From: Tier Nolan <tier.nolan@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP] Normalized Transaction IDs
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 19:11:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE-z3OV1WEDEV+X7gNVx+qBMt4jpSHFKXm3dxUrUyBEJrCNDSQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPg+sBggj382me1ATDx4SS9KHVfvX5KH7ZhLHN6B+2_a+Emw1Q@mail.gmail.com>
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On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:14 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail•com>
wrote:
> Normalized transaction ids are only effectively non-malleable when all
> inputs they refer to are also non-malleable (or you can have malleability
> in 2nd level dependencies), so I do not believe it makes sense to allow
> mixed usage of the txids at all.
>
The txid or txid-norm is signed, so can't be changed after signing.
The hard fork is to allow transactions to refer to their inputs by txid or
txid-norm. You pick one before signing.
> They do not provide the actual benefit of guaranteed non-malleability
> before it becomes disallowed to use the old mechanism.
>
A signed transaction cannot have its txid changed. It is true that users
of the system would have to use txid-norm.
The basic refund transaction is as follows.
A creates TX1: "Pay w BTC to <B's public key> if signed by A & B"
A creates TX2: "Pay w BTC from TX1-norm to <A's public key>, locked 48
hours in the future, signed by A"
A sends TX2 to B
B signs TX2 and returns to A
A broadcasts TX1. It is mutated before entering the chain to become
TX1-mutated.
A can still submit TX2 to the blockchain, since TX1 and TX1-mutated have
the same txid-norm.
>
> That, together with the +- resource doubling needed for the UTXO set (as
> earlier mentioned) and the fact that an alternative which is only a
> softfork are available, makes this a bad idea IMHO.
>
> Unsure to what extent this has been presented on the mailinglist, but the
> softfork idea is this:
> * Transactions get 2 txids, one used to reference them (computed as
> before), and one used in an (extended) sighash.
> * The txins keep using the normal txid, so not structural changes to
> Bitcoin.
> * The ntxid is computed by replacing the scriptSigs in inputs by the empty
> string, and by replacing the txids in txins by their corresponding ntxids.
> * A new checksig operator is softforked in, which uses the ntxids in its
> sighashes rather than the full txid.
> * To support efficiently computing ntxids, every tx in the utxo set
> (currently around 6M) stores the ntxid, but only supports lookup bu txid
> still.
>
> This does result in a system where a changed dependency indeed invalidates
> the spending transaction, but the fix is trivial and can be done without
> access to the private key.
>
The problem with this is that 2 level malleability is not protected against.
C spends B which spends A.
A is mutated before it hits the chain. The only change in A is in the
scriptSig.
B can be converted to B-new without breaking the signature. This is
because the only change to A was in the sciptSig, which is dropped when
computing the txid-norm.
B-new spends A-mutated. B-new is different from B in a different place.
The txid it uses to refer to the previous output is changed.
The signed transaction C cannot be converted to a valid C-new. The txid of
the input points to B. It is updated to point at B-new. B-new and B don't
have the same txid-norm, since the change is outside the scriptSig. This
means that the signature for C is invalid.
The txid replacements should be done recursively. All input txids should
be replaced by txid-norms when computing the txid-norm for the
transaction. I think this repairs the problem with only allowing one level?
Computing txid-norm:
- replace all txids in inputs with txid-norms of those transactions
- replace all input scriptSigs with empty scripts
- transaction hash is txid-norm for that transaction
The same situation as above is not fatal now.
C spends B which spends A.
A is mutated before it hits the chain. The only change in A is in the
scriptSig.
B can be converted to B-new without breaking the signature. This is
because the only change to A was in the sciptSig, which is dropped when
computing the txid-norm (as before).
B-new spends A mutated. B-new is different from B in for the previous
inputs.
The input for B-new points to A-mutated. When computing the txid-norm,
that would be replaced with the txid-norm for A.
Similarly, the input for B points to A and that would have been replaced
with the txid-norm for A.
This means that B and B-new have the same txid-norm.
The signed transaction C can be converted to a valid C-new. The txid of
the input points to B. It is updated to point at B-new. B-new and B now
have have the same txid-norm and so C is valid.
I think this reasoning is valid, but probably needs writing out actual
serializations.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-05-13 18:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-05-13 12:48 Christian Decker
2015-05-13 13:12 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-13 13:41 ` Gavin Andresen
2015-05-13 15:24 ` Christian Decker
2015-05-13 16:18 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-13 16:34 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-05-13 17:14 ` Pieter Wuille
2015-05-13 18:04 ` Christian Decker
2015-05-13 18:40 ` Pieter Wuille
2015-05-13 19:14 ` Christian Decker
2015-05-13 19:40 ` Pieter Wuille
2015-05-13 18:11 ` Tier Nolan [this message]
2015-05-13 20:27 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-13 20:31 ` Pieter Wuille
2015-05-13 20:32 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-14 0:37 ` Pieter Wuille
2015-05-14 11:01 ` Christian Decker
2015-05-14 11:26 ` Christian Decker
2015-05-15 9:54 ` s7r
2015-05-15 10:45 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-15 16:31 ` Luke Dashjr
2015-05-16 3:58 ` Stephen
2015-05-16 10:52 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-19 8:28 ` Christian Decker
2015-05-19 9:13 ` Tier Nolan
2015-05-19 10:43 ` Christian Decker
2015-05-19 12:48 ` Stephen Morse
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