>  when people are talking about enabling covenants, we are talking about whether OP_CAT should be allowed or not

Are they? Are you implying that anything that enables covenants is equivalent to enabling OP_CAT? Generally when I think about enabling covenants, I'm thinking more about OP_CTV (or some similarly specific opcode).

> OP_TWEAK 

I wasn't able to find anything about what that is. Would you mind clarifying what that concept is? 

On Mon, Jul 5, 2021 at 10:20 AM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Hi ZmnSCPxj,

I don't believe we need to ban Turing completeness for the sake of banning Turing completeness.  My concerns have always been around ensuring that transaction and block validation is not unduly burdensome for nodes.  So for Bitcoin Script, we want to bound the amount of resources needed to execute it, preferably as a linear function of weight[1], and preferably have it clear what the evaluation costs are going to be prior to evaluation[2].  We also want to keep Script execution as a pure function of the transaction data so that nodes do not need to reevaluate their mempool on every new block.  For consensus purposes we prefer to have simple primitive operations that have clear and precise semantics that are as likely as possible to be reimplemented correctly if they are reimplemented (or at least let us not make this problem worse than it already is).  In particular, Script needs to be easy to parse to avoid weird parsing machines that lead to security vulnerabilities within node software.

While the above design constraints imply a prohibition on Turing complete computation within a single Script, they do not imply a prohibition on arbitrary, covenant-enabled computations that spans across multiple transactions.  Neither would these constraints prohibit some kind of STARK or SNARK tapleaf version that was somehow capable of succinctly representing arbitrary computations, so long as validation costs remain bounded.

And while it is true that covenant-enabled computations could allow users to put their funds at risk through weird machines that manipulate their money on the blockchain, as longs as that weirdness stays at that level of the abstract Bitcoin Script machine, then I suppose it is caveat emptor; don't send your funds to random unverified Bitcoin Scripts, advice that is already the case today.  We can keep that potential weirdness at bay by keeping Script simple, and maintaining our understanding that the Script programs (like the rest of the blockchain data) are untrusted inputs and they need to be validated and scrutinized before interpretation.

[1] In tapscript I believe all operations are linear time with the exception of OP_ROLL.  However OP_ROLL is still constrained by global limits on stack size, etc.
[2] In Bitcoin Script, without loops of any kind, every opcode is evaluated at most once, so counting opcodes is an easy way to put an upper bound on your costs before evaluation.

On Sun, Jul 4, 2021 at 8:51 PM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Good morning Dave,

> On Sun, Jul 04, 2021 at 11:39:44AM -0700, Jeremy wrote:
>
> > However, I think the broader community is unconvinced by the cost benefit
> > of arbitrary covenants. See
> > https://medium.com/block-digest-mempool/my-worries-about-too-generalized-covenants-5eff33affbb6
> > as a recent example. Therefore as a critical part of building consensus on
> > various techniques I've worked to emphasize that specific additions do not
> > entail risk of accidentally introducing more than was bargained for to
> > respect the concerns of others.
>
> Respecting the concerns of others doesn't require lobotomizing useful
> tools. Being respectful can also be accomplished by politely showing
> that their concerns are unfounded (or at least less severe than they
> thought). This is almost always the better course IMO---it takes much
> more effort to satisfy additional engineering constraints (and prove to
> reviewers that you've done so!) than it does to simply discuss those
> concerns with reasonable stakeholders. As a demonstration, let's look
> at the concerns from Shinobi's post linked above:
>
> They seem to be worried that some Bitcoin users will choose to accept
> coins that can't subsequently be fungibily mixed with other bitcoins.
> But that's already been the case for a decade: users can accept altcoins
> that are non-fungible with bitcoins.
>
> They talk about covenants where spending is controlled by governments,
> but that seems to me exactly like China's CBDC trial.
>
> They talk about exchanges depositing users' BTC into a covenant, but
> that's just a variation on the classic not-your-keys-not-your-bitcoins
> problem. For all you know, your local exchange is keeping most of its
> BTC balance commitments in ETH or USDT.
>
> To me, it seems like the worst-case problems Shinobi describes with
> covenants are some of the same problems that already exist with
> altcoins. I don't see how recursive covenants could make any of those
> problems worse, and so I don't see any point in limiting Bitcoin's
> flexibility to avoid those problems when there are so many interesting
> and useful things that unlimited covenants could do.

The "altcoins are even worse" argument does seem quite convincing, and if Bitcoin can survive altcoins, surely it can survive covenants too?

In before "turns out covenants are the next ICO".
i.e. ICOs are just colored coins, which are useful for keeping track of various stuff, but have then been used as a vehicle to scam people.
But I suppose that is a problem that humans will always have: limited cognition, so that *good* popular things that are outside your specific field of study are indistinguishable from *bad* popular things.
So perhaps it should not be a concern on a technical level.
Maybe we should instead make articles about covenants so boring nobody will hype about it (^^;)v.

Increased functionality implies increased processing, and hopefully computation devices are getting cheap enough that the increased processing implied by new features should not be too onerous.



To my mind, an "inescapable" covenant (i.e. one that requires the output to be paid to the same covenant) is basically a Turing machine, and equivalent to a `while (true);` loop.
In a `while (true);` loop, the state of the machine reverts back to the same state, and it repeats again.
In an inescpable covenant, the control of some amount of funds reverts back to the same controlling SCRIPT, and it repeats again.
Yes, you can certainly add more functionality on top of that loop, just think of program main loops for games or daemons, which are, in essence, "just" `while (true) ...`.
But basically, such unbounded infinite loops are possible only under Turing machines, thus I consider covenants to be Turing-complete.
Principle of Least Power should make us wonder if we need full Turing machines for the functionality.

On the other hand --- codata processing *does* allow for unbounded loops, without requiring full Turing-completeness; they just require total functionality, not partial (and Turing-completeness is partial, not total).
Basically, data structures are unbounded storage, while codata structures are unbounded processing.
Perhaps covenants can encode an upper bound on the number of recursions, which prevents full Turing-completeness while allowing for a large number of use-cases.

(if the above paragraph makes no sense to you, hopefully this Wikipedia article will help: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_functional_programming )
(basically my argument here is based on academic programming stuff, and might not actually matter in real life)

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
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