AML/KYC is a side-effect of a some very important features of BIP0075.   

Features that have nothing to do with public names for wallet seeds, and moniker consistency should be scrapped.

BIP 75 formalises what someone could do today with a bunch of PGP emails back and forth.

I create a public key, and I exchange it via QR code with you.   From then on, You can initiate invoice requests with me, knowing my moniker is the same as it was the last time.   I publish this key to a server (via DNSSEC) so anyone can obtain it.   Sounds exactly like PGP.

Identity in BIP 75 is merely "moniker consistency".  Nothing says that identity has to be "real"... only publicly verifiably consistent and accessible.  This consistency and the ability to have public names for both merchants and users are the important features of BIP 075.   

Other features linking monikers to real-world identity should be surgically removed from the standard.

- Users need to be able to send Bitcoin to an address without MITM attacks during the address exchange.   

- Merchants need to be able to supply memorable names linked to internet services, like web servers and email addresses.  

- Merchants and users both need to be able to initiate transaction off-chain, with a workflow that allows things like rejection, subscription, etc.



On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 6:56 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 05:14:31PM -0700, Justin Newton wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 3:13 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
> Hi Peter,
>    Certainly AML/KYC compliance is one of the use cases that BIP 75 and our
> certificates can support.  As a quick summary,
>
> There are individuals and entities that would like to buy, sell, and use
> bitcoin, and other public blockchains, but that have compliance
> requirements that they need to meet before they can do so.  Similarly,
> companies and entrepreneurs in the space suffer under the potential threat
> of fines, or in extreme cases, jail time, also for not meeting AML or
> sanctions list compliance.  We wanted to build tools that allowed
> entrepreneurs to breathe easy, while at the same time allow more people and
> companies to enter the ecosystem.  We also believe that the solution we are
> using has the characteristics that you want in such a solution, for example:
>
> 1> Only the counterparties (and possibly their service providers in the
> case of hosted services) in a transaction can see the identity data,
> protecting user privacy.
>
> 2> The counterparties themselves (and possibly their service providers in
> the case of hosted services) decide whether identity information is
> required for any given transaction.
>
> 3> No trace is left on the blockchain or anywhere else (other than with the
> counterparties) that identity information was even exchanged, protecting
> fungibility
>
> 4> The solution is based on open source and open standards, allowing open
> permissionless innovation, versus parties building closed networks based on
> closed standards.  The very fact that this solution went through the BIP
> process and was adapted based on feedback is an example of how this is
> better for users than the inevitable closed solution that would arise if
> the open source, community vetted version didn’t already exist.
>
> I don’t know if you are opposed to organizations that have AML requirements
> from using the bitcoin blockchain, but if you aren’t, why wouldn’t you
> prefer an open source, open standards based solution to exclusionary,
> proprietary ones?

In some (most?) countries, it is illegal to offer telecoms services without
wiretap facilities. Does that mean Tor builds into its software "open source"
"open standards" wiretapping functionality? No. And interestingly, people
trying to add support for that stuff is actually a thing that keeps happening
in the Tor community...

In any case, I'd strongly argue that we remove BIP75 from the bips repository,
and boycott wallets that implement it. It's bad strategy for Bitcoin developers
to willingly participate in AML/KYC, just the same way as it's bad for Tor to
add wiretapping functionality, and W3C to support DRM tech. The minor tactical
wins you'll get our of this aren't worth it.