Thanks for the link. I readily admit only having given pay-to-future-miner a little bit of thought. Not convinced it sets a minimal tx fee in all cases. On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 12:55 AM, wrote: > Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-09-03 00:05 寫到: > >> Schemes proposing to pay with difficulty / hashpower to change block >> size should be avoided. The miners incentive has always been fairly >> straightforward - it is rational to deploy new hashpower as soon as >> you can get it online. Introducing the concepts of (a) requiring >> out-of-band collusion to change block size and/or (b) requiring miners >> to have idle hashpower on hand to change block size are both >> unrealistic and potentially corrosive. That potentially makes the >> block size - and therefore fee market - too close, too sensitive to >> the wild vagaries of the mining chip market. >> >> Pay-to-future-miner has neutral, forward looking incentives worth >> researching. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > > Ref: > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010723.html > > I explained here why pay with difficulty is bad for everyone: miners and > users, and described the use of OP_CLTV for pay-to-future-miner > > However, a general problem of pay-to-increase-block-size scheme is it > indirectly sets a minimal tx fee, which could be difficult and arbitrary, > and is against competition > > >