it's in line with the values of - immutable supply - enforced by the game theory of hard money and no, it's not only "rich holders"... i mine, and lots of people i know do it's certainly more decentralized than the alternatives On Thu, Jul 14, 2022 at 7:43 AM Gino Pinuto wrote: > This is not an argument in line with bitcoin values, on that scenario only > rich people will be able to mine and participate to the consensus process. > Like George Soros today, he use its financial reserves to monopolize ONG > in order to manipulate nation states. I would not define this a "tax", > moreover a cost to maintain control over the network. > > Those rich holders could crate a cartel and without market dynamics all > game theory stop to work and the bitcoin network value drop. > > We should think about how to maximise the network value instead of trying > to preserve it with corruptible practices outside of market dynamics > principles. > > On Thu, 14 Jul 2022, 12:53 Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev, < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> Fees and miner rewards are not needed at all for security at all since >> long term holders can simply invest in mining to secure the value of their >> stake. >> >> Isn't it enough that the protocol has a mechanism to secure value? >> >> Sure fees *might* be enough. >> >> But in the event that they are not, large holders can burn a bit to make >> sure the hashrate stays high. >> >> I know, I know it's a tax on the rich and it's not fair because smaller >> holders are less likely to do it, but it's a miniscule tax even in the >> worst case >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jul 14, 2022, 5:35 AM vjudeu via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >>> > This specific approach would obviously not work as most of those >>> outputs would be dust and the miner would need to waste an absurd amount of >>> block space just to grab them, but maybe there's a smarter way to do it. >>> >>> There is a smarter way. Just send 0.01 BTC per block to the timelocked >>> outputs. Now, we have 6.25 BTC, so it means less than 0.2%. But that >>> percentage will grow over time, as basic block reward will shrink, and we >>> will have mandatory 0.01 BTC endlessly moved, until it will wrap. And guess >>> what: if it will be 0.01 BTC per block, wrapped every 210,000 blocks, it >>> simply means you can lock 2,100 BTC in an endless circulation loop, and >>> avoid this "tail supply attack". >>> >>> So, fortunately, even if "tail supply attackers" will win, we will still >>> have a chance to counter-attack by burning those coins, or (even better) by >>> locking them in an endless circulation loop, just to satisfy their >>> malicious soft-fork, whatever amount it will require. Because even if it >>> will be mandatory to timelock 0.01 BTC to the current block number plus >>> 210,000, then it is still perfectly valid to move that amount endlessly, >>> without taking it, just to resist this "tail supply attack". >>> >>> >>> On 2022-07-13 20:01:39 user Manuel Costa via bitcoin-dev < >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> > What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth >>> out while keeping the ~21M coins limit ? >>> >>> This would be a hard fork afaict as it would go against the rules of the >>> coinbase transaction following the usual halving schedule. >>> >>> However, if instead we added a rule that fees have to be sent to an >>> anyone can spend output with a timelock we might be able to achieve a >>> similar thing. >>> >>> Highly inefficient example: >>> >>> - Split blocks into 144 (about a day) >>> - A mined block takes all the fees and distributes them equally into 144 >>> new outputs (anyone can spend) time locked to each of the 144 blocks of the >>> next day. >>> - Next day, for each block, we'd have available an amount equivalent to >>> the previous day total fees / 144. So we deliver previous day's fees >>> smoothed out. >>> >>> Notes: >>> 144 is arbitrary in the example. >>> This specific approach would obviously not work as most of those outputs >>> would be dust and the miner would need to waste an absurd amount of block >>> space just to grab them, but maybe there's a smarter way to do it. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Gino Pinuto via bitcoin-dev >>> escreveu no dia quarta, 13/07/2022 à(s) 13:19: >>> What about burning all fees and keep a block reward that will smooth out >>> while keeping the ~21M coins limit ? >>> >>> >>> Benefits : >>> - Miners would still be incentivized to collect higher fees transaction >>> with the indirect perspective to generate more reward in future. >>> - Revenues are equally distributed over time to all participants and we >>> solve the overnight discrepancy. >>> - Increased velocity of money will reduce the immediate supply of >>> bitcoin cooling down the economy. >>> - Reduction of velocity will have an impact on miners only if it >>> persevere in the long term but short term they will still perceive the >>> buffered reward. >>> >>> >>> I don't have ideas yet on how to elegantly implement this. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, 13 Jul 2022, 12:08 John Tromp via bitcoin-dev, < >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >>> > The emission curve lasts over 100 years because Bitcoin success state >>> requires it to be entrenched globally. >>> >>> It effectively doesn't. The last 100 years from 2040-2140 only emits a >>> pittance of about 0.4 of all bitcoin. >>> >>> What matters for proper distribution is the shape of the emission >>> curve. If you emit 99% in the first year and 1% in the next 100 years, >>> your emission "lasts" over 100 years, and you achieve a super low >>> supply inflation rate immediately after 1 year, but it's obviously a >>> terrible form of distribution. >>> >>> This is easy to quantify as the expected time of emission which would >>> be 0.99 * 0.5yr + 0.01* 51yr = 2 years. >>> Bitcoin is not much better in that the expected time of emission of an >>> bitcoin satisfies x = 0.5*2yr + 0.5*(4+x) and thus equals 6 years. >>> >>> Monero appears much better since its tail emission yields an infinite >>> expected time of emission, but if we avoid infinities by looking at >>> just the soft total emission [1], which is all that is emitted before >>> a 1% yearly inflation, then Monero is seen to actually be a lot worse >>> than Bitcoin, due to emitting over 40% in its first year and halving >>> the reward much faster. Ethereum is much worse still with its huge >>> premine and PoS coins like Algorand are scraping the bottom with their >>> expected emission time of 0. >>> >>> There's only one coin whose expected (soft) emission time is larger >>> than bitcoin's, and it's about an order of magnitude larger, at 50 >>> years. >>> >>> [1] >>> https://john-tromp.medium.com/a-case-for-using-soft-total-supply-1169a188d153 >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >