A 0-conf double spend caused by FSS-RBF would be harmless since the original output (address and amounts) remain in the double spending trx. So all a merchant would need to do is monitor block inclusion for the relevant output. Addition of some wallet logic would resolve it easily. Technically the only difference is that a FSS-RBF requires an additional input trx to be included in the second trx. Not clear to me, why the limitation of adding an additional input hinders the added value of FullRBF and how significant that hinderance is. On Tue, 13 Dec 2022 at 11:59 John Carvalho wrote: > Why wasn't this solution put in place back then? Are there problems with > the design? > > While I still think there are unhealthy side-effects of Full-RBF (like > more doublespending at unknowing merchants, after years of FSS protection) > I think discussion of this FSS-RBF feature is worth considering. > > -- > John Carvalho > CEO, Synonym.to > > > On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 8:09 AM Daniel Lipshitz wrote: > >> Thank you for bringing that to my attention, apologies for not being >> aware of it. >> >> First-seen-safe replace-by-fee as detailed here >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-May/008248.html >> by Peter Todd seems to be a very suitable option and route >> which balances FullRBF while retaining the significant 0-conf use case. >> >> This would seem like a good way forward. >> >> >> >> ________________________________ >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 13, 2022 at 6:20 AM Yuval Kogman >> wrote: >> >>> >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-May/008248.html >>> >> -- ________________________________ Daniel Lipshitz GAP600 www.Gap600.com