From: Daniele Pinna <daniele.pinna@gmail•com>
To: Peter R <peter_r@gmx•com>
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] "A Transaction Fee Market Exists Without a Block Size Limit"--new research paper suggests
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2015 23:02:48 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEgR2PGu4XhAcxR=gmCxKMwJY_4ckNX=0mvbsxygWm83kTNNjA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8A71E9FB-1901-4044-B2E0-04DEFE58C045@gmx.com>
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"However, that is outside the scope of the result that an individual
miner's profit per block is always maximized at a finite block size Q* if
Shannon Entropy about each transaction is communicated during the block
solution announcement. This result is important because it explains how a
minimum fee density exists and it shows how miners cannot create enormous
spam blocks for "no cost," for example. "
Dear Peter,
This might very well not be the case. Since the expected revenue *<V>* in
our formulas is but a lower bound to the true expected revenue, and the fee
supply curve [image: M_s(Q)\propto 1/\langle V\rangle], if the true
expected revenue doesn't decay faster than the mempool's average
transaction fee (or, more simply, if it doesn't decay to zero) then the
maximum miner surplus will be unbounded and unhealthy fee markets will
emerge.
Best,
Daniele
Daniele Pinna, Ph.D
On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 10:08 PM, Peter R <peter_r@gmx•com> wrote:
> Hi Daniele,
>
> I don't think there is any contention over the idea that miners that
> control a larger percentage of the hash rate, *h */ *H*, have a
> profitability advantage if you hold all the other variables of the miner's
> profit equation constant. I think this is important: it is a centralizing
> factor similar to other economies of scale.
>
> However, that is outside the scope of the result that an individual
> miner's profit per block is always maximized at a finite block size Q* if
> Shannon Entropy about each transaction is communicated during the block
> solution announcement. This result is important because it explains how a
> minimum fee density exists and it shows how miners cannot create enormous
> spam blocks for "no cost," for example.
>
> Best regards,
> Peter
>
>
> 2) Whether it's truly possible for a miner's marginal profit per unit of
> hash to decrease with increasing hashrate in some parametric regime.This
> however directly contradicts the assumption that an optimal hashrate exists
> beyond which the revenue per unit of hash *v' < v *if *h' > h. *
> *Q.E.D *
>
> This theorem in turn implies the following corollary:
>
> *COROLLARY: **The marginal profit curve is a monotonically increasing of
> miner hashrate.*
>
> This simple theorem, suggested implicitly by Gmaxwell disproves any and
> all conclusions of my work. Most importantly, centralization pressures will
> always be present.
>
>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-08-30 21:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-08-03 15:22 [bitcoin-dev] Eli Dourado on "governance" Gavin Andresen
[not found] ` <1438640036.2828.0.camel@auspira.com>
2015-08-03 22:21 ` Gavin Andresen
2015-08-04 6:40 ` [bitcoin-dev] "A Transaction Fee Market Exists Without a Block Size Limit"--new research paper suggests Peter R
2015-08-04 18:41 ` Dave Hudson
2015-08-04 21:18 ` Peter Todd
2015-08-04 21:30 ` Gavin Andresen
2015-08-04 21:46 ` Peter Todd
2015-08-05 0:26 ` Milly Bitcoin
2015-08-05 0:40 ` Neil Fincham
2015-08-04 23:37 ` Dave Hudson
2015-08-05 22:15 ` Peter R
2015-08-05 22:44 ` Dave Hudson
2015-08-05 23:45 ` Tom Harding
2015-08-05 8:33 ` Benjamin
2015-08-05 9:18 ` Hector Chu
2015-08-05 9:57 ` Adam Back
2015-08-05 10:51 ` Hector Chu
2015-08-05 11:07 ` Adam Back
2015-08-05 11:35 ` Hector Chu
2015-08-05 19:04 ` Hector Chu
2015-08-05 10:26 ` Peter R
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgTzeFnmnr2ScZvf1pDUtF+M3HhF9xo0yhjVPObpqhgz0A@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <6ED57388-6EC3-4515-BF3F-E753301537AB@gmx.com>
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgRoFna4i-d=hpmz-CpV35VQ=J1aEoTTT6B1oD4f15C1KA@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <C8B38FEC-0EF2-483F-9E53-43AB937455A0@gmx.com>
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgQjXNTi9Y_YwLg2dR8baYZhvmEjw43ictt749zR2AOEWw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <6FED5604-4A6F-4CE1-B42E-36626375D557@gmx.com>
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgQ7hRRvRtD8igcZ2aWBmnqre6iM27peCFGxgC8ODb9jgw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <6BA86443-7534-4AAA-92BC-EC9B1603DE5F@gmx.com>
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgTTZKD9LQHpMmEH0OU=T8Ta7cCaavWzhM1yQ68-MAT8UQ@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <27B16AB4-0DAD-4665-BF08-7A0C0A70D8D8@gmx.com>
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgRm_CSmWgr7CGmBUD0nX+V0fJ8N4TQN01Vchgip9-s6uQ@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CAAS2fgT+DP+DaoCMG276uF4=Yoi-w40YyNP-RDRG7NQgOmtpGw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CAEgR2PGn_SER18sMuKPJJz5RT=1K=346eCm ph5FJQhhoLcV1zw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CAEgR2PGn_SER18sMuKPJJz5RT=1K=346eCmph5FJQhhoLcV1zw@mail.gmail.com>
2015-08-30 20:08 ` Peter R
2015-08-30 21:02 ` Daniele Pinna [this message]
2015-08-04 14:22 ` [bitcoin-dev] Eli Dourado on "governance" Anthony Towns
2015-08-04 18:28 ` Owen
2015-08-05 3:07 ` Eric Lombrozo
2015-08-05 6:32 ` Mashuri Clark
2015-08-05 13:28 ` Mashuri Clark
2015-08-07 16:26 ` Thomas Zander
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