Pieter,

You are correct.

And also, I did prove what I set out to prove. The code provided privately to the security team will in fact consume 99% of the CPU, which means it does have an effect on the electorate.  It is true the node still stubbornly passes messages, but I would argue that this is still very much a problem that would concern operators, and perhaps the threshold for a patch is much too high.  A layered security system like what is found in bitcoin necessitates an attack chain.  The `getdata` message is an implicit information disclosure that allows for the identification of dissenting nodes.   As ZmnSCPxj pointed out, block mixing will give preemption at most 67% of the network, and the remaining dissenting nodes can be quelled by maxing out their processing power.  All of this can be used together to make sure that a withheld block becomes the prevailing solution.

FPNC rebalances incentives to serve the interests of the network, and fundamentally resolves a class of abuses that reshape the electorate.  FPNC will produce a more deceliterized and fair network than "first seen."

Cheers,
Mike

On Wed, Oct 7, 2020 at 5:12 PM Pieter Wuille <bitcoin-dev@wuille.net> wrote:
On Wednesday, October 7, 2020 1:31 PM, Mike Brooks via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

But first of all, I'd like to say that the idea for FPNC came out of a conversation with ZmnSCPxj's in regards to re-org stability.  When I had proposed blockchain pointers with the PubRef opcode, he took the time to explain to me concerns around re-orgs and why it is a bigger problem than I initially had thought — and I greatly appreciate this detail.   After touching base with ZmnSCPxj and Greg Maxwell there is an overwhelming view that the current problems that face the network outweigh any theoretical ones.

Greg Maxwell isn't on this list, but assuming this is about the conversion you've had on Bitcoin Core's security disclosure list, I believe this is a misrepresentation. The discussion has been mostly around a DoS attack report which turned out to be a mistake.

Cheers,

--
Pieter