
>     COutPoint prevout;
>     CScript scriptSig;
>     uint32_t nHeight;
> }
>
> And a new softfork rule could enforce that all new CTxIn set nHeight
> to the correct height in which its corresponding prevout got into the
> chain.
> That would remove the need for the TxOutputGetter param in
> bitcoinconsensus_verify_script, but unfortunately it is not reorg safe
> (apart from other ugly implementation details).

Wait, wait, this can be made reorg-safe and more backards compatible.
The new validation rule at the tx validation level (currently in
main::CheckInputs()) would be

for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++) {
// ...
            if (tx.vin.nHeight + 100 > tx.nLockTime)
                return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID,
"bad-txns-vin-height-reorg-unsafe");
            if (coins->nHeight > tx.vin.nHeight)
                return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID,
"bad-txns-vin-height-false");
// ...
}

Existing transactions that have used the deprecated CTxIn::nSequence
for something else will be fine if they've used low nSequences.
The only concern would be breaking some colored coins kernels, but
there's many others implemented that don't rely on CTxIn::nSequence.

Transactions that want to use OP_MATURITY just have to set the
corresponding CTxIn::nHeight and CTransaction::nLockTime properly.
This way op_maturity wouldn't require anything from the utxo and the
final interface could be:

 int bitcoinconsensus_verify_script(const unsigned char* scriptPubKey,
unsigned int scriptPubKeyLen,
                                        const unsigned char* txTo,
unsigned int txToLen,
                                        unsigned int nIn, unsigned int nHeight,
                                        unsigned int flags,
secp256k1_context_t* ctx,
                                        bitcoinconsensus_error* err);



  reply	other threads:[~2015-04-26 12:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-10-01 13:08 [Bitcoin-development] [BIP draft] CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY - Prevent a txout from being spent until an expiration time Peter Todd
2014-10-01 15:01 ` Gavin Andresen
2014-10-02  1:06   ` Peter Todd
2014-10-01 15:29 ` Sergio Lerner
2014-10-01 17:06   ` Peter Todd
2014-10-01 18:23 ` Luke Dashjr
2014-10-01 20:58   ` Gavin Andresen
2014-10-01 21:04     ` Alan Reiner
2014-10-01 21:34       ` Gavin Andresen
2014-10-02  0:12         ` Peter Todd
2014-10-02  0:05   ` Peter Todd
2014-10-02  0:55     ` Luke Dashjr
2014-10-02  1:09       ` Peter Todd
2014-10-02 15:05         ` Flavien Charlon
2014-10-03 14:28           ` Matt Whitlock
2014-10-03 14:30             ` Matt Whitlock
2014-10-03 16:17             ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-10-03 17:50             ` Luke Dashjr
2014-10-03 20:58               ` Mike Hearn
2014-10-03 23:12                 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-10-04  0:38                   ` Peter Todd
2014-10-04 12:58                     ` Mike Hearn
2014-10-07 15:50                       ` Gavin Andresen
2014-10-07 16:08                         ` Mike Hearn
2014-10-08 10:26                           ` Wladimir
2014-10-09  3:13                             ` Alan Reiner
2014-10-09  6:14                               ` Adam Back
2014-10-09  6:28                                 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-10-09  6:33                                   ` Peter Todd
2014-10-09  6:40                                     ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-10-08  4:07                         ` Tom Harding
2014-10-08 10:15                           ` Mike Hearn
2015-03-16 22:22 ` [Bitcoin-development] Relative CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (was CLTV proposal) Matt Corallo
2015-03-19 17:39   ` Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
2015-04-21  7:59   ` Peter Todd
2015-04-26 11:35     ` Jorge Timón
2015-04-26 12:20       ` Jorge Timón [this message]
2015-04-27 19:35         ` Peter Todd
2015-04-28  7:44           ` Jorge Timón
2015-05-04  2:15     ` Matt Corallo
2015-05-04 11:24       ` Jorge Timón
2015-05-05  0:41         ` Btc Drak
2015-05-05 19:19           ` Jorge Timón
2015-05-05 20:38         ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-06  7:37           ` Jorge Timón
2015-05-06 22:09             ` Tier Nolan

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