> How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork? I had proposed earlier and maintain that "UTXO bits" can be used to allow coordinated user participation activation thresholds akin to other hashpower thresholds. https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.html While I'm not certain that my implementation was correct (or was just too complicated and concerned with compression at the expense of readability), I am fairly certain that this mechanism - or a similar one - would be a reasonable way for users to coordinate changes independently of miners and with very high consensus levels. On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 1:04 AM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > On Jun 14, 2017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin wrote: > >> Hi Jameson: >> >> 在 2017年6月15日，01:20，Jameson Lopp 写道： >> >> >> >> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> > 在 2017年6月14日，02:11，Gregory Maxwell 写道： >>> > >>> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev >>> > wrote: >>> >>> > The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not just >>> > miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8, >>> > paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is >>> > critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current >>> > degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security >>> > would look a lot more like the Ripple system. >>> > >>> >>> 是的，用户永远都有选择，并可以抛弃那些节点。这个 BIP 并没有反对这些用户这么做。只有那些被动的钱包用户，他们需要知 >>> 道必须做出一个选择。（而不是被动的跟随默认的策略） >>> Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This BIP >>> does’t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) that’s >>> passive, they need to know there’s a choice and pick one. >>> >>> 这个 BIP 可以被应用于几乎任何的升级上，包括隔离见证，两兆的隔离见证，两兆扩容，涌现共识，八兆扩容等。但这些升级并不是重点。 >>> This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, >>> Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m… but the upgrade is not the key point. >>> >>> 到底我们的用户是否真的拥有选择？ >>> Did the users have any real choice? >>> >>> 我并不能理解他们相信大部分矿工（就像当前一样），但拒绝这些多数矿工对协议改变的投票结果。 >>> I don’t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they do today) >>> but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade. >>> >> >> To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using the >> term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a >> feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that >> they are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too >> "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users >> may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not >> show readiness for enforcing the new rules. >> >> >> How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But >> what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork? >> >> I agree with you that the “vote” is not accurate. Could you kindly >> suggest an other word for that? >> >> I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you >> agree with this or not? >> >> Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number > of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to > signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing > that to date has been arguably flawed. > > > There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus at the > protocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor > inequitable in the context of Bitcoin. > > The only "problem" with it is that people are not satisfied with having a > voice limited to their participation. People are used to political systems > in which they vote using their existence as power, not their participation, > and they expect some subset of existing human bodies to control all others. > This is the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a > more powerful voice than either their proportional existence or individual > participation would allow. > > Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. It is a market, not a > state. The only choice you have is to participate or leave. If you are > satisfied with others participating in your stead, you have left the > consensus - you have no say. > > Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never > participated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these > people now grope for a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your > say on consensus, but you cannot take it away from others. > > To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received > in exchange for something else of economic value. To have your say > regarding soft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard forks > cannot control miners' selection of transactions and miners cannot control > the economy's determination of what is valid. If one wants a say in either > one must participate in the respective operation. > > e > > Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely > impossible, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin > users do not voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules. > > Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best described > as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no > actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating > node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what > rules other entities are enforcing. > >> >> >>> >>> 对钱包用户的选择，是他们是否相信多数矿工。如果他们不相信，可以通过分叉来消除掉矿工。 >>> This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% >>> majority miners. If they don’t, they can have their fork that get rid of >>> miners. >>> >>> 如果他们仍旧相信矿工，那么可以留下来并跟随矿工将来的协议改变。 >>> If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for >>> upcoming protocol upgrade. >>> >>> 所以问题在于：比特币的开发者、用户、拥有者、服务提供者、甚至矿工，是否（仍然）如白皮书中描述的对大多数矿工拥有信任。 >>> So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, service >>> provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as >>> designed in the white paper? >>> >>> >> There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white >> paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to >> determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ >> chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the >> correct chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid >> chain forks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners >> (or any other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they >> wish to enforce. >> >> >> Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 >> temporarily. That’s a “soft fork” right? If they dislike the idea, they can >> leave as always. >> >> From my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop > confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a > soft fork, yes. > >> >> Regards >> >> LIN Zheming >> >> >> > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > >