When I was working on mSIGNA I became a little torn on the whole filtering mechanism. I fully support connection filtering...but in practice always run my own full node instances to connect to due to the three fatal flaws: 1) no mechanism for short proofs of tx nonexclusion, txout unspentness, block validity, nor the ability to find the first instance of the use of a scriptPubKey without full blockchain scanning, 2) poor privacy, 3) lack of incentives to run servers.

I always felt that BIP37 was necessarily a step towards a client/server architecture.

Having said that, I have found the filter mechanism useful, if only because no "special" server is required. However, in practice I'd rather make the distinction between trustless peers and a client/server model more explicit.


On Mon, Aug 24, 2015, 10:41 AM Wladimir J. van der Laan via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 05:37:51PM +0000, Matt Corallo wrote:
> Its more of a statement of "in the future, we expect things to happen
> which would make this an interesting thing to do, so we state here that
> it is not against spec to do so". Could reword it as "NODE_BLOOM is
> distinct from NODE_NETWORK, and it is legal to advertise NODE_BLOOM but
> not NODE_NETWORK (though there is little reason to do so now, some
> proposals may make this more useful in the future)"?

Yes, it makes sense to not explicitly exclude it.
Looks good to me.

Wladimir

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