From: "Jorge Timón" <jtimon@monetize•io>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org>
Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] 0 confirmation txs using replace-by-fee and game theory
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 16:20:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAC1+kJMREKv6ke1wQNxcHtt0G+2r7c7G7WjfVzV0tOwuLo8JNg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140424125953.GC16884@savin>
On 4/24/14, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> wrote:
> ...
> With replace-by-fee scorched-earth the success rate of such
> double-spends would be significantly reduced as the attacker would need
> to get lucky with bad propagation not just once, but twice in a row.
Interesting.
>> Replace-by-fee and child-pays-for parent cannot be prohibited by a
>> protocol rule.
>> I believe all miners will eventually implement these policies because
>> it is the more rational way for them to prioritize transactions.
>> Finally I hope they do because it would make 0-confirmation
>> transactions possible as described in this post.
>> So I can't find any reasoning against replace-by-fee unless my example
>> is terribly flawed.
>> Am I missing something?
>
> A few things:
>
> 1) Replace-by-fee doesn't protect against sybil attacks; only
No worse than the current situation.
> 2) Replace-by-fee scorched earth does require you to keep private keys
> online to sign the replacements. Not a big deal, but it's yet another
> reason why you wouldn't want to use it for high-value stuff.
High-value transactions should wait for several confirmations.
> 3) It doesn't directly solve finney attacks(1) where the miner mines the
> transaction in private. However finney attacks are only relevant if
> there is high centralization of hashing power, and all other proposed
> mechanisms, e.g. coinbase reallocation, themselves do a lot of harm to
> decentralization. (just look at how coinbase reallocation lets large
> pools bully smaller miners out of business by blacklisting their blocks)
Again, no worse than the current situation. And regular double-spends
attacks are much simpler than finney attacks.
> One interesting thing with regard to finney attacks and replace-by-fee
> though is that enforcing hasher visibility of the blocks they are mining
> - what getblocktemplate was meant to do voluntarily - lets any hasher
> detect a finney attack double-spend and broadcast it. They have a weak
> incentive to do so - the scorched earth reply is a high-fee transaction
> of course and pre-broadcasting transactions makes blocks propagate
> faster - at which point you're back to a public double-spend. Enforcing
> visibility of block contents to hashers is definitely a good thing for
> decentralization.
Where can I read more about "enforcing hashing visibility of block contents"?
Sounds somewhat similar to p2pool to me but I'm not sure I understand it.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-04-24 14:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-04-24 10:48 Jorge Timón
2014-04-24 11:54 ` Mike Hearn
2014-04-24 12:07 ` Chris Pacia
2014-04-24 12:15 ` Mike Hearn
2014-04-24 14:49 ` Jorge Timón
2014-04-24 15:45 ` Mike Hearn
2014-04-24 17:13 ` Jannis Froese
2014-06-19 3:47 ` Isidor Zeuner
2014-04-25 4:51 ` Gareth Williams
2014-04-25 10:19 ` Mike Hearn
2014-04-25 13:38 ` Gareth Williams
2014-04-24 12:59 ` Peter Todd
2014-04-24 14:20 ` Jorge Timón [this message]
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