@Russell In that thread, you quoted Satoshi there, but neither he nor you really deeply explained the concern. Would you mind elaborating on a situation that calls for concern here? Some deeper explanation of the "reorg safety" property would also be helpful. I'd very much like to know what your thoughts are on the specific points I brought up in the BIP as well. 

On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 11:35 AM Russell O'Connor <roconnor@blockstream.com> wrote:
This is a continuation of the thread at https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-April/018760.html on this topic.

I still remain unconvinced that we ought to give up on the "reorg safety" property that is explicitly part of Bitcoin's design.

On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 1:56 PM Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Hi Everyone,

I'd like to open a discussion of an opcode I call OP_BEFOREBLOCKVERIFY (OP_BBV) which is similar to ones that have been discussed before (eg OP_BLOCKNUMBER). The opcode is very simple: the it takes as a parameter a number representing a block height, and marks the transaction invalid if the current block the transaction is being evaluated for is greater than or equal to that block height, the transaction is invalid. I wrote up a bip for OP_BBV here.

The motivation for this opcode is primarily to do switch-off kinds of transactions. Eg, an output that contains both a spend path that uses OP_BBV and a spend path that uses OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY so that before a particular block one person can spend, and after that block a different person can spend. This can allow doing things like expiring payments or reversible payments in a cheaper way. Currently, things like that require a sequence of multiple transactions, however OP_BBV can do it in a single transaction, making these applications a lot more economically feasible. 

The particular application I'm most interested in is more efficient wallet vaults. However, wallet vaults requires other new opcodes, and I've been given the (good, I think) advice to start off this discussion with something a bit more bite sized and manageable. So I want to keep this discussion to OP_BBV and steer away from the specifics of the wallet vaults I'm thinking of (which are more involved, requiring other new opcodes that I think makes more sense to discuss in a different thread).

The main thing I'd like to discuss is the historical avoidance of and stigma toward opcodes that can cause a valid transaction to become invalid.

It seems there are two concerns:

1. that an opcode like might create a DOS vector where a malicious actor might be able to spam the mempool with transactions containing this opcode.
2. that an opcode like this could cause "bad" reorg behavior, where in a reorg, transactions that were spent become not spend and not spendable because they were mined too near their expiry point. 

While I don't want to claim anything about opcodes that can cause spend paths to expire in general, I do want to claim that *some* opcodes like that are safe - in particular OP_BBV. In the context of OP_BBV specifically, it seems to me like item 1 (mempool handling) is a solvable problem and that point 2 (reorg issues) is not really a problem since people should generally be waiting for 6 confirmations and software can warn the user to wait for 6 confirmations in relevant scenarios where a 6-block reorg might reverse the transaction. I discuss this in detail in the Design Tradeoffs and Risks section of the document I wrote for OP_BBV. I'd love to hear thoughts from others on here about these things and especially the discussion of these issues in the document I linked to. 

Thanks,
BT

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