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* [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-07-09 12:46 Peter Todd
  2022-07-09 14:26 ` Eric Voskuil
                   ` (4 more replies)
  0 siblings, 5 replies; 56+ messages in thread
From: Peter Todd @ 2022-07-09 12:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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New blog post:

https://petertodd.org/2022/surprisingly-tail-emission-is-not-inflationary

tl;dr: Due to lost coins, a tail emission/fixed reward actually results in a
stable money supply. Not an (monetarily) inflationary supply.

...and for the purposes of reply/discussion, attached is the article itself in
markdown format:

---
layout: post
title:  "Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary"
date:   2022-07-09
tags:
- bitcoin
- monero
---

At present, all notable proof-of-work currencies reward miners with both a block
reward, and transaction fees. With most currencies (including Bitcoin) phasing
out block rewards over time. However in no currency have transaction fees
consistently been more than 5% to 10% of the total mining
reward[^fee-in-reward], with the exception of Ethereum, from June 2020 to Aug 2021.
To date no proof-of-work currency has ever operated solely on transaction
fees[^pow-tweet], and academic analysis has found that in this condition block
generation is unstable.[^instability-without-block-reward] To paraphrase Andrew
Poelstra, it's a scary phase change that no other coin has gone through.[^apoelstra-quote]

[^pow-tweet]: [I asked on Twitter](https://twitter.com/peterktodd/status/1543231264597090304) and no-one replied with counter-examples.

[^fee-in-reward]: [Average Fee Percentage in Total Block Reward](https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/fee_to_reward-btc-eth-bch-ltc-doge-xmr-bsv-dash-zec.html#alltime)

[^instability-without-block-reward]: [On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward](https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~arvindn/publications/mining_CCS.pdf)

[^apoelstra-quote]: [From a panel at TABConf 2021](https://twitter.com/peterktodd/status/1457066946898317316)

Monero has chosen to implement what they call [tail
emission](https://www.getmonero.org/resources/moneropedia/tail-emission.html):
a fixed reward per block that continues indefinitely. Dogecoin also has a fixed
reward, which they widely - and incorrectly - refer to as an "abundant" supply[^dogecoin-abundant].

[^dogecoin-abundant]: Googling "dogecoin abundant" returns dozens of hits.

This article will show that a fixed block reward does **not** lead to an
abundant supply. In fact, due to the inevitability of lost coins, a fixed
reward converges to a **stable** monetary supply that is neither inflationary
nor deflationary, with the total supply proportional to rate of tail emission
and probability of coin loss.

Credit where credit is due: after writing the bulk of this article I found out
that Monero developer [smooth_xmr](https://www.reddit.com/user/smooth_xmr/)
also observed that tail emission results in a stable coin supply
[a few years ago](https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/4z0azk/maam_28_monero_ask_anything_monday/d6sixyi/).
There's probably others too: it's a pretty obvious result.


<div markdown="1" class="post-toc">
# Contents
{:.no_toc}
0. TOC
{:toc}
</div>

## Modeling the Fixed-Reward Monetary Supply

Since the number of blocks is large, we can model the monetary supply as a
continuous function $$N(t)$$, where $$t$$ is a given moment in time. If the
block reward is fixed we can model the reward as a slope $$k$$ added to an
initial supply $$N_0$$:

$$
N(t) = N_0 + kt
$$

Of course, this isn't realistic as coins are constantly being lost due to
deaths, forgotten passphrases, boating accidents, etc. These losses are
independent: I'm not any more or less likely to forget my passphrase because
you recently lost your coins in a boating accident — an accident I probably
don't even know happened. Since the number of individual coins (and their
owners) is large — as with the number of blocks — we can model this loss as
though it happens continuously.

Since coins can only be lost once, the *rate* of coin loss at time $$t$$ is
proportional to the total supply *at that moment* in time. So let's look at the
*first derivative* of our fixed-reward coin supply:

$$
\frac{dN(t)}{dt} = k
$$

...and subtract from it the lost coins, using $$\lambda$$ as our [coin loss
constant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exponential_decay):

$$
\frac{dN(t)}{dt} = k - \lambda N(t)
$$

That's a first-order differential equation, which can be easily solved with
separation of variables to get:

$$
N(t) = \frac{k}{\lambda} - Ce^{-\lambda t}
$$

To remove the integration constant $$C$$, let's look at $$t = 0$$, where the
coin supply is $$N_0$$:

$$
\begin{align}
    N_0 &= \frac{k}{\lambda} - Ce^{-\lambda 0} = \frac{k}{\lambda} - C \\
      C &= \frac{k}{\lambda} - N_0
\end{align}
$$

Thus:

$$
\begin{align}
    N(t) &= \frac{k}{\lambda} - \left(\frac{k}{\lambda} - N_0 \right)e^{-\lambda t} \\
         &= \frac{k}{\lambda} + \left(N_0 - \frac{k}{\lambda} \right)e^{-\lambda t}
\end{align}
$$


## Long Term Coin Supply

It's easy to see that in the long run, the second half of the coin supply
equation goes to zero because $$\lim_{t \to \infty} e^{-\lambda t} = 0$$:

$$
\begin{align}
    \lim_{t \to \infty} N(t) &= \lim_{t \to \infty} \left[ \frac{k}{\lambda} + \left(N_0 - \frac{k}{\lambda} \right)e^{-\lambda t} \right ] = \frac{k}{\lambda} \\
                   N(\infty) &= \frac{k}{\lambda}
\end{align}
$$

An intuitive explanation for this result is that in the long run, the initial
supply $$N_0$$ doesn't matter, because approximately all of those coins will
eventually be lost. Thus in the long run, the coin supply will converge towards
$$\frac{k}{\lambda}$$, the point where coins are created just as fast as they
are lost.


## Short Term Dynamics and Economic Considerations

Of course, the intuitive explanation for why supply converges to
$$\frac{k}{\lambda}$$, also tells us that supply must converge fairly slowly:
if 1% of something is lost per year, after 100 years 37% of the initial supply
remains. It's not clear what the rate of lost coins actually is in a mature,
valuable, coin. But 1%/year is likely to be a good guess — quite possibly less.

In the case of Monero, they've introduced tail emission at a point where it
represents a 0.9% apparent monetary inflation rate[^p2pool-tail]. Since the number of
previously lost coins, and the current rate of coin loss, is
unknown[^unknowable] it's not possible to know exactly what the true monetary
inflation rate is right now. But regardless, the rate will only converge
towards zero going forward.

[^unknowable]: Being a privacy coin with [shielded amounts](https://localmonero.co/blocks/richlist), it's not even possible to get an estimate of the total amount of XMR in active circulation.

[^p2pool-tail]: P2Pool operates [a page with real-time date figures](https://p2pool.io/tail.html).

If an existing coin decides to implement tail emission as a means to fund
security, choosing an appropriate emission rate is simple: decide on the
maximum amount of inflation you are willing to have in the worst case, and set
the tail emission accordingly. In reality monetary inflation will be even lower
on day zero due to lost coins, and in the long run, it will converge towards
zero.

The fact is, economic volatility dwarfs the effect of small amounts of
inflation. Even a 0.5% inflation rate over 50 years only leads to a 22% drop.
Meanwhile at the time of writing, Bitcoin has dropped 36% in the past year, and
gained 993% over the past 5 years. While this discussion is a nice excuse to
use some mildly interesting math, in the end it's totally pedantic.

## Could Bitcoin Add Tail Emission?

...and why could Monero?

Adding tail emission to Bitcoin would be a hard fork: a incompatible rule
change that existing Bitcoin nodes would reject as invalid. While Monero was
able to get sufficiently broad consensus in the community to implement tail
emission, it's unclear at best if it would ever be possible to achieve that for
the much larger[^btc-vs-xmr-market-cap] Bitcoin. Additionally, Monero has a
culture of frequent hard forks that simply does not exist in Bitcoin.

[^btc-vs-xmr-market-cap]: [As of writing](https://web.archive.org/web/20220708143920/https://www.coingecko.com/), the apparent market cap of Bitcoin is $409 billion, almost 200x larger than Monero's $2.3 billion.

Ultimately, as long as a substantial fraction of the Bitcoin community continue
to run full nodes, the only way tail emission could ever be added to Bitcoin is
by convincing that same community that it is a good idea.


## Footnotes

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-07-09 14:57 John Tromp
  2022-07-09 15:13 ` Peter Todd
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 56+ messages in thread
From: John Tromp @ 2022-07-09 14:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

> New blog post:
> https://petertodd.org/2022/surprisingly-tail-emission-is-not-inflationary

A Tail Emission is best described as disinflationary; the yearly
supply inflation steadily decreases toward zero.

> Dogecoin also has a fixed reward

It started out with random rewards up to 1M doge per block, with the
maximum halving every 100K blocks, until the fixed reward of 10K doge
kicked in at height 600K.

> If an existing coin decides to implement tail emission as a means to fund security, choosing an appropriate emission rate is simple: decide on the maximum amount of inflation you are willing to have in the worst case, and set the tail emission accordingly.

Any coin without a premine starts with infinite inflation. Bitcoin in
its first 4 years had yearly inflation rates of inf, 100%, 50%, and
33%. So deciding on a maximum amount of inflation is deciding on a
premine.

While in the long term, a capped supply doesn't meaningfully differ
from un uncapped supply [1], the 21M limit is central to Bitcoin's
identity, and removing this limit results in something that can no
longer be called Bitcoin.

[1] https://john-tromp.medium.com/a-case-for-using-soft-total-supply-1169a188d153


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* [bitcoin-dev]  Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-07-09 20:53 Eric Voskuil
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 56+ messages in thread
From: Eric Voskuil @ 2022-07-09 20:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Peter Todd; +Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

In Bitcoin we use the term “supply“ as a reference to the number of coins minted. This colloquialism is commonly conflated with the economic concept of supply, and then injected into a supply/demand relation as if it had the same applicability. Economically supply refers to desire to sell, while demand refers to desire to buy.

e

> On Jul 9, 2022, at 08:24, Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil•org> wrote:
> 
> To clarify, price inflation is not caused by market production. Attributing the observed lack of inflation (eg fee %) to loss is an assumed relation.
> 
> Even if the amount of loss was known (which it is not), there remains an assumption in the correlation of non-lost coins to price. Demand determines price, not the amount of something in existence, hence the folly of S2F (1/monetary-inflation).
> 
> e
> 
>> On Jul 9, 2022, at 08:15, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> wrote:
>> On Sat, Jul 09, 2022 at 07:26:22AM -0700, Eric Voskuil wrote:
>>>> Due to lost coins, a tail emission/fixed reward actually results in a stable money supply. Not an (monetarily) inflationary supply.
>>> This observation is not a proof of lost coins, that is an assumption.
>> To be clear, are you claiming that there is no proof that coins are lost?
>> --
>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-07-09 20:54 Eric Voskuil
  2022-07-09 21:59 ` ZmnSCPxj
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 56+ messages in thread
From: Eric Voskuil @ 2022-07-09 20:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Peter Todd; +Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

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Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to which I was responding.

Math cannot prove how much coin is “lost”, and even if it was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produced, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I’ve already pointed out. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just as it does not with any other good.

The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship resistance, not on price.

e

> On Jul 9, 2022, at 08:31, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd•org> wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 09, 2022 at 08:24:51AM -0700, Eric Voskuil wrote:
>> To clarify, price inflation is not caused by market production. Attributing the observed lack of inflation (eg fee %) to loss is an assumed relation.
> 
> My article is a mathematical proof that has nothing to do with observations of
> inflation.
> 
> What I did is prove that if there is tail emission/fixed supply, the coin
> supply will converge towards a fixed amount because the coin supply dependant
> rate of coin loss balances out the fixed rate of coin production.
> 
> That proof has nothing to do with market dynamics and would happen in any
> system, economic or not, with similar underlying dynamics.
> 
> -- 
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-07-09 22:21 Peter
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 56+ messages in thread
From: Peter @ 2022-07-09 22:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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>At present, all notable proof-of-work currencies reward miners with both a block reward, and transaction fees. With most currencies (including Bitcoin) phasing out block rewards over time. However in no currency have transaction fees consistently been more than 5% to 10% of the total mining reward[^fee-in-reward], with the exception of Ethereum, from June 2020 to Aug 2021. To date no proof-of-work currency has ever operated solely on transaction fees[^pow-tweet], and academic analysis has found that in this condition block generation is unstable.[^instability-without-block-reward] To paraphrase Andrew Poelstra, it's a scary phase change that no other coin has gone through.[^apoelstra-quote]

We should consider that a fixed block reward doesn't guarantee that the value of energy securing transactions is greater than the value being transacted in a practical amount of blocks where practical is a certain amount of time (currently 1 hour). If the energy expenditure is less than the value transacted in a given amount of blocks those transactions are at risk of being double spent. We have seen this failure with Ethereum Classic where any meaningful amount of value would need 2 weeks of blocks to be deeply confirmed for economic purposes.

We should also not assume that the Bitcoin emission curve implies there will be zero block rewards for mining Bitcoin, let me explain. There's an ugly solution that doesn't require a hard fork (I'm not advocating for this solution just presenting it) where a new coin is launched to merge mine with Bitcoin and that new coin (called BTail for discussion purposes) would enfranchise everyone who is a Bitcoin UTXO holder at the moment of the real-time launch of BTail at a well known block height. Using a technique we have seen with BCH to create an arguably fair launch. BTail would have a floating exchange rate to Bitcoin and its success or failure in terms of adoption would be determined by the market. It would require the same network effect barriers as a hard fork (opt-in) but would not put Bitcoin at risk while people can take time to install new software (and write new integrations) as they would with a soft fork.

Regards

Peter Kroll

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <mailman.80287.1657405305.8511.bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>]
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-07-10 17:42 Eric Voskuil
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 56+ messages in thread
From: Eric Voskuil @ 2022-07-10 17:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: alicexbt; +Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion


> On Jul 10, 2022, at 07:17, alicexbt <alicexbt@protonmail•com> wrote:
> Hi ZmnSCPxj,
> 
> 
>> Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions without community consensus.
>> Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to deploy.
> 
> `consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval` for mainnet in [chainparams.cpp][1] can be decreased to 195000. This will reduce the number of halvings from 34 to 14 and subsidy will be 0 when it becomes less than 0.01 although not sure if this will be a soft fork.

Soft fork, though a bit aggressive, as it would invalidate all existing blocks above the first new halving height block which claimed more than the reduced reward.

Increasing the value would be a hard fork, as it would validate blocks that would previously have been invalid, as opposed to a soft fork, which invalidates blocks that would previously have been valid.

e

> I doubt there will be consensus for it because all the [projections and predictability][2] about bitcoin(currency) would be affected by this change. Maybe everyone can agree with this change if most of the miners start being 'compliant' like one of the coinjoin implementation.
> 
> [1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp#L66
> [2]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply
> 
> 
> /dev/fd0
> 
> Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
> 
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Saturday, July 9th, 2022 at 9:59 PM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> 
>> Good morning e, and list,
>> 
>>> Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to which I was responding.
>>> Math cannot prove how much coin is “lost”, and even if it was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produced, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I’ve already pointed out. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just as it does not with any other good.
>>> The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship resistance, not on price.
>> 
>> 
>> To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail emission"):
>> 
>> * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, and one which had a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible or zero.
>> * Now consider a censoring miner.
>> * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the miner loses out on the fees of those transactions.
>> * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from the censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost.
>> * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is small relative to the total earnings of each block.
>> * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is large relative to the total earnings of each block.
>> * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains from the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situation.
>> 
>> Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy erodes the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved.
>> But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved are censored or not censored.
>> Thus, there is no incentive, considering only the block subsidy, to not censor coin movements.
>> Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movements.
>> 
>> 
>> Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions without community consensus.
>> Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to deploy.
>> 
>> 
>> Regards,
>> ZmnSCPxj
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-07-19 18:36 Peter
  2022-07-20 14:35 ` Eric Voskuil
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 56+ messages in thread
From: Peter @ 2022-07-19 18:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

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>And therefore this reduces to the simple fact that tx fees are what provides censorship resistance, whether you mine your own or others?.

What's the business model of the person who mines with the intention to censor transactions when there's no block reward?

Regards

Peter Kroll

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-07-26 20:01 jk_14
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 56+ messages in thread
From: jk_14 @ 2022-07-26 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Erik Aronesty, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion



Let's assume fees don't compensate low block reward.
And for example every 10 BTC holding needs to be secured by one Antminer S19 running.

In an ideal world every large bitcoin holder will run proper amount of ASICs and run it at loss.
The holders of less than 10 BTC - will organize "group pays", this time for sharing loss (electricity costs)
(exactly the same way like people made "group buys" of ASIC hardware in 2013)


Pretty sure in real world it won't work. And there is a large payoff for betrayal, or more precise:
People will think there is tiny punishment for betrayal.

Even Bitcoin can't beat a human nature.


Regards
Jaroslaw


W dniu 2022-07-26 19:06:12 użytkownik Erik Aronesty <erik@q32•com> napisał:
> I'm pretty sure we will have a textbook case of Prisoner's Dilemma here.


no, there is no large payoff for betrayal





^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-08-15 21:46 jk_14
  2022-08-17 11:10 ` Erik Aronesty
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 56+ messages in thread
From: jk_14 @ 2022-08-15 21:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion, pete


> New blog post:
> https://petertodd.org/2022/surprisingly-tail-emission-is-not-inflationary


Tail emission is inevitable, Milton Friedman says...


The key thing here in my opinion is to properly understand the seriousness of the situation.
"There is no such thing as a free lunch" - is definitely helpful quote here.

There are two edge cases.

1. while starting given cryptocurrency
- the annual inflation is huge, nobody (in developed/mature monetary system) would like to keep such kind of money with e.g. 100% annual inflation rate, but from the other side there is no problem for transaction fee to be free of charge here

2. while given cryptocurrency is switching off the block reward, in supposed "mature phase":
- the annual inflation is zero, everyone want to hoard such money, transaction fees must carry the whole security of the system


In the first edge case: active users have got "free lunches" and passive users (i.e. holders) are paying for it (by "inflation tax")
In the second edge case: passive users have got "free lunches" and active users should pay for it (by "transactional tax")

So far I only highlighted some maybe not very well recognized, but pure facts (it's not comfortable to contradict the facts...)


The reason people do pay in the first phase - is a hope/promise of system growth (future coin price appreciation = profit)
The problem in the second phase is that there is no real incentive for people to pay for other's free lunches.


Any wishful thinking that most (or even: any significant part) of holders will resign from a free lunch and will buy and run ASIC mining equipment at loss - is just a delusional perspective. It's well proven by game theory and what says us the Prisoner's Dilemma about it. For better understanding - here is my modified version of Prisoner's Dilemma short description:

"The Prisoner's Dilemma is a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why completely rational large holders might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so."

I'm pretty sure we will have a textbook case of Prisoner's Dilemma here.

As a useful example - let's assume that fees don't compensate low block reward. Btw, right now a single transaction fee need to be $60 to compensate that (and it will only get worse in time). System is not inclusive with $60 per transaction fee. Only rich people will use it. Another possible scenario is a x100 drop of network hashrate to catch a previous fee levels. The network is x100 less secure, then. It really doesn't matter if this process is spread over the long run...

So, for example - let every 10 BTC holding needs to be secured by one Antminer S19 running.

In an ideal world every large bitcoin holder will run proper amount of ASICs and run it at loss.
The holders of less than 10 BTC - will organize "group pays", this time for sharing loss (electricity costs)
Exactly the same way like people made "group buys" of ASIC hardware in 2013.

I hope it's clear that in the real world it WILL NOT work. People will simply think, that there is only a tiny punishment for betrayal.
Noone will waste his renewable energy on unprofitable Antminer while he/she can sell this energy for the market price. Even Bitcoin can't beat the human nature.


Thanks to Milton Friedman - we can easily say that situation with "free lunches" (at least for some part of users) - is an unhealthy state of financial system.
And may last only exceptionally for short period of time, and definitely not as a default state. System must be sustainable and time to accept that there is a real problem here (or: an elephant in the room - but maybe not such invisible like was before).

The good news is a natural solution exists. Bitcoin can solve this issue natural way.

While decreasing block reward and moving from the first edge case to the second one - the system naturally cross the Area of Balance.
And healthy system should stay somewhere in such area. And that's exactly what Monero did. But they did it arbitrally, at 0.9% level.
Bitcoin is able to do it much better - because empirically.

There is a simple trigger if the system is leaving an Area of Balance and cross the line of Phase 2 with "free lunches". The network difficulty / global network hashrate chart.
Four years after some particular halving (in 2028, 2032 or later - no matter when in fact) - we will (definitely) see difficulty is not recovered during four long years.
This is a big red light. It means that halvings starts to be destructive to the network security. 

Something what became destructive to the network - must be removed. Halving must be removed in such moment. Moment determined empirically - what is good thing. Satoshi Nakamoto wasn't able to properly predict when this moment may appear, but we are in better situation.

"Bitcoin to the moon" (and any other pro-21M hardcap shortsighted slogans) - must have a lower priority than network security/health.
I'm sure Satoshi would agree with it. Of course, someone may set up such environment, where holders (i.e. passive users) have got a free lunches
and security of network is based on active users' shoulders only. Someone could even insist that it is quite fair...
But please don't expect a lack of impact for the network security where not all, but only a part of users - participate in supporting network health.
Many people don't realise a simple fact: keeping destructive halvings in such situation above, just for maximising appreciation of already hoarded coins
- is counterproductive. Because the network security is decreasing.


We have a lot of time yet to educate people about it - for reaching common consensus for halvings removal with "ease".
We should probably use Milton Friedman's quote and highlight that balanced system with 0.45% / 0.225% / 0.1125% (?) annual inflation rate (and slowly decreasing)
- is still enormously better than any surrounding fiat system. But system still balanced and stable - and not in spiral of death...


“Bitcoin should have had a 0.1% or 1% monetary inflation tax to pay for security,” Peter said long time ago, further arguing bitcoin will die if it doesn’t change the limit.

I fully agree with Peter. The halvings should be removed in case it starts to be destructive to the network security (lack of hashrate recovery during long 4 years after given halving). Because that means bitcoin system has reached equilibrium / saturation on a globe scale level. The evolutionary path is the best path.
The worst path is: overcomplicated constructs, completely unclear for Average Joe. Additional merge-mining coins, whatever etc. - just to achieve the same final goal.
KISS = Keep It Simple. Halving removal is the most honest, simplest and most understandable way to make every bitcoin pasive user to participate in keeping Bitcoin network secure. It just force the rule, that someone pay proportionally to amount of bitcoins he/she hold, and all participants are sure that everybody participate (no Prisoner's Dilemma, what is crucial matter)


Yes, that means: hard fork. But as written above - Bitcoin will die without the solution.

Bitcoin may be also out of sudden in a deadly risk from quantum computers. In such circumstances everyone (or: almost, i.e. everyone who cares) - would immediately download a quantum resistant, freshly released bitcoin wallet, no doubt. And these two dangers are similar at least in one aspect: both will cause the spiral of death.
Widespread consensus would be the best scenario, but from the other side: a fork always shows retrospectively, who was right (BCH turmoil in 2017)


Regards
Jaroslaw


P.S  some other resources yet:

"Friedman originally proposed a fixed monetary rule, called Friedman's k-percent rule, where the money supply would be automatically increased by a fixed percentage per year. Under this rule, there would be no leeway for the central reserve bank, as money supply increases could be determined "by a computer", and business could anticipate all money supply changes. With other monetarists he believed that the active manipulation of the money supply or its growth rate is more likely to destabilise than stabilise the economy.

Most monetarists oppose the gold standard. Friedman, for example, viewed a pure gold standard as impractical.[9] For example, whereas one of the benefits of the gold standard is that the intrinsic limitations to the growth of the money supply by the use of gold would prevent inflation, if the growth of population or increase in trade outpaces the money supply, there would be no way to counteract deflation and reduced liquidity (and any attendant recession) except for the mining of more gold"

no block reward  => reduced liquidity (reduced number of transactions) => network security in spiral of death

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monetarism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedman%27s_k-percent_rule
https://twitter.com/hasufl/status/1511470668457652224



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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-08-16 16:05 Peter
  2022-08-19 17:21 ` aliashraf.btc At protonmail
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 56+ messages in thread
From: Peter @ 2022-08-16 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: bitcoin-dev

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1284 bytes --]

Hi Jaroslaw,

In the Prisoner's Dilemma the prisoners cannot communicate. In Bitcoin large holders are able to communicate with each other. Also, prisoners need not make an all or nothing decision in Bitcoin. Miners can join and leave the network freely over time. You can change your decision based on the decision of others.

The Bitcoin design is such that security is volatile but the issuance of blocks is timely and evened out to a 10 minutes average even after the reward is exhausted.

The existing incentive that miners earn money for including transactions is enough to motivate human nature. Transaction initiators have an incentive to mine and run full nodes for personal interest.

>Noone will waste his renewable energy on unprofitable Antminer while he/she can sell this energy for the market price.

The law in most jurisdictions prevents the resale of spare electricity unless an expensive license is obtained (and in most cases no license is available as the government maintains a monopoly). Mining with waste electricity is reducing losses. Another incentive to motivate human nature.

Bitcoin holders can be enfranchised into any new system. So, no need for bike shedding the original design which is a Schelling Point.

Regards

Peter Kroll

pointbiz/ BTCCuracao

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-08-17  8:54 jk_14
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 56+ messages in thread
From: jk_14 @ 2022-08-17  8:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dizzle, bitcoin-dev, pete


Hi, Peter

Thanks to human nature, still:

1. Bitcoin large holders are able to communicate with each other...
- and as a large bitcoin holder someone will very well understand that he should run his Antminers at loss for goodness of Bitcoin network security.
But he won't communicate that - due to his greed - he just betrayed it. Maybe someone will communicate that he is running Anminers... But it doesn't change a lot.
We can assume this additional possibility of communication (especially taking into account big number of large holders and their anonimity) - doesn't change this Prisoner's Dilemma into a "not textbook case enough".

2. The existing incentive that miners earn money for including transactions is enough to motivate human nature...
- but paying $50 usd per such transaction (the amount necessary to compensate lack of block reward right now) - is "no way" to motivate a human nature, just due to: personal interest (as you correctly highlighted). It really doesn't matter that the process of disappearance of block reward is spreaded over the long run.
(the same, but more terse: https://twitter.com/hasufl/status/1511470668457652224 )

3. In many jurisdictions you can take back from grid for free - the amount you have produced and uploaded earlier (I'm in one of such). So I won't invest and oversize my solar panels by additional ~24kW of power for additional Antminer runing 24h/day - if I know it will be running at loss. (side note: it's not a good idea to be dependant with future health of bitcoin -  on what type of jurisdiction is the most popular one in given moment)


There are two statements to repeat then, but more precisely:

A. Bitcoiners (me too) are proud the bitcoin system is designed so clever, that from the beginning till now - is able to run without the trust to anyone. And utilise even people's greed - for system goodness/expansion. But when I wrote the FIRST edge case is behind us, but the SECOND one - with no doubt with pathological Friedman's "free lunches" for part of participants - is only some years ahead (like in a Titanic scene) - then most of them suddenly say:

"Ok, then... Bitcoin idea is so brilliant that maybe the game theory won't apply anymore. Let's TRUST the large holders they will run Antminers at loss."

It's not The Satoshi's Vision anymore.


B. Bitcoiners (me too) want to remove or neutralise all destructive things to Bitcoin, like for example: unfriendly government regulations, etc. But when I wrote there will be in the future (and the only question is: when) an alarm siren that halvings start to be destructive to the Bitcoin network, while start to cause consecutive network security/hashrate regressions - then most of them suddenly say:

"Ok, then... I'm to greed to resign from it."



It's not The Satoshi's Vision anymore.

Regards
Jaroslaw




W dniu 2022-08-16 23:21:30 użytkownik Peter via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> napisał:
Hi Jaroslaw,

In the Prisoner's Dilemma the prisoners cannot communicate. In Bitcoin large holders are able to communicate with each other. Also, prisoners need not make an all or nothing decision in Bitcoin. Miners can join and leave the network freely over time. You can change your decision based on the decision of others.

The Bitcoin design is such that security is volatile but the issuance of blocks is timely and evened out to a 10 minutes average even after the reward is exhausted.

The existing incentive that miners earn money for including transactions is enough to motivate human nature. Transaction initiators have an incentive to mine and run full nodes for personal interest.

>Noone will waste his renewable energy on unprofitable Antminer while he/she can sell this energy for the market price.

The law in most jurisdictions prevents the resale of spare electricity unless an expensive license is obtained (and in most cases no license is available as the government maintains a monopoly). Mining with waste electricity is reducing losses. Another incentive to motivate human nature.

Bitcoin holders can be enfranchised into any new system. So, no need for bike shedding the original design which is a Schelling Point.

Regards

Peter Kroll

pointbiz/ BTCCuracao






^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-08-17 13:43 jk_14
  2022-08-18 15:29 ` Breno Brito
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 56+ messages in thread
From: jk_14 @ 2022-08-17 13:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Erik Aronesty, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion


On one scale you puts the Trust to the large stakeholders (why we avoid plenty of small stakeholders, btw),
and on the other side I put game theory and well defined Prisoner's Dilemma.

Again: large stakeholders WILL NOT incentivised to mine, they will have the hundreds excuses why not to switch-on Antminers back.
That's how it simply works.  Bitcoin would fail miserably if Satoshi was based his concept mainly on existence of idealists.

If we will observe lack of hashrate recovery four years after some halving and still unprepared like today
- means the trust in large stakeholders was a very costly mistake.


Superiority of Proof of Work against Proof of Stake has been discussed enough either
The overall conclusion with what I fully agree  is: swapping PoW to PoS - would be a degradation.
You can stop talking about degradation to proof of stake, but just: degradation.

Degradation of Bitcoin, due to human greed.

Now you mine and you have an INSTANT gratification.
Then you will mine and it will cost you real money, but simple switch - and you have a DELAYED, maybe some day in the future, maybe only a tiny - punishment.
And The Punishment Won't Be Tiny.


"If the pain after hitting the hand with a hammer would appear after a month - people would notoriously walk with swollen fingers"
100% (^2)

Regards
Jaroslaw



W dniu 2022-08-17 13:10:38 użytkownik Erik Aronesty <erik@q32•com> napisał:

> you can stop talking about  the "security of the system" as meaningful
> this has been discussed enough
> if fees are not sufficient, clearance times increase and large stakeholders are incentivised to mine 
> in the best case, fees are sufficient
> in the worst case, it degrades to proof of stake
> i'm sure you can see how that's fine either way



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https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-08-18 20:22 jk_14
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 56+ messages in thread
From: jk_14 @ 2022-08-18 20:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Billy Tetrud, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion


Fortunately halving in 2020 will be non destructive because it looks like we will have higher difficulty in 2024 than in 2020.

Let's assume the worst case scenario: after halving in 2024, we have regression of difficulty in 2028. Annual inflation rate in 2028 is 0.81%. Removal of halvings in this year means that in year 2100 (72 years later) we will have 0.51% annual inflation rate, still. And that is Monero concept in fact: constant annual supply, thus very slowly decreasing of inflation.

Yes, you are right. Better that that - would be to wait for bitcoin ecosystem to show us what is the equilibrium/saturation level at globe scale - I hope it will be several years later and "the annual inflation to keep" - will be 0.40% in 2032 or even 0.20% only in 2036.

And then instead of halving every 210k blocks - just to adjust the block reward (i.e. slightly increase). To keep the annual inflation rate constant. Constant forever. On most proper level - because determined empirically. I didn't propose it, because of certain, immediate backlash :)

And for the same reason, as an answer how much security we need. Empirically reached security level is - the most accurate one. In military terminology: the protection of already conquered land. Regression is sign of weakness and we probably don't want to see it in Bitcoin.

Anyway, keeping Bitcoin in the middle of ultra-obvious Edge Case, with pathological Friedman's "free lunches" for stakeholders, due to this overtaxing (punish) people which are simply want to use Bitcoin, additionally with pure form of Prisoner's Dilemma here, and with Trust to "large" stakeholders, while almost every of them will convince himself he is not really a large one and "let Microstrategy run Antminers" (and burn money)

- and all above only because we are too greed to pay miners as low as only few tenths of a percent per year for their real service as keeping network secure, pay in most honest way, because with no exceptions and proportionally to holdings - and instead of it we rather prefer to take the high risk of spiral of death - is madness.


Pure madness. This is what almost 50y old cynic may assure you.

Regards
Jaroslaw




W dniu 2022-08-18 17:44:29 użytkownik Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail•com> napisał:
While constant tail emission does in fact converge to 0 inflation over time (which bitcoin's halvings do as well mind you), tail emission does *not* solve the potential problem of mining rewards, it only delays it. A tail emission of 200,000 btc/year (~1% of the current supply) would be equivalent to halvings every ~50 years rather than every 4 years. Were we to implement this kind of thing right after the last non-" destructive" halving, it would buy us 46 years of extra time. Nothing more, nothing less.

While its mildly interesting to know that tail emission converges to a stable point, while no inflation implies monetary deflation at the rate of loss, this feels very likely to be an insignificant problem. I think 1% loss rate per year is an absurdly high estimate these days, and the loss rate is likely to decrease as methods of storing bitcoin mature. Imagine bitcoin was worth $1 trillion (not so hard, since it was not too long ago), then try imagining people losing $10 billion of bitcoin every year. Highly unlikely IMO. A rate of loss of 0.01%/year might be more realistic for a near-future mature bitcoin. That's not going to be enough to make a significant difference even over 100s of years. 

If we actually wanted to solve the potential problem of not-enough-fees to upkeep mining security, there are less temporary ways to solve that. For example, if fees end up not being able to support sufficient mining, we could add emission based on a constant fraction of fees in the block. For example, every block could emit new bitcoin amounting to 10% of the fees collected in that block. This would tie coinbase rewards to the real world (since the fee market is tied to the real economy) and ensure higher block revenue indefinitely - ie not just for another 50 years. 

But its also worth saying that blockchain security (which mining revenue correlates with) does *not* need to increase indefinitely. There is some amount of security (and therefore some amount of mining revenue) that is sufficient, beyond which additional security is simply unnecessary, unwarranted, and wasteful (you wouldn't buy a $1000 safe to store $1000 of valuables). Do we, as the bitcoin community, have some good idea how much security we need? Do we have some idea how costly a 51% attack must be where we can be comfortable it will never happen? I'm curious to hear what people think about that. Because without having some kind of estimates of what "enough security" is, there's absolutely no way of evaluating whether or not its likely that bitcoin fees alone will be able to sustain enough security. 


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary
@ 2022-08-19  5:34 vjudeu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 56+ messages in thread
From: vjudeu @ 2022-08-19  5:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Billy Tetrud, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion, , jk_14, ,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion

> If we actually wanted to solve the potential problem of not-enough-fees to upkeep mining security, there are less temporary ways to solve that. For example, if fees end up not being able to support sufficient mining, we could add emission based on a constant fraction of fees in the block. For example, every block could emit new bitcoin amounting to 10% of the fees collected in that block. This would tie coinbase rewards to the real world (since the fee market is tied to the real economy) and ensure higher block revenue indefinitely - ie not just for another 50 years.

Miners can game this system by moving their own coins in 100% fees transactions, just to produce more coins. You have one million BTC? No problem, just move them as fees, and you just created 100k BTC out of thin air, just because you are a wealthy miner. And even if that amount will be stolen, when some other miner will reorg your block, then still, miners will keep creating coins by moving them as fees, and the strongest miner will get the whole pot. And guess what: 100 blocks later you can reuse newly created 100k BTC to make another 10k BTC, so it will exponentially explode as (amountOfCoins*(1+0.1))^n function. And guess what: (1.1)^8 is 2.14358881. That means, after eight moves, you can double your coins, if you are a wealthy miner. And you can start with smaller amounts, to play it safe, but eventually, this system will degrade into "coin doubler after 800 blocks" or something similar.


On 2022-08-18 18:45:43 user Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
While constant tail emission does in fact converge to 0 inflation over time (which bitcoin's halvings do as well mind you), tail emission does *not* solve the potential problem of mining rewards, it only delays it. A tail emission of 200,000 btc/year (~1% of the current supply) would be equivalent to halvings every ~50 years rather than every 4 years. Were we to implement this kind of thing right after the last non-" destructive" halving, it would buy us 46 years of extra time. Nothing more, nothing less.


While its mildly interesting to know that tail emission converges to a stable point, while no inflation implies monetary deflation at the rate of loss, this feels very likely to be an insignificant problem. I think 1% loss rate per year is an absurdly high estimate these days, and the loss rate is likely to decrease as methods of storing bitcoin mature. Imagine bitcoin was worth $1 trillion (not so hard, since it was not too long ago), then try imagining people losing $10 billion of bitcoin every year. Highly unlikely IMO. A rate of loss of 0.01%/year might be more realistic for a near-future mature bitcoin. That's not going to be enough to make a significant difference even over 100s of years. 


If we actually wanted to solve the potential problem of not-enough-fees to upkeep mining security, there are less temporary ways to solve that. For example, if fees end up not being able to support sufficient mining, we could add emission based on a constant fraction of fees in the block. For example, every block could emit new bitcoin amounting to 10% of the fees collected in that block. This would tie coinbase rewards to the real world (since the fee market is tied to the real economy) and ensure higher block revenue indefinitely - ie not just for another 50 years. 


But its also worth saying that blockchain security (which mining revenue correlates with) does *not* need to increase indefinitely. There is some amount of security (and therefore some amount of mining revenue) that is sufficient, beyond which additional security is simply unnecessary, unwarranted, and wasteful (you wouldn't buy a $1000 safe to store $1000 of valuables). Do we, as the bitcoin community, have some good idea how much security we need? Do we have some idea how costly a 51% attack must be where we can be comfortable it will never happen? I'm curious to hear what people think about that. Because without having some kind of estimates of what "enough security" is, there's absolutely no way of evaluating whether or not its likely that bitcoin fees alone will be able to sustain enough security. 






On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 9:31 AM Jaroslaw via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

On one scale you puts the Trust to the large stakeholders (why we avoid plenty of small stakeholders, btw),
and on the other side I put game theory and well defined Prisoner's Dilemma.

Again: large stakeholders WILL NOT incentivised to mine, they will have the hundreds excuses why not to switch-on Antminers back.
That's how it simply works.  Bitcoin would fail miserably if Satoshi was based his concept mainly on existence of idealists.

If we will observe lack of hashrate recovery four years after some halving and still unprepared like today
- means the trust in large stakeholders was a very costly mistake.


Superiority of Proof of Work against Proof of Stake has been discussed enough either
The overall conclusion with what I fully agree  is: swapping PoW to PoS - would be a degradation.
You can stop talking about degradation to proof of stake, but just: degradation.

Degradation of Bitcoin, due to human greed.

Now you mine and you have an INSTANT gratification.
Then you will mine and it will cost you real money, but simple switch - and you have a DELAYED, maybe some day in the future, maybe only a tiny - punishment.
And The Punishment Won't Be Tiny.


"If the pain after hitting the hand with a hammer would appear after a month - people would notoriously walk with swollen fingers"
100% (^2)

Regards
Jaroslaw



W dniu 2022-08-17 13:10:38 użytkownik Erik Aronesty <erik@q32•com> napisał:

> you can stop talking about  the "security of the system" as meaningful
> this has been discussed enough
> if fees are not sufficient, clearance times increase and large stakeholders are incentivised to mine 
> in the best case, fees are sufficient
> in the worst case, it degrades to proof of stake
> i'm sure you can see how that's fine either way



_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
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https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 56+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2022-08-20 15:30 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2022-07-09 12:46 [bitcoin-dev] Surprisingly, Tail Emission Is Not Inflationary Peter Todd
2022-07-09 14:26 ` Eric Voskuil
2022-07-09 15:15   ` Peter Todd
2022-07-09 15:24     ` Eric Voskuil
2022-07-09 15:31       ` Peter Todd
2022-07-09 17:43         ` naman naman
2022-07-09 17:48           ` Peter Todd
2022-07-10  6:54             ` naman naman
2022-07-10  2:10         ` Tobin Harding
2022-07-10  7:08 ` vjudeu
2022-07-11 18:25   ` Larry Ruane
2022-07-10 10:18 ` Jacob Eliosoff
2022-07-11  2:32 ` Anthony Towns
2022-07-11  6:15   ` Stefan Richter
2022-07-11 10:42     ` Giuseppe B
2022-07-11 12:56   ` Erik Aronesty
2022-07-11 23:57     ` Anthony Towns
2022-07-13 18:29       ` Zac Greenwood
2022-07-11 16:59   ` Peter Todd
2022-07-11 17:44     ` Bram Cohen
2022-07-13 14:06 ` Alfred Hodler
2022-07-09 14:57 John Tromp
2022-07-09 15:13 ` Peter Todd
2022-07-11 18:44   ` Dave Scotese
2022-07-09 20:53 Eric Voskuil
2022-07-09 20:54 Eric Voskuil
2022-07-09 21:59 ` ZmnSCPxj
2022-07-10 14:17   ` alicexbt
2022-07-10 16:38     ` alicexbt
2022-07-10 17:29     ` Peter Todd
2022-07-10 17:27   ` Peter Todd
2022-07-10 18:12     ` vjudeu
2022-07-18 11:34     ` David A. Harding
2022-07-18 19:14       ` Erik Aronesty
2022-07-18 21:48         ` Eric Voskuil
2022-07-25 15:04         ` Erik Aronesty
2022-07-26 15:44           ` jk_14
2022-07-26 17:05             ` Erik Aronesty
2022-07-09 22:21 Peter
     [not found] <mailman.80287.1657405305.8511.bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
2022-07-10  7:44 ` John Tromp
2022-07-10 17:42 Eric Voskuil
2022-07-19 18:36 Peter
2022-07-20 14:35 ` Eric Voskuil
2022-07-26 20:01 jk_14
2022-08-15 21:46 jk_14
2022-08-17 11:10 ` Erik Aronesty
2022-08-16 16:05 Peter
2022-08-19 17:21 ` aliashraf.btc At protonmail
2022-08-20 15:30   ` Billy Tetrud
2022-08-17  8:54 jk_14
2022-08-17 13:43 jk_14
2022-08-18 15:29 ` Breno Brito
2022-08-18 15:44 ` Billy Tetrud
2022-08-18 20:49 ` Erik Aronesty
2022-08-18 20:22 jk_14
2022-08-19  5:34 vjudeu

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