Hi Vjudeu,

Perhaps this could make sense in some setting. e.g. instead of a hardware
device which protects your secret key via pin you use a pinless device but
you create a strong password and use a proper password hash to create
another key and put them in a 2-of-2. But make sure you don't use sha256 to
hash the password. Use a proper password hash. Keep in mind there's also
bip39 passwords which do a similar but this does involve entering them into
the possibly malicious hardware device.

Cheers,

LL

On Mon, 2 May 2022 at 03:56, vjudeu via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> It seems that Taproot allows us to protect each individual public key with
> a password. It could work in this way: we have some normal, Taproot-based
> public key, that is generated in a secure and random way, as it is today in
> Bitcoin Core wallet. Then, we can create another public key, just by taking
> password from the user, executing SHA-256 on that, and using it as a
> private key, so the second key will be just a brainwallet. Then, we can
> combine them in a Schnorr signature, forming 2-of-2 multisig, where the
> first key is totally random, and the second key is just a brainwallet that
> takes a password chosen by the user. By default, each key can be protected
> with the same password, used for the whole wallet, but it could be possible
> to choose different passwords for different addresses, if needed.
> Descriptors should handle that nicely, in the same way as they can be used
> to handle any other 2-of-2 multisig.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>