On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:43 PM, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

This could render transactions with a locktime in the future as unspendable.

It is pretty low probability that someone has created a >100kB locked transaction though.

It violates the principle that no fork should render someone's coins unspendable.

Mmmm.... you'd have to:

a) Have lost or thrown away the keys to the unspent transaction outputs

b) Have created a locktime'd transaction with a lock time after the BIP100/101 switchover times

that is more than 100,000 bytes big

c) Have some special relationship with a miner that you trust to still be around when the transaction

unlocks that would mine the bigger-than-standard transaction for you.

I don't think adding extra complexity to consensus-critical code to support such an incredibly unlikely

scenario is the right decision here. I think it is more likely that the extra complexity would trigger a bug

that causes a loss of bitcoin greater than the amount of bitcoin tied up in locktime'ed transactions

(because I think there are approximately zero BTC tied up in >100K locktime'ed transactions).

RE: limit size of transaction+parents: Feature creep, belongs in another BIP in my opinion. This one

is focused on fixing CVE-2013-2292

--
Gavin Andresen