CTV does not enable this afaiu because it does not commit to the inputs
(otherwise there's a hash cycle for predicting the output's TXID.


--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>


On Thu, Sep 3, 2020 at 7:39 AM Dmitry Petukhov <dp@simplexum.com> wrote:

> Just had an idea that an an "inverse timelock" can be made
> almost-certainly automatic: a revocation UTXO shall become
> anyone-can-spend after a timeout, and bear some non-dust amount.
>
> Before the timelock expiration, it shall be spendable only along with
> the covenant-locked 'main' UTXO (via a signature or mutual covenant)
>
> This way, after a timeout expires, a multitude of entities will be
> incentivized to spend this UTXO, because this would be free money for
> them. It will probably be spend by a miner, as they can always replace
> the spending transaction with their own and claim the amount.
>
> After the revocation UTXO is spent, the covenant path that commits to
> having it in the inputs will be unspendable, and this would effectively
> constitute an "inverse timelock".
>
>
>