* [bitcoindev] Introducing Hourglass @ 2025-04-29 22:38 Hunter Beast 2025-04-30 3:01 ` [bitcoindev] " Michael Tidwell 2025-05-02 15:45 ` Francis Pouliot 0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Hunter Beast @ 2025-04-29 22:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 653 bytes --] This is a proposal to mitigate against potential mass liquidation of P2PK funds. The specification is pretty simple, but the motivation and justification for it is a bit longer. https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/hourglass/bip-hourglass.mediawiki Feedback welcome! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/db3d0ec4-90b8-44a4-b912-b98ec9083b10n%40googlegroups.com. [-- Attachment #1.2: Type: text/html, Size: 1273 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [bitcoindev] Re: Introducing Hourglass 2025-04-29 22:38 [bitcoindev] Introducing Hourglass Hunter Beast @ 2025-04-30 3:01 ` Michael Tidwell 2025-05-01 11:38 ` Jameson Lopp 2025-05-01 17:38 ` Nagaev Boris 2025-05-02 15:45 ` Francis Pouliot 1 sibling, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Michael Tidwell @ 2025-04-30 3:01 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4046 bytes --] I'm much more in favor of this approach vs freezing/burning the coins. Putting out some thoughts with the assumption this will one day be possible* At least at a high level this has some interesting merits that should be considered. Distribution of p2pk coins have pre-determined throttle rules that don't lead to any clear bias. Like the BIP explains, deciding which coins should be locked is a dangerous precedent. I'm more in favor of cryptographic romanticism vs authoritarian UTXO adjudicating. Early p2pk were not created with the idea that could be stolen. However imo, it is a better in everyway: technical, cultural, moral to allow early, inactive vulnerable coins to be naturally recycled without changing the unlocking script. From my search, there's roughly ~45,700 P2PK outputs. I don't think the address count matters here. We're looking at nearly one year's worth of UTXOs (~317 days), assuming a scenario where, once a key is cracked, there will be roughly one cracked key per block thereafter. Here are a few hypothetical scenarios to consider of many regarding mining pools and QC sig producing entities: - 1. Sigs become public: QC sigs become easy to produce and commoditized, freely available for every miner to pull from. Mining pools can arbitrarily select the most profitable signatures for their blocks. Given the relatively shortish time window between becoming available and being commoditized, I think this is unlikely. - 2. Single Entity rush spends: A single entity generates QC signatures and tries to rapidly flip the UTXOs while having their first mover competitive edge. They either broadcast to the mempool, partner with miners, or mine directly. This creates potential miner collusion if P2PK fees remain low, pressuring the QC entity to raise fees and incentivize miners before their competitive advantage expires and others catch up. - 3. Bidding war from multiple QC'ers: QC sigs produced by multiple entities, leading to potential bidding wars as suggested by BIP scenario. However, if the entities controlling the signatures are few, collusion to keep fees low and maximize profits elsewhere imo is likely to occur. This scenario would somewhat counterbalance scenario (2) above. - 4. Patient Miner: A single QC capable entity, also operating as a miner or partners with a miner, chooses to be patient, including P2PK transactions only in their own blocks to maximize long-term profits. I've discussed this idea off-band and heard concerns regarding MEV specifically, (i.e. miners needing QC partnerships or capabilities to remain competitive.) Considering the approximately 1 year exploit window, and an unknown amount of time in the future when this would occur, it's not clear that there would be significant MEV concerns during or afterwards for the (post QC phase). I consider 1 year in Bitcoin to be a relatively short time period that could be stomached as a "phase". Due to potential market panic and pressure from QC stakeholders, it's unlikely an entity would choose a long-term approach (e.g., 3-4+ years) to exploit these transactions. Instead, they'd likely pay fees promptly to outpace other people about to make breakthroughs in QC. On Tuesday, April 29, 2025 at 7:08:16 PM UTC-4 Hunter Beast wrote: > This is a proposal to mitigate against potential mass liquidation of P2PK > funds. The specification is pretty simple, but the motivation and > justification for it is a bit longer. > > https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/hourglass/bip-hourglass.mediawiki > > Feedback welcome! > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/c3b9617f-b419-4fc0-9a00-5d1866f80920n%40googlegroups.com. [-- Attachment #1.2: Type: text/html, Size: 5247 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoindev] Re: Introducing Hourglass 2025-04-30 3:01 ` [bitcoindev] " Michael Tidwell @ 2025-05-01 11:38 ` Jameson Lopp 2025-05-01 17:38 ` Nagaev Boris 1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Jameson Lopp @ 2025-05-01 11:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Tidwell; +Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6159 bytes --] I think this could benefit from a lot more blockchain analysis in order to support the claim that it will reduce economic volatility. On its surface it feels like a half measure. Sure, requiring P2PK output spends to be spread out over a year /could/ slow down the /tail end/ of said economic volatility. This is assuming that post-QDay, the machines doing the cracking can crack a key in less than 10 minutes. However, a rational quantum adversary will seek to maximize their revenue. For example, the most valuable likely lost funds are 12ib7dApVFvg82TXKycWBNpN8kFyiAN1dr which has 31,000 BTC spread across only a handful of UTXOs. It's not a P2PK address, but a P2PKH with an exposed pubkey due to address re-use. Even if this proposal is implemented we can still expect massive economic volatility at the front-end of the quantum era. Even if this proposal was extended to INCLUDE spends from re-used addresses, that would be 31,000 BTC in an hour or two. Moving on to P2PK specifically, I'd expect a similar issue of front-loaded volatility once a quantum adversary runs through the high value reused addresses that haven't migrated to a quantum safe scheme. Take, for example, James Howells' funds at 198aMn6ZYAczwrE5NvNTUMyJ5qkfy4g3Hi - 8,000 BTC spread out across just 16 UTXOs, which would be spendable in a 3 hour timeframe in this proposal. On Tue, Apr 29, 2025 at 11:26 PM Michael Tidwell <michael@tidwell•io> wrote: > I'm much more in favor of this approach vs freezing/burning the coins. > > Putting out some thoughts with the assumption this will one day be > possible* > > At least at a high level this has some interesting merits that should be > considered. Distribution of p2pk coins have pre-determined throttle rules > that don't lead to any clear bias. Like the BIP explains, deciding which > coins should be locked is a dangerous precedent. I'm more in favor of > cryptographic romanticism vs authoritarian UTXO adjudicating. Early p2pk > were not created with the idea that could be stolen. However imo, it is a > better in everyway: technical, cultural, moral to allow early, inactive > vulnerable coins to be naturally recycled without changing the unlocking > script. > > From my search, there's roughly ~45,700 P2PK outputs. I don't think the > address count matters here. We're looking at nearly one year's worth of > UTXOs (~317 days), assuming a scenario where, once a key is cracked, there > will be roughly one cracked key per block thereafter. > > Here are a few hypothetical scenarios to consider of many regarding mining > pools and QC sig producing entities: > > - 1. Sigs become public: > QC sigs become easy to produce and commoditized, freely available for > every miner to pull from. Mining pools can arbitrarily select the most > profitable signatures for their blocks. Given the relatively shortish time > window between becoming available and being commoditized, I think this is > unlikely. > > - 2. Single Entity rush spends: > A single entity generates QC signatures and tries to rapidly flip the > UTXOs while having their first mover competitive edge. They either > broadcast to the mempool, partner with miners, or mine directly. This > creates potential miner collusion if P2PK fees remain low, pressuring the > QC entity to raise fees and incentivize miners before their competitive > advantage expires and others catch up. > > - 3. Bidding war from multiple QC'ers: > QC sigs produced by multiple entities, leading to potential bidding wars > as suggested by BIP scenario. However, if the entities controlling the > signatures are few, collusion to keep fees low and maximize profits > elsewhere imo is likely to occur. This scenario would somewhat > counterbalance scenario (2) above. > > - 4. Patient Miner: > A single QC capable entity, also operating as a miner or partners with a > miner, chooses to be patient, including P2PK transactions only in their own > blocks to maximize long-term profits. > > I've discussed this idea off-band and heard concerns regarding MEV > specifically, (i.e. miners needing QC partnerships or capabilities to > remain competitive.) > Considering the approximately 1 year exploit window, and an unknown amount > of time in the future when this would occur, it's not clear that there > would be significant MEV concerns during or afterwards for the (post QC > phase). I consider 1 year in Bitcoin to be a relatively short time period > that could be stomached as a "phase". Due to potential market panic and > pressure from QC stakeholders, it's unlikely an entity would choose a > long-term approach (e.g., 3-4+ years) to exploit these transactions. > Instead, they'd likely pay fees promptly to outpace other people about to > make breakthroughs in QC. > On Tuesday, April 29, 2025 at 7:08:16 PM UTC-4 Hunter Beast wrote: > >> This is a proposal to mitigate against potential mass liquidation of P2PK >> funds. The specification is pretty simple, but the motivation and >> justification for it is a bit longer. >> >> https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/hourglass/bip-hourglass.mediawiki >> >> Feedback welcome! >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/c3b9617f-b419-4fc0-9a00-5d1866f80920n%40googlegroups.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/c3b9617f-b419-4fc0-9a00-5d1866f80920n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CADL_X_eDtRS1FCqo1g7TMzNTujhmDGPMAw21p2ej9iXQPXG%2Bmg%40mail.gmail.com. [-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 7574 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoindev] Re: Introducing Hourglass 2025-04-30 3:01 ` [bitcoindev] " Michael Tidwell 2025-05-01 11:38 ` Jameson Lopp @ 2025-05-01 17:38 ` Nagaev Boris 2025-05-01 18:23 ` Agustin Cruz 1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Nagaev Boris @ 2025-05-01 17:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Michael Tidwell; +Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List On Wed, Apr 30, 2025 at 12:26 AM Michael Tidwell <michael@tidwell•io> wrote: > - 2. Single Entity rush spends: > A single entity generates QC signatures and tries to rapidly flip the UTXOs while having their first mover competitive edge. They either broadcast to the mempool, partner with miners, or mine directly. This creates potential miner collusion if P2PK fees remain low, pressuring the QC entity to raise fees and incentivize miners before their competitive advantage expires and others catch up. > [...] > > - 4. Patient Miner: > A single QC capable entity, also operating as a miner or partners with a miner, chooses to be patient, including P2PK transactions only in their own blocks to maximize long-term profits. IMHO for a single QC capable entity even if it mines itself or partners with a miner, it would make sense to broadcast the transaction publicly. If it doesn't broadcast, then it can only capture one UTXO when it mines a block - rarely, depending on their hashrate share. If it mines itself and broadcasts at the same time, there is a possibility that another miner includes the transaction into a block. So a rational QC capable entity would broadcast in addition to mine themselves. Also it would make sense to use different UTXOs for broadcasting and for self mining: if another miner mines one UTXO, the QC entity can continue mining another UTXO trying to mine the next block with it. If they use the same UTXO, they would have to quickly make a signature for a fresh UTXO for their own block. Or just have a pool of attacked UTXOs and take them one by one... -- Best regards, Boris Nagaev -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAFC_Vt6c_DwmpCzNVCRWzz9E2AGn0PpkZzLeYeGNE1tYbUzyOA%40mail.gmail.com. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoindev] Re: Introducing Hourglass 2025-05-01 17:38 ` Nagaev Boris @ 2025-05-01 18:23 ` Agustin Cruz 2025-05-02 13:58 ` Saint Wenhao 0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Agustin Cruz @ 2025-05-01 18:23 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Nagaev Boris; +Cc: Michael Tidwell, Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3349 bytes --] Hi everyone, Boris’ point about a quantum capable attacker simply broadcasting and self mining at the same time is exactly the scenario that pushed me toward the QRAMP idea in the first place. Rather than trying to chase a well funded adversary around the mempool, QRAMP proposal says: let’s set a firm deadline and make every unspent P2PK output move to a quantum safe address before it arrives. Once the block height or a date passes, anything that stayed behind just stops being spendable. Holders who migrate on time keep full control; coins that don’t make the jump are effectively burned or otherwise invalidated by consensus, so there’s nothing left for an attacker to sign. Regards, Agustín On Thu, May 1, 2025 at 2:07 PM Nagaev Boris <bnagaev@gmail•com> wrote: > On Wed, Apr 30, 2025 at 12:26 AM Michael Tidwell <michael@tidwell•io> > wrote: > > - 2. Single Entity rush spends: > > A single entity generates QC signatures and tries to rapidly flip the > UTXOs while having their first mover competitive edge. They either > broadcast to the mempool, partner with miners, or mine directly. This > creates potential miner collusion if P2PK fees remain low, pressuring the > QC entity to raise fees and incentivize miners before their competitive > advantage expires and others catch up. > > > [...] > > > > - 4. Patient Miner: > > A single QC capable entity, also operating as a miner or partners with a > miner, chooses to be patient, including P2PK transactions only in their own > blocks to maximize long-term profits. > > IMHO for a single QC capable entity even if it mines itself or > partners with a miner, it would make sense to broadcast the > transaction publicly. If it doesn't broadcast, then it can only > capture one UTXO when it mines a block - rarely, depending on their > hashrate share. If it mines itself and broadcasts at the same time, > there is a possibility that another miner includes the transaction > into a block. So a rational QC capable entity would broadcast in > addition to mine themselves. > > Also it would make sense to use different UTXOs for broadcasting and > for self mining: if another miner mines one UTXO, the QC entity can > continue mining another UTXO trying to mine the next block with it. If > they use the same UTXO, they would have to quickly make a signature > for a fresh UTXO for their own block. Or just have a pool of attacked > UTXOs and take them one by one... > > -- > Best regards, > Boris Nagaev > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAFC_Vt6c_DwmpCzNVCRWzz9E2AGn0PpkZzLeYeGNE1tYbUzyOA%40mail.gmail.com > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAJDmzYyAb4GT%2BrdpF8ndAcFrFziQyO%3DQpA36m1T8gw0LTLLg-g%40mail.gmail.com. [-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 4303 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoindev] Re: Introducing Hourglass 2025-05-01 18:23 ` Agustin Cruz @ 2025-05-02 13:58 ` Saint Wenhao 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Saint Wenhao @ 2025-05-02 13:58 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Agustin Cruz Cc: Nagaev Boris, Michael Tidwell, Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5094 bytes --] > coins that don’t make the jump are effectively burned or otherwise invalidated by consensus, so there’s nothing left for an attacker to sign If you require the classical ECDSA signature, and a quantum-resistant one, then it will make coins "trapped", instead of "burned". And I think it is better, because then, if some quantum-resistant algorithm will be broken for any reason (some of them were broken classically), then it will be possible to go back to ECDSA, and soft-fork-out of the upgraded version by doing a downgrade, and switching to a different quantum-resistant scheme. Also, as long as ECDSA is not fully broken, the implementation of all of that will still be needed, to validate all historical blocks. And of course in some cases, it may be still possible to prove, that you are the original owner of the coin, for example if some key is a part of some HD wallet. By making funds unspendable, instead of trapped, you break all ways of accepting such proofs in the future. pt., 2 maj 2025 o 13:06 Agustin Cruz <agustin.cruz@gmail•com> napisał(a): > Hi everyone, > Boris’ point about a quantum capable attacker simply broadcasting and self > mining at the same time is exactly the scenario that pushed me toward the > QRAMP idea in the first place. Rather than trying to chase a well funded > adversary around the mempool, QRAMP proposal says: let’s set a firm > deadline and make every unspent P2PK output move to a quantum safe address > before it arrives. Once the block height or a date passes, anything that > stayed behind just stops being spendable. Holders who migrate on time keep > full control; coins that don’t make the jump are effectively burned or > otherwise invalidated by consensus, so there’s nothing left for an attacker > to sign. > > Regards, > Agustín > > On Thu, May 1, 2025 at 2:07 PM Nagaev Boris <bnagaev@gmail•com> wrote: > >> On Wed, Apr 30, 2025 at 12:26 AM Michael Tidwell <michael@tidwell•io> >> wrote: >> > - 2. Single Entity rush spends: >> > A single entity generates QC signatures and tries to rapidly flip the >> UTXOs while having their first mover competitive edge. They either >> broadcast to the mempool, partner with miners, or mine directly. This >> creates potential miner collusion if P2PK fees remain low, pressuring the >> QC entity to raise fees and incentivize miners before their competitive >> advantage expires and others catch up. >> > >> [...] >> > >> > - 4. Patient Miner: >> > A single QC capable entity, also operating as a miner or partners with >> a miner, chooses to be patient, including P2PK transactions only in their >> own blocks to maximize long-term profits. >> >> IMHO for a single QC capable entity even if it mines itself or >> partners with a miner, it would make sense to broadcast the >> transaction publicly. If it doesn't broadcast, then it can only >> capture one UTXO when it mines a block - rarely, depending on their >> hashrate share. If it mines itself and broadcasts at the same time, >> there is a possibility that another miner includes the transaction >> into a block. So a rational QC capable entity would broadcast in >> addition to mine themselves. >> >> Also it would make sense to use different UTXOs for broadcasting and >> for self mining: if another miner mines one UTXO, the QC entity can >> continue mining another UTXO trying to mine the next block with it. If >> they use the same UTXO, they would have to quickly make a signature >> for a fresh UTXO for their own block. Or just have a pool of attacked >> UTXOs and take them one by one... >> >> -- >> Best regards, >> Boris Nagaev >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. >> To view this discussion visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAFC_Vt6c_DwmpCzNVCRWzz9E2AGn0PpkZzLeYeGNE1tYbUzyOA%40mail.gmail.com >> . >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAJDmzYyAb4GT%2BrdpF8ndAcFrFziQyO%3DQpA36m1T8gw0LTLLg-g%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAJDmzYyAb4GT%2BrdpF8ndAcFrFziQyO%3DQpA36m1T8gw0LTLLg-g%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CACgYNOKXtmN7dwCX63UBhc4GhMAUOuaYKMfyj4Aa8-qv3v8c_Q%40mail.gmail.com. [-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 6409 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [bitcoindev] Re: Introducing Hourglass 2025-04-29 22:38 [bitcoindev] Introducing Hourglass Hunter Beast 2025-04-30 3:01 ` [bitcoindev] " Michael Tidwell @ 2025-05-02 15:45 ` Francis Pouliot 1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Francis Pouliot @ 2025-05-02 15:45 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1154 bytes --] Concept NACK. 1.7 million Bitcoin represents possibly about 1 week of global trading volumes. Even assuming it is 1-2 months of trading volumes, the market can absorb. Trying to manage the Bitcoin price via spending restrictions is a terrible idea. In any case, the Bitcoin price routinely drops by upwards of 85%. It is not a security concern. Price volatility is not a security. On Tuesday, April 29, 2025 at 5:08:16 PM UTC-6 Hunter Beast wrote: > This is a proposal to mitigate against potential mass liquidation of P2PK > funds. The specification is pretty simple, but the motivation and > justification for it is a bit longer. > > https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/hourglass/bip-hourglass.mediawiki > > Feedback welcome! > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups•com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/c4094fa8-8ec0-411c-8a67-80b8fc6282fdn%40googlegroups.com. [-- Attachment #1.2: Type: text/html, Size: 2201 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2025-05-03 11:55 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2025-04-29 22:38 [bitcoindev] Introducing Hourglass Hunter Beast 2025-04-30 3:01 ` [bitcoindev] " Michael Tidwell 2025-05-01 11:38 ` Jameson Lopp 2025-05-01 17:38 ` Nagaev Boris 2025-05-01 18:23 ` Agustin Cruz 2025-05-02 13:58 ` Saint Wenhao 2025-05-02 15:45 ` Francis Pouliot
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