From: Tier Nolan <tier.nolan@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Assurance contracts to fund the network with OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY
Date: Fri, 8 May 2015 15:56:35 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE-z3OUypPwtvzhFJEPYfO7zw4NxmEEXNtRFfqQrVCO2Z2jr6A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAOoPuRZo6M1-XTYk6LebADHwQVwKEOYtaHGvEoRkk5AfevvJYw@mail.gmail.com>
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On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 3:54 PM, Benjamin <benjamin.l.cordes@gmail•com>
wrote:
> AC does not solve the problem. AC works if people gain directly from
> the payment.
Not necessarily.
> Imagine a group of people paying tax - nobody gains from
> paying it. You have to actually need to enforce negative outcomes to
> enable it (jail for tax fraud). Hence in Bitcoin we have the enforced
> subsidy. AFAIK the problem of how to incentivize transaction
> verification without subsidy is unsolved. Who determines a fair price?
> People around here should study more economics, game theory, etc.
> instead of debating low level encodings all the time.
>
> On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 4:15 PM, Tier Nolan <tier.nolan@gmail•com> wrote:
> > Just to clarify the process.
> >
> > Pledgers create transactions using the following template and broadcast
> > them. The p2p protocol could be modified to allow this, or it could be a
> > separate system.
> >
> > Input: 0.01 BTC
> > Signed with SIGHASH_ANYONE_CAN_PAY
> >
> > Output 50BTC
> > Paid to: <1 million> OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY OP_TRUE
> >
> > Output 0.01BTC
> > Paid to OP_TRUE
> >
> > This transaction is invalid, since the inputs don't pay for the output.
> The
> > advantage of the sighash "anyone can pay" field is that other people can
> add
> > additional inputs without making the signature invalid. Normally, any
> > change to the transaction would make a signature invalid.
> >
> > Eventually, enough other users have added pledges and a valid transaction
> > can be broadcast.
> >
> > Input: 0.01 BTC
> > Signed with SIGHASH_ANYONE_CAN_PAY
> >
> > Input: 1.2 BTC
> > Signed with SIGHASH_ANYONE_CAN_PAY
> >
> > Input: 5 BTC
> > Signed with SIGHASH_ANYONE_CAN_PAY
> >
> > <etc>
> >
> > Input: 1.3 BTC
> > Signed with SIGHASH_ANYONE_CAN_PAY
> >
> > Output 50BTC
> > Paid to: <1 million> OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY OP_TRUE
> >
> > Output 0.01BTC
> > Paid to OP_TRUE
> >
> > This transaction can be submitted to the main network. Once it is
> included
> > into the blockchain, it is locked in.
> >
> > In this example, it might be included in block 999,500. The 0.01BTC
> output
> > (and any excess over 50BTC) can be collected by the block 999,500 miner.
> >
> > The OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY opcode means that the 50BTC output cannot be
> > spent until block 1 million. Once block 1 million arrives, the output is
> > completely unprotected. This means that the miner who mines block 1
> million
> > can simply take it, by including his own transaction that sends it to an
> > address he controls. It would be irrational to include somebody else's
> > transaction which spent it.
> >
> > If by block 999,900, the transaction hasn't been completed (due to not
> > enough pledgers), the pledgers can spend the coin(s) that they were
> going to
> > use for their pledge. This invalidates those inputs and effectively
> > withdraws from the pledge.
> >
> > On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 11:01 AM, Benjamin <benjamin.l.cordes@gmail•com>
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> 2. "A merchant wants to cause block number 1 million to effectively
> >> have a minting fee of 50BTC." - why should he do that? That's the
> >> entire tragedy of the commons problem, no?
> >
> >
> > No, the pledger is saying that he will only pay 0.01BTC if the miner
> gets a
> > reward of 50BTC.
> >
> > Imagine a group of 1000 people who want to make a donation of 50BTC to
> > something. They all way that they will donate 0.05BTC, but only if
> everyone
> > else donates.
> >
> > It still isn't perfect. Everyone has an incentive to wait until the last
> > minute to pledge.
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-05-08 14:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-05-07 23:32 Tier Nolan
2015-05-08 9:49 ` Mike Hearn
2015-05-08 10:01 ` Benjamin
2015-05-08 14:15 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-08 14:54 ` Benjamin
2015-05-08 14:56 ` Tier Nolan [this message]
2015-05-08 15:03 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-08 10:00 ` Jeff Garzik
2015-05-08 16:43 ` Peter Todd
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