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From: Nadav Ivgi <nadav@shesek•info>
To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail•com>
Cc: Matan Yehieli <matany@campus•technion.ac.il>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>,
	Itay Tsabary <sitay@campus•technion.ac.il>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] MAD-HTLC
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 07:35:51 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXD5f25Y180WoVhh+PnNP6pF_fHE1DbRqDJp_vaLz58+-5=8g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <XcV-a5p3nVenGEXgv4CO2X6lh4UXi18PM4-iKnfY3_SSoi5xCeCp84wsS1yHdHMVvDftNX5TrOnhUfvei371OQQHIVAJmcF-UQ_EAAZONyE=@protonmail.com>

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Hi ZmnSCPxj,

You are of course correct. I had considered the effect of reorgs, but the
email seemed to be getting too lengthy to mention that too.

You would need a few spare blocks in which Bob won't be accused of bribery
as a safety margin, which does reduce the time frame in which Alice can get
her transaction confirmed in order to have a valid bribery fraud. This
seems workable if the time frame was long enough (over a few hours should
be sufficient, assuming we consider reorgs of over 3-4 blocks to be
unlikely), but could indeed be problematic if the time frame is already
short to begin with.

Nadav

On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 7:04 AM ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail•com> wrote:

> Good morning Nadav,
>
> > > I and some number of Lightning devs consider this to be sufficient
> disincentive to Bob not attacking in the first place.
> >
> > An additional disincentive could be introduced in the form of bribery
> proofs for failed attempts.
> >
> > If we assume that "honest" users of the LN protocol won't reveal their
> timelocked transactions before reaching the timelock expiry (they shouldn't
> anyway because standard full node implementations won't relay them), we can
> prove that Bob attempted bribery and failed to an outside observer by
> showing Bob's signed timelocked transaction, spending an output that was in
> reality spent by a different transaction prior to the locktime expiry,
> which should not be possible if Bob had waited.
>
>
> Unfortunately this could be subject to an inversion of this attack.
>
> Alice can wait for the timelock to expire, then bribe miners to prevent
> confirmation of the Bob timelocked transaction, getting the Alice
> hashlocked transaction confirmed.
>
> Now of course you do mention "prior to the locktime expiry" but there is
> now risk at around locktime.
>
> Particularly, "natural" orphaned blocks and short-term chainsplits can
> exist.
> Bob might see that the locktime has arrived and broadcast the signed
> timelocked transaction, then Alice sees the locktime has not yet arrived
> (due to short-term chainsplits/propagation delays) and broadcast the signed
> hashlocked transaction, then in the end the Alice side of the short-term
> chainsplit is what solidifies into reality due to random chance on which
> miner wins which block.
> Then Bob can now be accused of bribery, even though it acted innocently;
> it broadcasted the timelock branch due to a natural chainsplit but Alice
> hashlocked branch got confirmed.
>
> Additional complications can be added on top to help mitigate this edge
> case but more complex == worse in general.
> For example it could "prior to locktime expiry" can ignore a few blocks
> before the actual timelock, but this might allow Bob to mount the attack by
> initiating its bribery behavior earlier by those few blocks.
>
> Finally, serious attackers would just use new pseudonyms, the important
> thing is to make pseudonyms valuable and costly to lose, so it is
> considered sufficient that LN nodes need to have some commitment to the LN
> in the form of actual channels (which are valuable, potentially
> money-earning constructs, and costly to set up).
>
> Other HTLC-using systems, such as the "SwapMarket" being proposed by Chris
> Belcher, could use similar disincentivizing; I know Chris is planning a
> fidelity bond system for SwapMarket makers, for example, which would mimic
> the properties of LN channels (costly to set up, money-earning).
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-25  4:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <CABT1wW=X35HRVGuP-BHUhDrkBEw27+-iDkNnHWjRU-1mRkn0JQ@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-23  6:41 ` Stanga
2020-06-23  9:48   ` ZmnSCPxj
2020-06-23 12:47     ` Stanga
2020-06-23 13:18       ` Stanga
2020-06-25  1:38         ` ZmnSCPxj
2020-06-25  3:26           ` Nadav Ivgi
2020-06-25  4:04             ` ZmnSCPxj
2020-06-25  4:35               ` Nadav Ivgi [this message]
2020-06-25 13:12                 ` Bastien TEINTURIER
2020-06-28 16:41       ` David A. Harding
2020-07-04 21:05         ` ZmnSCPxj
2020-06-28 12:15   ` David A. Harding
2020-06-29 11:57     ` Tejaswi Nadahalli
2020-06-29 18:05     ` ZmnSCPxj
2020-06-30  6:28       ` Stanga
2020-06-30  6:45       ` Tejaswi Nadahalli
2020-07-01 16:58         ` ZmnSCPxj
2020-07-02 12:22           ` Tejaswi Nadahalli
2020-07-02 16:06             ` ZmnSCPxj
2020-07-03  9:43               ` Tejaswi Nadahalli
2020-07-03 10:16                 ` ZmnSCPxj
2020-07-03 10:44                   ` Tejaswi Nadahalli
     [not found]                     ` <CAF-fr9Z7Xo8JmwtuQ7LE3k1=er+p7s9zPjH_8MNPwbxAfT1z7Q@mail.gmail.com>
2020-07-03 12:38                       ` ZmnSCPxj
     [not found]                         ` <CAF-fr9YhiOFD4n8rGF-MBkWeZmzBWfOJz+p8ggfLuDpioVRvyQ@mail.gmail.com>
2020-07-04 20:58                           ` ZmnSCPxj
2020-07-05  9:03                         ` Stanga
2020-07-06 11:13                       ` Tejaswi Nadahalli
2020-07-02 12:39           ` Tejaswi Nadahalli

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