@Jorge
> I disagree...  I would oppose such a change no matter what other users or miners say.

I don't know why you think we disagree on that point. I agree that I would oppose a change to 1GB blocks no matter what other users or miners say. You must have misunderstood me there.

>>  Are you really saying that we should just hard fork every time instead of soft fork?
> No

So what are you advocating for then, exactly?

>> Are you not at all worried about the costs associated with an increased orphan rate and reorg rate?
> Orphan blocks are bad, yes, not sure what the point of your question is.

The point is that if we just deployed with BIP8 LOT=true (as that seems to be the kind of thing you're advocating for) and only 60% of miners had upgraded to the new update by the time it activates, orphans and reorg rate and depths would greatly increase. The point of the question is: shouldn't we avoid that "when possible"? 

> What do you think of bip99?

I haven't read it before, but after reading it, it seems like a reasonable discussion of possibilities and types of forks. It looks like you advocated that "miner voting" is appropriate for some of the types of forks. And yet, from the way you're talking in this thread, it sounds like you don't think any consensus rule change deployment should consider miner signaling. So I'm confused because it seems like the things you're saying here conflict with some of the things you wrote in BIP99. 

What specifically did you want me to get out of BIP99 in this context?

@Eric
> I’d also question the use of the term “majority”

I just want to clarify that by "economic majority" I mean a set of users that presently accept more than 50% of the volume of payments in a given period of time. I definitely agree that no majority of any kind is needed for a split. 


On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 2:52 AM <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
> From: Jorge Timón <jtimon@jtimon.cc>

>> "Soft forks aren’t compatible without miner enforcement"
> Compatible with what?

There is a good summary of what is meant by this term in BIP141:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0141.mediawiki

"Backward compatibility
As a soft fork, older software will continue to operate without modification. Non-upgraded nodes, however, will not see nor validate the witness data and will consider all witness programs as anyone-can-spend scripts (except a few edge cases where the witness programs are equal to 0, which the script must fail). Wallets should always be wary of anyone-can-spend scripts and treat them with suspicion. Non-upgraded nodes are strongly encouraged to upgrade in order to take advantage of the new features."

The explanation is however incomplete. If majority hash power does not enforce the new rules, the above is incorrect. Granted the word "operate" is vague, but clearly what is intended is that "non-upgraded" nodes will not be on a different coin. But in fact they would be. The underlying presumption is that BIP141 is not only signaled, but enforced by majority hash power.

>> "Soft forks without miner support cause splits".
> No, what causes splits are 3 things:
>
> 1) bugs
> 2) coordination mistakes
> 3) people wanting different rules.

#3 (and possibly #4) is what we're talking about, so it's not at all clear why you said "no".

People change their rules, because #3. If majority hash power does not enforce this (soft) change, it's a chain split.

> Let me give an example. Let's say all users want change A.
>
> Only 60% miners want it.
> When it activates with LOT=true, will this cause a split?

No, regardless of percentage adoption. You've proposed that it' is majority hash power enforced.

Furthermore, the term compatibility (see above) implies that not everyone (your impossible presumption of 100%) is aligned.

This is not a debatable subject as far as I'm concerned, but it's worth discussion for those who aren't familiar.

e