This might be unpopular because of bad re-org behavior, but I believe the utility of this construction can be improved if we introduce functionality that makes a script invalid after a certain time (correct me if I'm wrong, I believe all current timelocks are valid after a certain time and invalid before, this is the inverse). Then you can exclude old delegates by timing/block height arguments, or even pre-sign delegates for different periods of time (e.g., if this happens in the next 100 blocks require y, before the next 1000 blocks but after the first 100 require z, etc). -- @JeremyRubin On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:58 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 3:56 PM, Ryan Grant wrote: > > Am I reading correctly that this allows unilateral key rotation (to a > > previously unknown key), without invalidating the interests of other > > parties in the existing multisig (or even requiring any on-chain > > transaction), at the cost of storing the signed delegation? > > Yes, though I'd avoid the word rotation because as you note it doesn't > invalidate the interests of any key, the original setup remains able > to sign. You could allow a new key of yours (plus everyone else) to > sign, assuming the other parties agree... but the old one could also > still sign. > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >