Re: [bitcoin-dev] Even more proposed BIP extensions to BIP 0070

From: Justin Newton <justin@netki•com>
To: Police Terror <PoliceTerror@dyne•org>,
	 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Even more proposed BIP extensions to BIP 0070
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2016 15:44:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABqynxKmqrUhFsGFp0N6yGpHcbE5NgxdKCPWvTAXTkXhHs6z_w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <576C5531.90608@dyne.org>

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Hi there,
   For users who don’t wish a service provider to be able to see their
information, even ephemerally, and they would like to exchange information
via BIP75, they can use a software wallet, such as a breadwallet or others,
and that data will only exist on their phone, and the phone of their
counterparty (assuming the counterparty also chose to exchange info, and
was running on a software wallet).

In this way, we allow users to exchange data as they choose, without having
the risk that a service provider be asked for that data.

If a user chooses to use a hosted platform, and also to store their
identity data there, I do agree it could be subject to a subpoena, the same
as when they host their email, and other services.

Finally, they could choose not to use BIP75 at all, and no one would know
whether they did or didn’t (other than their counterparts) as we don’t
leave any residue on the blockchain, or anywhere else in the public eye.

We believe that this solution, due in part to its narrow data aperture, is
the best solution available to the problem we are solving.  We are eager to
engage in any discussions about how to improve the proposed solution, with
an eye to fungibility, privacy, and usability.

That said, there is a real need for people to know who they are transacting
with for usability reasons, for fraud reduction, and also of regulatory
reasons for some players.  To NOT solve it with a carefully crafted
standard means that it is more likely to be solved with back room, quick
and dirty solutions that are not available for community review and
feedback.

Thanks!

Justin

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 2:31 PM, Police Terror via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> In England under RIPA 2000 legislation, it's irrelevant whether you have
> the data or not. If the authorities compel you to hand over that
> information, and it is within your means to obtain it then you are
> obliged to do so under threat of criminal offense.
>
> So any mechanism whereby data could be collected from Bitcoin users,
> whether it's stored ephemerally or not, if the police have reasonable
> suspicion to think it exists then they can compel all parties to work to
> get them the data they require.
>
> If the mechanism flat out does not exist, that is miles better than
> could exist. Deniability is not a defense when served with a police
> notice for disclosing data.
>
> You have to think not only about the end result, but also about how
> these mechanisms can be used for intimidating users or leveraging
> technologies.
>
> Justin Newton via bitcoin-dev:
> > On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:46 PM, s7r via bitcoin-dev <
> > bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Any kind of built-in AML/KYC tools in Bitcoin is bad, and might draw
> >> expectations from _all_ users from authorities. Companies or individuals
> >> who want and/or need AML/KYC can find ways and do it at their side
> >> isolated from the entire network, and the solutions shouldn't come from
> >> upstream. AML/KYC/<insert other regulation here> differ from country to
> >> country and will be hard to implement in a global consensus network even
> >> if it would be worth it.
> >>
> >>
> > This was precisely our thinking as well.
> >
> > This is actually exactly why BIP 75 was designed the way that it was.
> Any
> > (voluntary) identity exchange is done at the application level, on an
> > encrypted https (or other) connection between the sender and receiver.
> > Identity data is not passed through or stored on the blockchain, and
> there
> > is actually no mark left on the blockchain that identity was even
> exchanged
> > on that transaction.
> >
> > The only people who know identity info was exchanged, or what the
> identity
> > was is the counterparties in the transaction, and depending on
> > implementation, their service provider.  (At a high level, many software
> > based wallet providers wouldn’t have any visibility into identity info,
> > where many hosted services would, for example)
> >
> > We did this to protect user privacy as well as fungibility.
> >
> > We are allowing the people who want or need to exchange identtity info
> > (either self signed or 3rd party validated) the option to exchange it,
> in a
> > standards based way, directly between peers, without touching the
> > blockchain or network itself.
> >
> > Is this more clear?
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >
> _______________________________________________
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> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

-- 

Justin W. Newton
Founder/CEO
Netki, Inc.

justin@netki•com
+1.818.261.4248

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