I fully agree with sipa and his reasoning that this proposal is not solving any particular problem, but making it actually a bit worse. Also, do you know what I hate more than copy&pasting bitcoin addresses? Copy pasting zillion random fields for SEPA/wire transfers. And I believe that a single copy pasta of a bitcoin address is a much better user experience after all. Best, slush On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 9:08 AM ts via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Pieter, thanks for your comments. Here my thoughts: > > Pieter Wuille wrote on 8/29/21 9:24 AM: > > On Saturday, August 28th, 2021 at 5:17 PM, ts via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > >> Following up on my original proposal, I would like to get some more > feedback of the community > >> > >> to see if this could be realized at some point. Also, any > recommendations as to who to contact > >> > >> to get things rolling? > > > > I honestly don't understand the point of what you're suggesting. > > It is about creating a simple technical assistance that makes it more user > friendly and less > error prone to verify the entered address. For all types of users, > including those who are > less tech savvy. > > > > * If you're concerned about random typos, this is something already > automatically protected against through the checksum (both base58check or > bech32/bech32m). > > I agree, but as mentioned in the original proposal, it is not about random > typos (although > this would help for other coins without integrated checksum of course), > but rather about > copy&paste errors (both technical or user caused). > > > > * If you're concerned about accidentally entering the wrong - but > honestly created - address, comparing any few characters of the address is > just as good as any other. It doesn't even require the presence of a > checksum. Looking at the last N characters, or the middle N, or anything > except the first few, will do, and is just as good as an "external" > checksum added at the end. For randomly-generated addresses (as honest ones > are), each of those has exactly as much entropy. > > Correct. However, I believe that ADDITIONALLY to looking at N characters, > a quick check of a 3 > or 4 digit code in bigger font next to the address would make for a better > user experience. > This gives the user the reassurance that there is definitely no error. I > agree that most users > with technical background including most of us here will routinely check > the first/last N > characters. I usually check the first 3 + last 3 characters. But I don't > think this is very > user friendly. More importantly, I once had the case that two addresses > were very similar at > precisely those 6 characters, and only a more close and concentrated look > made me see the > difference. Moreover, some inexperienced users that are not aware of the > consequences of > entering a wrong address (much worse than entering the wrong bank account > in an online bank > transfer) might forget to look at the characters altogether. > > > > * If you're concerned about maliciously constructed addresses, which are > designed to look similar in specific places, an attacker can just as easily > make the external checksum collide (and having one might even worsen this, > as now the attacker can focus on exactly that, rather than needing to focus > on every other character). > > Not so concerned about this case, since this is a very special case that > can only occur under > certain circumstances. But taking this case also into consideration, this > is why the user > should use the verification code ADDITIONALLY to the normal way of > verifying, not instead. If > the attacker only focuses on the verification code, he will only be > successful with users that > ONLY look at this code. But if the attacker intends to be more successful, > he now needs to > create a valid address that is both similar in specific places AND > produces the same > verification code, which is way more difficult to achieve. > > > > Things would be different if you'd suggest a checksum in another medium > than text (e.g. a visual/drawing/colorcoding one). But I don't see any > added value for an additional text-based checksum when addresses are > already text themselves. > > Yes, a visual checksum could also work. Christopher Allen proposed to use > LifeHash as an > alternative. It would be a matter of balancing the more complex > implementation and need of > space in the app's layout with the usability and advantages of use. One > advantage of the digit > verification code is that it can be spoken in a call or written in a > message. > > > This is even disregarding the difficulty of getting the ecosystem to > adopt such changes. > > No changes are needed, only an agreement or recommendation on which > algorithm for the code > generation should be used. Once this is done, it is up to the developers > of wallets and > exchanges to implement this feature as they see fit. > > Greetings, > TS > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >