Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 100 specification

From: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@gmail•com>
To: jl2012@xbt•hk
Cc: Bitcoin development mailing list <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 100 specification
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2015 10:35:56 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CADm_WcYZ3mDzRrRax5j+RmjhV9xQd3_NuV-hPVOBh2p+HpxbQQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e54e93e519d776262f9c0f4ae23f54fb@xbt.hk>

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Thanks - several good suggestions, including some in common.  Will comment
& revise today.

Currently in "collecting" mode, to avoid duplicative comments in multiple
locales.

On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 3:57 AM, <jl2012@xbt•hk> wrote:

> Some comments:
>
>
>    - The 75% rule is meaningless here. Since this is a pure relaxation of
>    rules, there is no such thing as "invalid version 4 blocks"
>
>
>    -
>
>    The implication threshold is unclear. Is it 95% or 80%?
>
>    - Softfork requires a very high threshold (95%) to "attack" the
>       original fork. This makes sure that unupgraded client will only see the new
>       fork.
>       - In the case of hardfork, however, the new fork is unable to
>       attack the original fork, and unupgraded client will never see the new
>       fork. The initiation of a hardfork should be based on its acceptance by the
>       economic majority, not miner support. 95% is an overkill and may probably
>       never accomplished. I strongly prefer a 80% threshold rather than 95%.
>
>
>    - As I've pointed out, using 20-percentile rather than median creates
>    an incentive to 51% attack the uncooperative minority.
>    https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010690.html
>
> Having said that, I don't have a strong feeling about the use of
> 20-percentile as threshold to increase the block size. That means the block
> size is increased only when most miners agree, which sounds ok to me.
>
> However, using 20-percentile as threshold to DECREASE the block size could
> be very dangerous. Consider that the block size has been stable at 8MB for
> a few years. Everyone are happy with that. An attacker would just need to
> acquire 21% of mining power to break the status quo and send us all the way
> to 1MB. The only way to stop such attempt is to 51% attack the attacker.
> That'd be really ugly.
>
> For technical and ethical reasons, I believe the thresholds for increase
> and decrease must be symmetrical: increase the block size when the
> x-percentile is bigger than the current size, decrease the block size when
> the (100-x)-percentile is smaller than the current size. The overall effect
> is: the block size remains unchanged unless 80% of miners agree to.
>
>    - Please consider the use of "hardfork bit" to signify the hardfork:
>
>
> https://www.reddit.com/r/bitcoin_devlist/comments/3ekhg2/bip_draft_hardfork_bit_jl2012_at_xbthk_jul_23_2015/
>
> https://github.com/jl2012/bips/blob/master/hardforkbit.mediawiki
>
>    - Or, alternatively, please combine the hardfork with a softfork. I'm
>    rewriting the specification as follow (changes underlined):
>
>
>    1. Replace static 1M block size hard limit with a floating limit
>    ("hardLimit").
>    2.
>
>    hardLimit floats within the range 1-32M, inclusive.
>
>    3.
>
>    Initial value of hardLimit is 1M, preserving current system.
>
>    4. Changing hardLimit is accomplished by encoding a proposed value
>    within a block's coinbase scriptSig.
>       1. Votes refer to a byte value, encoded within the pattern
>       "/BV\d+/" Example: /BV8000000/ votes for 8,000,000 byte hardLimit. If
>       there is more than one match with with pattern, the first match is counted.
>       2. Absent/invalid votes and votes below minimum cap (1M) are
>       counted as 1M votes. Votes above the maximum cap (32M) are counted as 32M
>       votes.
>       3. A new hardLimit is calculated at each difficult adjustment
>       period (2016 blocks), and applies to the next 2016 blocks.
>       4. Calculate hardLimit by examining the coinbase scriptSig votes of
>       the previous 12,000 blocks, and taking the 20th percentile and 80th
>       percentile.
>       5. New hardLimit is the median of the followings:
>          1. min(current hardLimit * 1.2, 20-percentile)
>          2. max(current hardLimit / 1.2, 80-percentile)
>          3. current hardLimit
>       5. version 4 block: the coinbase of a version 4 block must match
>    this pattern: "/BV\d+/"
>    6. 70% rule: If 8,400 of the last 12,000 blocks are version 4 or
>    greater, reject invalid version 4 blocks. (testnet4: 501 of last 1000)
>    7. 80% rule ("Point of no return"): If 9,600 of the last 12,000 blocks
>    are version 4 or greater, reject all version <= 3 blocks. (testnet4: 750 of
>    last 1000)
>    8. Block version number is calculated after masking out high 16 bits
>    (final bit count TBD by versionBits outcome).
>
> Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-09-02 23:33 寫到:
> > BIP 100 initial public draft:
> > https://github.com/jgarzik/bip100/blob/master/bip-0100.mediawiki [1]
> >
> > Emphasis on "initial"  This is a starting point for the usual open
> > source feedback/iteration cycle, not an endpoint that Must Be This
> > Way.
> >
> >
> >
> > Links:
> > ------
> > [1] https://github.com/jgarzik/bip100/blob/master/bip-0100.mediawiki
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>

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