Presigned transactions have to use a N-of-N (2-2 for ln, more for pools)
multisignature which is computed over the network whereas in-script
commitments can be done 1 key that is a non-secret point (e.g., just the
generator I think works).

For large protocol trees (e.g., of size N) the savings can be substantial!
It also reduces the amount of state that needs to be stored since the
in-script sigs can be deterministic.

Rene has some nice work demonstrating that latency in generating state
transitions has a very substantial cost to the efficiency of routing, maybe
he can chime in further.


You can also do a "back-filling" where you get the best of both, by (after
you commit to the quick to generate in-script version) lazily backfilling
with an equivalent p2wpkh version. If you have a channel, when you are in
"burst mode", you can cancel the longer to generate p2wpkh version when
newer states come in. (data hazard/ bypass).


With respect to mining pools and size constraints,
https://rubin.io/bitcoin/2021/12/12/advent-15/ shows how paying into
batches of channels can be used to trustlessly compress payouts without
custodial relationship.


--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>

On Fri, Aug 19, 2022 at 11:53 AM David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On 2022-08-19 06:33, James O'Beirne via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > Multiple parties could
> > trustlessly collaborate to settle into a single CTV output using
> > SIGHASH_ALL | ANYONECANPAY. This requires a level of interaction
> > similar to coinjoins.
>
> Just to make sure I understand, is the reason for SH_ALL|SH_ACP so that
> any of the parties can subsequently RBF fee bump the transaction?
>
> > Conceptually, CTV is the most parsimonious way to do such a scheme,
> > since you can't really get smaller than a SHA256 commitment
>
> What's the advantage of CTV here compared to presigned transactions?  If
> multiple parties need to interact to cooperatively sign a transaction,
> no significant overhead is added by having them simultaneously sign a
> second transaction that spends from the output of the first transaction.
>   Presigned transactions actually have two small benefits I can think of:
>
> 1. The payment from the first transaction (containing the spends from
> the channel setup transactions) can be sent to a P2WPKH output, which is
> actually smaller than a SHA256 commitment.  Though this probably does
> require an extra round of communication for commit-and-reveal to prevent
> a collision attack on the P2WPKH address.[1]
>
> 2. Having the first transaction pay a either a P2WPKH or bech32m output
> and the second transaction spend from that UTXO may blend in better with
> other transactions, enhancing privacy.  This advantage probably isn't
> compatible with SH_ALL|SH_ACP, though, and it would require other
> privacy upgrades to LN.
>
> > direct-from-coinbase payouts seem like a
> > desirable feature which avoids some trust in pools.
> > [...]
> > If the payout was instead a single OP_CTV output, an arbitrary number
> > of pool participants could be paid out "atomically" within a single
> > coinbase.  One limitation is
> > the size of the coinbase outputs owed to constituent miners; this
> > limits the number of participants in the pool.
>
> I'm confused by this.  What is the size limitation on coinbase outputs,
> how does it limit the number of participants in a pool, and how does CTV
> fix that?
>
> Thanks,
>
> -Dave
>
> [1]
>
> https://bitcoinops.org/en/newsletters/2020/06/24/#reminder-about-collision-attack-risks-on-two-party-ecdsa
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