Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Pre-BIP] Fee Accounts

From: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail•com>
To: Jeremy <jlrubin@mit•edu>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>,
	lightning-dev <lightning-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Pre-BIP] Fee Accounts
Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 10:51:48 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGpPWDbPptac9UPM45_eWnmgDgeoyc=KxuQs1x7_vk37uarsLA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAD5xwhhbXZPg+rQjdaygv_6ZsNuuVpibu=LTZBNU4g_naBOWyw@mail.gmail.com>

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Hmm, I don't know anything about  SIGHASH_BUNDLE. The only references
online I can find are just mentions (mostly from you). What is
SIGHASH_BUNDLE?

> unless you're binding a WTXID

That could work, but it would exclude cases where you have a transaction
that has already been partially signed and someone wants to, say, only sign
that transaction if some 3rd party signs a transaction paying part of the
fee for it. Kind of a niche use case, but it would be nice to support it if
possible. If the transaction hasn't been signed at all yet, a new
transaction can just be created that includes the prospective fee-payer,
and if the transaction is fully signed then it has a WTXID to use.

> then you can have fee bumping cycles

What kind of cycles do you mean? You're saying these cycles would make it
less robust to reorgs?

> OP_VER

I assume you mean something other than pushing the version onto the stack
<https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/97258/given-op-ver-was-never-used-is-disabled-and-not-considered-useful-can-its-meani>?
Is that related to your fee account idea?

On Wed, Jan 19, 2022 at 1:32 AM Jeremy <jlrubin@mit•edu> wrote:

> Ah my bad i misread what you were saying as being about SIGHASH_BUNDLE
> like proposals.
>
> For what you're discussing, I previously proposed
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-September/018168.html
> which is similar.
>
> The benefit of the OP_VER output is that SIGHASH_EXTERNAL has the issue
> that unless you're binding a WTXID (which is maybe too specific?) then you
> can have fee bumping cycles. Doing OP_VER output w/ TXID guarantees that
> you are acyclic.
>
> The difference between a fee account and this approach basically boils
> down to the impact on e.g. reorg stability, where the deposit/withdraw
> mechanism is a bit more "robust" for reorderings in reorgs than the in-band
> transaction approach, although they are very similar.
>
> --
> @JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
> <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
>
>
> On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 8:53 PM Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail•com>
> wrote:
>
>> >  because you make transactions third party malleable it becomes
>> possible to bundle and unbundle transactions.
>>
>> What I was suggesting doesn't make it possible to malleate someone else's
>> transaction. I guess maybe my proposal of using a sighash flag might
>> have been unclear. Imagine it as a script opcode that just says "this
>> transaction must be mined with this other transaction" - the only
>> difference being that you can use any output with any encumberance as an
>> input for fee bumping. It doesn't prevent the original transaction from
>> being mined on its own. So adding junk inputs would be no more of a problem
>> than dust attacks already are. It would be used exactly like cpfp, except
>> it doesn't spend the parent.
>>
>> I don't think what I was suggesting is as different from your proposal.
>> All the problems of fee revenue optimization and feerate rules that you
>> mentioned seem like they'd also exist for your proposal, or for cpfp. Let
>> me know if I should clarify further.
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 8:51 PM Jeremy <jlrubin@mit•edu> wrote:
>>
>>> The issue with sighash flags is that because you make transactions third
>>> party malleable it becomes possible to bundle and unbundle transactions.
>>>
>>> This means there are circumstances where an attacker could e.g. see your
>>> txn, and then add a lot of junk change/inputs + 25 descendants and strongly
>>> anchor your transaction to the bottom of the mempool.
>>>
>>> because of rbf rules requiring more fee and feerate, this means you have
>>> to bump across the whole package and that can get really messy.
>>>
>>> more generally speaking, you could imagine a future where mempools track
>>> many alternative things that might want to be in a transaction.
>>>
>>> suppose there are N inputs each with a weight and an amount of fee being
>>> added and the sighash flags let me pick any subset of them. However, for a
>>> txn to be standard it must be < 100k bytes and for it to be consensus <
>>> 1mb. Now it is possible you have to solve a knapsack problem in order to
>>> rationally bundle this transaction out of all possibilities.
>>>
>>> This problem can get even thornier, suppose that the inputs I'm adding
>>> themselves are the outputs of another txn in the mempool, now i have to
>>> track and propagate the feerates of that child back up to the parent txn
>>> and track all these dependencies.
>>>
>>> perhaps with very careful engineering these issues can be tamed. however
>>> it seems with sponsors or fee accounts, by separating the pays-for from the
>>> participates-in concerns we can greatly simplify it to something like:
>>> compute effective feerate for a txn, including all sponsors that pay more
>>> than the feerate of the base txn. Mine that txn and it's subsidies using
>>> the normal algo. If you run out of space, all subsidies are same-sized so
>>> just take the ones that pay the highest amount up until the added marginal
>>> feerate is less than the next eligible txn.
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> @JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
>>> <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 6:38 PM Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail•com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I see, its not primarily to make it cheaper to append fees, but also
>>>> allows appending fees in cases that aren't possible now. Is that right? I
>>>> can certainly see the benefit of a more general way to add a fee to any
>>>> transaction, regardless of whether you're related to that transaction or
>>>> not.
>>>>
>>>> How would you compare the pros and cons of your account-based approach
>>>> to something like a new sighash flag? Eg a sighash flag that says "I'm
>>>> signing this transaction, but the signature is only valid if mined in the
>>>> same block as transaction X (or maybe transactions LIST)". This could be
>>>> named SIGHASH_EXTERNAL. Doing this would be a lot more similar to other
>>>> bitcoin transactions, and no special account would need to be created. Any
>>>> transaction could specify this. At least that's the first thought I would
>>>> have in designing a way to arbitrarily bump fees. Have you compared your
>>>> solution to something more familiar like that?
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 11:43 AM Jeremy <jlrubin@mit•edu> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Can you clarify what you mean by "improve the situation"?
>>>>>
>>>>> There's a potential mild bytes savings, but the bigger deal is that
>>>>> the API should be much less vulnerable to pinning issues, fix dust leakage
>>>>> for eltoo like protocols, and just generally allow protocol designs to be
>>>>> fully abstracted from paying fees. You can't easily mathematically
>>>>> quantify API improvements like that.
>>>>> --
>>>>> @JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
>>>>> <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 8:13 AM Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail•com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you have any back-of-the-napkin math on quantifying how much this
>>>>>> would improve the situation vs existing methods (eg cpfp)?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 1, 2022 at 2:04 PM Jeremy via bitcoin-dev <
>>>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Happy new years devs,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I figured I would share some thoughts for conceptual review that
>>>>>>> have been bouncing around my head as an opportunity to clean up the fee
>>>>>>> paying semantics in bitcoin "for good". The design space is very wide on
>>>>>>> the approach I'll share, so below is just a sketch of how it could work
>>>>>>> which I'm sure could be improved greatly.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Transaction fees are an integral part of bitcoin.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> However, due to quirks of Bitcoin's transaction design, fees are a
>>>>>>> part of the transactions that they occur in.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> While this works in a "Bitcoin 1.0" world, where all transactions
>>>>>>> are simple on-chain transfers, real world use of Bitcoin requires support
>>>>>>> for things like Fee Bumping stuck transactions, DoS resistant Payment
>>>>>>> Channels, and other long lived Smart Contracts that can't predict future
>>>>>>> fee rates. Having the fees paid in band makes writing these contracts much
>>>>>>> more difficult as you can't merely express the logic you want for the
>>>>>>> transaction, but also the fees.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Previously, I proposed a special type of transaction called a
>>>>>>> "Sponsor" which has some special consensus + mempool rules to allow
>>>>>>> arbitrarily appending fees to a transaction to bump it up in the mempool.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As an alternative, we could establish an account system in Bitcoin
>>>>>>> as an "extension block".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Here's how it might work:*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. Define a special anyone can spend output type that is a "fee
>>>>>>> account" (e.g. segwit V2). Such outputs have a redeeming key and an amount
>>>>>>> associated with them, but are overall anyone can spend.
>>>>>>> 2. All deposits to these outputs get stored in a separate UTXO
>>>>>>> database for fee accounts
>>>>>>> 3. Fee accounts can sign only two kinds of transaction: A: a fee
>>>>>>> amount and a TXID (or Outpoint?); B: a withdraw amount, a fee, and
>>>>>>> an address
>>>>>>> 4. These transactions are committed in an extension block merkle
>>>>>>> tree. While the actual signature must cover the TXID/Outpoint, the
>>>>>>> committed data need only cover the index in the block of the transaction.
>>>>>>> The public key for account lookup can be recovered from the message +
>>>>>>> signature.
>>>>>>> 5. In any block, any of the fee account deposits can be: released
>>>>>>> into fees if there is a corresponding tx; consolidated together to reduce
>>>>>>> the number of utxos (this can be just an OP_TRUE no metadata needed); or
>>>>>>> released into fees *and paid back* into the requested withdrawal key
>>>>>>> (encumbering a 100 block timeout). Signatures must be unique in a block.
>>>>>>> 6. Mempool logic is updated to allow attaching of account fee spends
>>>>>>> to transactions, the mempool can restrict that an account is not allowed
>>>>>>> more spend more than it's balance.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *But aren't accounts "bad"?*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes, accounts are bad. But these accounts are not bad, because any
>>>>>>> funds withdrawn from the fee extension are fundamentally locked for 100
>>>>>>> blocks as a coinbase output, so there should be no issues with any series
>>>>>>> of reorgs. Further, since there is no "rich state" for these accounts, the
>>>>>>> state updates can always be applied in a conflict-free way in any order.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Improving the privacy of this design:*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This design could likely be modified to implement something like
>>>>>>> Tornado.cash or something else so that the fee account paying can be
>>>>>>> unlinked from the transaction being paid for, improving privacy at the
>>>>>>> expense of being a bit more expensive.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Other operations could be added to allow a trustless mixing to be
>>>>>>> done by miners automatically where groups of accounts with similar values
>>>>>>> are trustlessly  split into a common denominator and change, and keys are
>>>>>>> derived via a verifiable stealth address like protocol (so fee balances can
>>>>>>> be discovered by tracing the updates posted). These updates could also be
>>>>>>> produced by individuals rather than miners, and miners could simply honor
>>>>>>> them with better privacy. While a miner generating an update would be able
>>>>>>> to deanonymize their mixes, if you have your account mixed several times by
>>>>>>> independent miners that could potentially add sufficient privacy.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The LN can also be used with PTLCs to, in theory, have another
>>>>>>> individual paid to sponsor a transaction on your behalf only if they reveal
>>>>>>> a valid sig from their fee paying account, although under this model it's
>>>>>>> hard to ensure that the owner doesn't pay a fee and then 'cancel' by
>>>>>>> withdrawing the rest. However, this could be partly solved by using
>>>>>>> reputable fee accounts (reputation could be measured somewhat
>>>>>>> decentralized-ly by longevity of the account and transactions paid for
>>>>>>> historically).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Scalability*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This design is fundamentally 'decent' for scalability because adding
>>>>>>> fees to a transaction does not require adding inputs or outputs and does
>>>>>>> not require tracking substantial amounts of new state.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Paying someone else to pay for you via the LN also helps make this
>>>>>>> more efficient if the withdrawal issues can be fixed.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Lightning:*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This type of design works really well for channels because the
>>>>>>> addition of fees to e.g. a channel state does not require any sort of
>>>>>>> pre-planning (e.g. anchors) or transaction flexibility (SIGHASH flags).
>>>>>>> This sort of design is naturally immune to pinning issues since you could
>>>>>>> offer to pay a fee for any TXID and the number of fee adding offers does
>>>>>>> not need to be restricted in the same way the descendant transactions would
>>>>>>> need to be.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Without a fork?*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This type of design could be done as a federated network that bribes
>>>>>>> miners -- potentially even retroactively after a block is formed. That
>>>>>>> might be sufficient to prove the concept works before a consensus upgrade
>>>>>>> is deployed, but such an approach does mean there is a centralizing layer
>>>>>>> interfering with normal mining.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Happy new year!!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jeremy
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> @JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
>>>>>>> <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>>>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>>>>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>

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