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From: Nadav Ivgi <nadav@shesek•info>
To: darosior <darosior@protonmail•com>,
	 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] ANYPREVOUT in place of CTV
Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 17:25:42 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXD5f1EquTAx0j0uc_jzWr9ZG8WRutUxznpmXn_7xuav6H4cw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXD5f1KgDzY5sc-zknHYUSiSa7kWsXOHkg7kDakY3Kh5QtxTQ@mail.gmail.com>

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> via `sha_sequences`

Since you cannot expect txid stability with >1 inputs either way[0], it
should be sufficient to commit just to the current input's
nSequence/scriptSig to get txid stability for single input transactions. I
chatted with Jeremy about this and he appears to agree.

Not committing to the nSequence of other inputs gives them the freedom to
set it independently, so for example you can spend a CSV-encumbered output
alongside the covenant. And there seems to be no downside to doing this [1].

APO/APOAS already commits to the nSequence of the current input. And since
APO is Taproot-only, the scriptSig of the covenant input is guarrnated to
be empty, so it is also already committed to in a way.

However, without committing to all the nSequences which implicitly commits
to the number of inputs, the number has to be committed separately.

So my suggestion is to explicitly commit to the number of inputs, instead
of commiting to `sha_sequences`.

Cheers
shesek

[0] the additional input(s) will be third-party malleable, since their
prevouts can be replaced with an entirely different txid:vout
[1] BIP 119's rationale for committing to the nSequences is txid
malleability:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0119.mediawiki#committing-to-the-sequences-hash



On Sat, Apr 30, 2022 at 11:09 AM Nadav Ivgi <nadav@shesek•info> wrote:

> Hi darosior,
>
> It's interesting to note that APOAS|SINGLE (with the ANYONECANPAY
> behaviour and without covering the spent input index) has some interesting
> uses for cases where the covenant only needs to restrict a single output
> (so useful for e.g. vaults or spacechains, but not for batch channels or
> congestion control).
>
> For example in the vault use-case, it makes it possible to bump fees on
> the unvault tx by adding more inputs and a change output, as well as
> unvault multiple vaulted outputs in a single transaction.
>
> For spacechains, it makes it possible to add the spaceblock hash OP_RETURN
> and pay fees directly in the tx chain, instead of having to use an
> additional tx to prepare an output that gets spent in the tx chain  (see
> the diagram in [0]).
>
> > via `sha_sequences` and maybe also `sha_amounts`
>
> CTV does not commit to the input amounts. This has some practical
> implications:
>
> 1. If it is committed, sending an even slightly incorrect amount will make
> the covenant-encumbered spend path unusable.
>
> With CTV, sending a slightly lower amount results in slightly lower fees,
> while any extra gets spent/burned on fees. The covenant spend path only
> becomes unusable if the amount is too low to cover for the outputs (+relay
> fee for it to also be standard).
>
> 2. The ability to allow for additional inputs with unknown amounts makes
> it possible to fee-bump the covenant spending transaction (with whole utxos
> and no change). You can have one tapleaf for spending the covenant output
> alone, and another one for attaching an extra fee input to it.
>
> This also makes it possible to resolve the under-payment issue described
> in (1), by adding an input that covers the original intended amount.
>
> So my suggestion would be to either not cover `sha_amounts` in the msg
> hash, or to make it optional behind a flag.
>
> shesek
>
> [0] https://github.com/fiatjaf/simple-ctv-spacechain
>
> On Fri, Apr 22, 2022 at 2:23 PM darosior via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> I would like to know people's sentiment about doing (a very slightly
>> tweaked version of) BIP118 in place of
>> (or before doing) BIP119.
>>
>> SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT and its precedent iterations have been discussed for
>> over 6 years. It presents proven and
>> implemented usecases, that are demanded and (please someone correct me if
>> i'm wrong) more widely accepted than
>> CTV's.
>>
>> SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT, if its "ANYONECANPAY" behaviour is made
>> optional [0], can emulate CTV just fine.
>> Sure then you can't have bare or Segwit v0 CTV, and it's a bit more
>> expensive to use. But we can consider CTV
>> an optimization of APO-AS covenants.
>>
>> CTV advocates have been presenting vaults as the flagship usecase.
>> Although as someone who've been trying to
>> implement practical vaults for the past 2 years i doubt CTV is necessary
>> nor sufficient for this (but still
>> useful!), using APO-AS covers it. And it's not a couple dozen more
>> virtual bytes that are going to matter for
>> a potential vault user.
>>
>> If after some time all of us who are currently dubious about CTV's stated
>> usecases are proven wrong by onchain
>> usage of a less efficient construction to achieve the same goal, we could
>> roll-out CTV as an optimization.  In
>> the meantime others will have been able to deploy new applications
>> leveraging ANYPREVOUT (Eltoo, blind
>> statechains, etc..[1]).
>>
>>
>> Given the interest in, and demand for, both simple covenants and better
>> offchain protocols it seems to me that
>> BIP118 is a soft fork candidate that could benefit more (if not most of)
>> Bitcoin users.
>> Actually i'd also be interested in knowing if people would oppose the
>> APO-AS part of BIP118, since it enables
>> CTV's features, for the same reason they'd oppose BIP119.
>>
>>
>> [0] That is, to not commit to the other inputs of the transaction (via
>> `sha_sequences` and maybe also
>> `sha_amounts`). Cf
>> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0118.mediawiki#signature-message
>> .
>>
>> [1] https://anyprevout.xyz/ "Use Cases" section
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-01 14:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-22 11:11 darosior
2022-04-22 11:44 ` rot13maxi
2022-04-22 11:54   ` darosior
2022-04-22 17:01 ` Luke Dashjr
2022-04-24 20:41 ` Richard Myers
2022-04-25 13:35   ` darosior
2022-04-25 16:35     ` darosior
2022-04-25  1:46 ` Erik Aronesty
2022-04-25 16:35 ` Nadav Ivgi
2022-04-25 16:57 ` Nadav Ivgi
2022-04-26 20:13 ` Jeremy Rubin
2022-04-29  5:08 ` Nadav Ivgi
2022-04-29  8:30   ` darosior
2022-04-29 10:21     ` Nadav Ivgi
2022-04-29 11:40       ` Nadav Ivgi
2022-05-01 23:35         ` Billy Tetrud
2022-04-30  8:09 ` Nadav Ivgi
2022-04-30 11:15   ` Greg Sanders
2022-05-01 14:25   ` Nadav Ivgi [this message]
2022-05-03 15:51 ` Jeremy Rubin
2022-04-22 13:35 pushd
2022-04-25 13:34 ` Hampus Sjöberg
2022-04-22 17:14 pushd
2022-04-29 13:22 Swambo, Jacob
2022-05-03 10:38 ` darosior
2022-05-03 16:40 Swambo, Jacob

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