From: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32•com>
To: Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
<bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>,
Anthony Towns <aj@erisian•com.au>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Swift Activation - CTV
Date: Mon, 1 Jan 2024 12:11:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJowKg+CQWiHxcJLPE7bHbfwGo3WGQSqBNAQU-aEyCJH8YGO3w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <JjjvS5JDzMsm_gr9M1li4rhxJbQroFXfC8CvIYkHsncrYTB9K723Ds68KnPPm7rKyDgvVdMcUoeg8QQgRKlPsaOSvp5vc6OjB_-TiQZ5iWE=@protonmail.com>
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1. Claiming that something that isn't activated (unusable) isn't used as a
non-argument
2. Talking about activation methods is orthogonal. Bip8 is fine.
3. Covenants allow trustless utxos sharing and also are needed for
vaulting. The numerous use cases are documented, built out and on signet
to my knowledge. Check out utxos.org for a good list
3. No need to discuss wild extremes that are unrelated to ctvs well
documented utility. Plus multi-sig allows governments to encumber (or
accidentally ruin) destination addresses just like covenants.
4. "Best tool for the job" is not the bar. "Safe for all" and "useful for
some" is the bar. Like any opcodes or tech Bitcoin has deployed in the
past. Changing the bar is not up for discussion.
CTV has already been demonstrated "useful for some". The question that
needs to be answered is whether there are any specific objections to safety.
On Mon, Jan 1, 2024, 11:37 AM Michael Folkson <michaelfolkson@protonmail•com>
wrote:
> Hi Erik
>
> > So what exactly are the risks of CTV over multi-sig?
>
> It is a strange comparison. Multisig is active onchain and is being used
> today for all sorts of things including Lightning and setups that address
> risk of single key loss or malicious signing. When discussing risks of CTV
> there are all sorts of risks that don't apply to multisig. These include
> that it is never used for any of its speculated use cases (multisig is
> being used today), other proposals end up being used instead of it (I'm not
> sure there were or are competing proposals so that multisig stops being
> used, MuSig2 maybe?), chain split risks with activation if there isn't
> consensus to activate it etc. Plus usage of complex (non covenant) scripts
> that fully utilize Taproot trees is still low today. Going straight to
> covenants (imposing restrictions on *where* funds can be sent) and not
> bothering with imposing all the restrictions you'd like on *how* funds
> can be spent in the first place seems to me to be putting the cart before
> the horse. Covenants don't ultimately solve the key management issue, they
> just move it from the pre spending phase to the post spending phase. So the
> benefits (although non-zero) aren't as obvious as some of the covenant
> advocates are suggesting. And although CTV is a limited covenant (some
> argue too limited) covenants taken to wild extremes could create all sorts
> of second order effects where funds can't be spent because of complex
> combinations of covenants. Even the strongest CTV proponent seems to
> suggest that the introduction of covenants wouldn't end with CTV.
>
> The way to reduce implementation risk for a use case of a particular
> proposal is to build out that use case and see if CTV is the best tool for
> the job. Repeatedly trying to activate CTV when there isn't consensus for
> it to be activated does not reduce that implementation risk in any way,
> shape or form.
>
> Thanks
> Michael
>
>
> --
> Michael Folkson
> Email: michaelfolkson at protonmail.com
> GPG: A2CF5D71603C92010659818D2A75D601B23FEE0F
>
> Learn about Bitcoin: https://www.youtube.com/@portofbitcoin
>
> On Saturday, 30 December 2023 at 08:59, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> So what exactly are the risks of CTV over multi-sig?
>
>
>>
>>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-01 17:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-20 1:44 alicexbt
2023-12-22 1:05 ` Luke Dashjr
2023-12-22 1:56 ` alicexbt
2023-12-22 22:34 ` alicexbt
2023-12-30 8:05 ` Anthony Towns
2023-12-30 8:59 ` Erik Aronesty
2024-01-01 16:37 ` Michael Folkson
2024-01-01 17:11 ` Erik Aronesty [this message]
2024-01-02 13:52 ` Michael Folkson
2024-01-02 14:32 ` Erik Aronesty
2024-01-02 16:24 ` Ryan Breen
2024-01-02 16:43 ` alicexbt
2023-12-30 13:54 ` Michael Folkson
2024-01-03 8:36 ` Anthony Towns
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