From: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail•com>
To: Bram Cohen <bram@chia•net>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Covenants and capabilities in the UTXO model
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 20:24:47 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGpPWDabAbY3nS-1QATrzLj+O4dxfs4Fo0EuYFftNdjw_gwRPw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHUJnBAfnmfs2nY3HFRhzNL6ztpZT3dgqe5wCxuO3qpk0OsgRg@mail.gmail.com>
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> 'assert that my parent has a scriptpubkey of X'... That way you can, for
example, have a UTXO which only allows itself to be absorbed by a
transaction also involving a UTXO with a particular capability
I'm not sure I fully follow. I usually think about covenants as having the
reverse form, that a parent would assert "my children must have a script of
the form XYZ". Are you saying you want to be able to specify that a UTXO
can only be spent if the resulting outputs of that transaction all share
the same script? I see this page
<https://chialisp.com/docs/puzzles/singletons/> but i don't understand how
those concepts relate to covenants.
> allow references to old blocks so code snippets can be pulled out of them
Nodes currently aren't required to keep around the whole blockchain, but
your proposal sounds like it would require them to. I think this could be
pretty detrimental to future scalability. Monero, for example, has a
situation where its UTXO set is the whole blockchain because you can't
generally know what has been spent and what hasn't been. Allowing
references to old blocks would pull in all this old block data into the
UTXO set. So unless you're very careful about how or when you can reference
old blocks, this could cause issues.
> If the recipient can't parse a UTXO the defined behavior should be that
they assume it's bricked.
I must have misunderstood you. I think that's the appropriate response: if
you don't know everything about how a UTXO sent "to you" can be spent, you
can't really treat it as yours.
On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 11:16 AM Bram Cohen <bram@chia•net> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 7:10 AM Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail•com>
> wrote:
>
>> > Since scriptpubkeys/scriptsigs continue to run ephemerally at
>> validation time full turing completeness is much less dangerous than people
>> fear.
>>
>> The covenant proposals I've seen that might give bitcoin turing
>> completeness require a turing complete process to be stepped such that each
>> step is a transaction paid for with a usual fee. This fact I think makes
>> the turing completeness a lot less scary. No single transaction would be
>> turing complete, while a sequence of them could be. But importantly, each
>> transaction has a strictly limited runtime and every script could continue
>> to have a calculable number of maximum runtime steps.
>>
>
> This flows naturally out of the UTXO model. In ETH you don't know how much
> transactions will cost in advance because things don't declare their state
> up front, but with all dependencies declared up front execution can be made
> completely deterministic.
>
> > It would also probably be a good idea to add in a bunch of special
> purpose opcodes for making coherent statements about transactions since in
> Bitcoin they're a very complex and hard to parse format.
>
>>
>> What are some examples you're thinking of?
>>
>
> What's needed from a programming perspective is the ability to say 'assert
> that my parent has a scriptpubkey of X'. That way you can, for example,
> have a UTXO which only allows itself to be absorbed by a transaction also
> involving a UTXO with a particular capability ('pay to singleton' is a term
> for this) and that capability can be enforced by the scriptpubkey asserting
> that either its parent is the originator of it or that its parent also has
> the same type of scriptpubkey. This allows capabilities to be added without
> gunking up on chain state with things other than UTXOs.
>
>
>
>>
>> > Once you start implementing complex general purpose functionality it
>> tends to get very expensive very fast and is likely impractical unless
>> there's a way to compress or at least de-duplicate snippets of code which
>> are repeated on chain.
>>
>> I like this idea. If there was a way to dedupe scripts in some way, it
>> could save a lot of bandwidth which would help bitcoin scale better. One
>> thing we could do is have a specific set of pre-ordained script snippets
>> that are given a shorthand that's stored in the software and explicitly
>> shouldn't be transmitted long-hand. That would help for very standard
>> widespread things. We could even add in a consensus rule where short-handed
>> scripts pay for their expanded vbytes, not the vbytes of the compressed
>> version. This would mean the incentives wouldn't be changed by this
>> approach.
>>
>
> One approach is to allow references to old blocks so code snippets can be
> pulled out of them. That avoids having to define the 'common sections' up
> front. Charging for virtual vbytes unfortunately keeps smart functionality
> very expensive and the point is to make it not so expensive.
>
>
>> > For a payment to someone to come with a rider where they could accept
>> it and think their system was working properly for a while until you
>> exercised some kind of retroactive veto on new action or even clawback
>> would obviously be unacceptable behavior.
>>
>> I definitely agree. A payment's covenant should be completely knowable to
>> the recipient, and recipients shouldn't accept random covenants they
>> haven't explicitly accepted on their own.
>>
>> > for payments to come with covenants but the recipient not even be able
>> to parse them unless they're fully buying into that behavior is much more
>> reasonable.
>>
>> The recipient not being able to parse them? Couldn't that result in
>> exactly the situation above you said was not acceptable? The recipient must
>> be able to know all the possibilities of the covenant or there might be
>> some secret retroactive clawback in there waiting to bite them.
>>
>
> Not sure what you're saying. If the recipient can't parse a UTXO the
> defined behavior should be that they assume it's bricked.
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-19 2:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-31 23:22 Bram Cohen
2022-01-18 15:10 ` Billy Tetrud
2022-01-18 17:16 ` Bram Cohen
2022-01-19 2:24 ` Billy Tetrud [this message]
2022-01-20 19:23 ` Bram Cohen
2022-01-21 2:22 ` Peter Todd
2022-01-21 17:32 ` Billy Tetrud
2022-01-22 0:19 ` Bram Cohen
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