From: Alex Mizrahi <alex.mizrahi@gmail•com>
To: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail•com>,
Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists•sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] deterministic transaction expiration
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2014 21:01:29 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAE28kUQwHwkovAVhp=OHfOw72n2NRqQgDWjWqNkp8RrJY9d_0A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAAS2fgT2g9FgsVuKWLLxNqE_pp1DgdAc-edLL474UQ+eJQiXwg@mail.gmail.com>
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>
> A distinction there is that they can only become invalid via a
> conflict— replaced by another transaction authored by the prior
> signers. If no other transaction could be created (e.g. you're a
> multisigner and won't sign it again) then there is no such risk.
You need to check transaction's dependencies up to a certain depth to know
whether it is safe:
If one of inputs depends on transaction which is signed by parties with
unknown trustworthiness, then it isn't safe.
> It now introduces chance events ("act of god") into the mix where they
> they didn't exist before.
You need to check transaction's dependencies up to a certain depth to know
whether it is safe:
If one of inputs depends on transaction time-locked script (or other
unrecognized script), then it isn't safe.
Situation is identical, you might need several extra lines of code.
I think it would matter only if we had deterministic, reliable mempool and
reorganization behavior. But it's not something we can depend on.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-08-05 18:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-08-01 0:58 Kaz Wesley
2014-08-01 1:06 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-01 1:37 ` Kaz Wesley
2014-08-01 1:38 ` Matt Whitlock
2014-08-01 2:28 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-08-01 3:26 ` Matt Whitlock
2014-08-01 3:31 ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-08-05 18:01 ` Alex Mizrahi [this message]
2014-08-02 0:36 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-05 17:02 ` Flavien Charlon
2014-08-05 17:48 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-05 18:54 ` Mike Hearn
2014-08-05 19:08 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-05 19:10 ` Kaz Wesley
2014-08-05 19:36 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 4:01 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-06 12:55 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 13:54 ` Mike Hearn
2014-08-06 14:44 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-06 15:08 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 15:17 ` Christian Decker
2014-08-06 15:42 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-06 16:15 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 17:02 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-06 17:21 ` Mark Friedenbach
2014-08-06 17:34 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-06 17:24 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-06 16:31 ` Mark Friedenbach
2014-08-06 17:20 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-06 17:30 ` Mark Friedenbach
2014-08-06 17:38 ` Peter Todd
2014-08-08 17:38 ` Tom Harding
2014-08-08 18:13 ` Jeff Garzik
2014-08-08 18:42 ` Kaz Wesley
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