Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork

From: Zac Greenwood <zachgrw@gmail•com>
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>,
	eric@voskuil•org
Cc: Prayank <prayank@tutanota•de>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 13:33:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJ4-pEBcKJPNAKNQ-i4gBNFUuFFPYfxyWuzWHpZwO_kCp0wFQA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <026701d76d90$b4095e30$1c1c1a90$@voskuil.org>

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Hi Eric,

> A node (software) doesn’t enforce anything. Merchants enforce consensus
rules

… by running a node which they believe to enforce the rules of Bitcoin.

A node definitely enforces consensus rules and defines what is Bitcoin. I
am quite disturbed that this is even being debated here.

Zac

On Wed, 30 Jun 2021 at 11:17, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hi Prayank,
>
>
>
> > So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in
> chain split?
>
>
>
> Any two people on different rules implies a chain split. That’s presumably
> why rule changes are called forks. There is no actual concept of “the
> rules” just one set of rules or another.
>
>
>
> > Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants to
> use?
>
>
>
> I don’t presume to know why people prefer one thing over another, or what
> people want to use, nor does economics.
>
>
>
> > What are different things possible in this case based on game theory?
>
>
>
> I’ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory to
> Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can’t give you an
> answer because I have found no evidence of a valid game theoretic model
> applicable to Bitcoin. It’s not a game, it’s a market.
>
>
>
> > Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling
> for a soft fork begins?
>
>
>
> Who knows, I don’t get invited to round table meetings.
>
>
>
> > Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling
> readiness for soft fork?
>
>
>
> A person can mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner to
> enforce. Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the signals
> of others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume that
> others will enforce.
>
>
>
> > Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or
> Miners?
>
>
>
> A node (software) doesn’t enforce anything. Merchants enforce consensus
> rules when they reject trading for something that they don’t consider
> money. Every time two people trade both party validates what they receive
> (not what they trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economically
> relevant and their power is a function of how much they are doing so.
>
>
>
> Miners censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced. Majority miners
> can enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-censoring blocks.
> This is what soft fork enforcement is.
>
>
>
> > Is soft fork signaling same as voting?
>
>
>
> I don’t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are many
> kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of them.
> It’s a public signal that the miner who mined a given block miner intends
> to censor, that’s all.
>
>
>
> > According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules
> enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work.
>
>
>
> Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There are many. They earn
> the block reward.
>
>
>
> > Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting
> including some mining pools and exchanges.
>
>
>
> What people consider it is inconsequential. It has clearly defined
> behavior.
>
>
>
> e
>
>
>
> *From:* Prayank <prayank@tutanota•de>
> *Sent:* Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 AM
> *To:* eric@voskuil•org
> *Cc:* Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork
>
>
>
> Hello Eric,
>
>
>
> I have few questions:
>
>
>
> > Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are off
> on a chain split.
>
>
>
> So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in
> chain split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that
> nobody wants to use? What are different things possible in this case based
> on game theory?
>
>
>
> > And activation without majority hash power certainly does not “ensure”
> this.
>
>
>
> Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling for
> a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post activation even
> if signaling readiness for soft fork?
>
>
>
> > If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is
> accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so
> everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If
> enough people want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It’s time
> Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and
> that’s your vote.
>
>
>
> Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners?
>
>
>
> Is soft fork signaling same as voting?
>
>
>
> According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced
> by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. Signaling is not
> voting although lot of people consider it voting including some mining
> pools and exchanges.
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Prayank
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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