> The choice between whether we offer them a light client technology that
is better or worse for privacy and scalability.

And offer them a solution which would scale in the long-term.

Again it's not an argumentation against BIP 157 protocol in itself, the
problem I'm interested in is how implementing BIP157 in Core will address
this issue ?

Le mar. 5 mai 2020 à 13:36, John Newbery via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> a écrit :

> There doesn't seem to be anything in the original email that's specific to
> BIP 157. It's a restatement of the arguments against light clients:
>
> - light clients are a burden on the full nodes that serve them
> - if light clients become more popular, there won't be enough full nodes
> to serve them
> - people might build products that depend on altruistic nodes serving
> data, which is unsustainable
> - maybe at some point in the future, light clients will need to pay for
> services
>
> The choice isn't between people using light clients or not. People already
> use light clients. The choice between whether we offer them a light client
> technology that is better or worse for privacy and scalability.
>
> The arguments for why BIP 157 is better than the existing light client
> technologies are available elsewhere, but to summarize:
>
> - they're unique for a block, which means they can easily be cached.
> Serving a filter requires no computation, just i/o (or memory access for
> cached filter/header data) and bandwidth. There are plenty of other
> services that a full node offers that use i/o and bandwidth, such as
> serving blocks.
> - unique-for-block means clients can download from multiple sources
> - the linked-headers/filters model allows hybrid approaches, where headers
> checkpoints can be fetched from trusted/signed nodes, with intermediate
> headers and filters fetched from untrusted sources
> - less possibilities to DoS/waste resources on the serving node
> - better for privacy
>
> > The intention, as I understood it, of putting BIP157 directly into
> bitcoind was to essentially force all `bitcoind` users to possibly service
> BIP157 clients
>
> Please. No-one is forcing anyone to do anything. To serve filters, a node
> user needs to download the latest version, set `-blockfilterindex=basic` to
> build the compact filters index, and set `-peercfilters` to serve them over
> P2P. This is an optional, off-by-default feature.
>
> Regards,
> John
>
>
> On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 9:50 AM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Good morning ariard and luke-jr
>>
>>
>> > > Trust-minimization of Bitcoin security model has always relied first
>> and
>> > > above on running a full-node. This current paradigm may be shifted by
>> LN
>> > > where fast, affordable, confidential, censorship-resistant payment
>> services
>> > > may attract a lot of adoption without users running a full-node.
>> >
>> > No, it cannot be shifted. This would compromise Bitcoin itself, which
>> for
>> > security depends on the assumption that a supermajority of the economy
>> is
>> > verifying their incoming transactions using their own full node.
>> >
>> > The past few years has seen severe regressions in this area, to the
>> point
>> > where Bitcoin's future seems quite bleak. Without serious improvements
>> to the
>> > full node ratio, Bitcoin is likely to fail.
>> >
>> > Therefore, all efforts to improve the "full node-less" experience are
>> harmful,
>> > and should be actively avoided. BIP 157 improves privacy of fn-less
>> usage,
>> > while providing no real benefits to full node users (compared to more
>> > efficient protocols like Stratum/Electrum).
>> >
>> > For this reason, myself and a few others oppose merging support for BIP
>> 157 in
>> > Core.
>>
>> BIP 157 can be implemented as a separate daemon that processes the blocks
>> downloaded by an attached `bitcoind`, i.e. what Wasabi does.
>>
>> The intention, as I understood it, of putting BIP157 directly into
>> bitcoind was to essentially force all `bitcoind` users to possibly service
>> BIP157 clients, in the hope that a BIP157 client can contact any arbitrary
>> fullnode to get BIP157 service.
>> This is supposed to improve to the situation relative to e.g. Electrum,
>> where there are far fewer Electrum servers than fullnodes.
>>
>> Of course, as ariard computes, deploying BIP157 could lead to an
>> effective DDoS on the fullnode network if a large number of BIP157 clients
>> arise.
>> Though maybe this will not occur very fast?  We hope?
>>
>> It seems to me that the thing that *could* be done would be to have
>> watchtowers provide light-client services, since that seems to be the major
>> business model of watchtowers, as suggested by ariard as well.
>> This is still less than ideal, but maybe is better than nothing.
>>
>> Regards,
>> ZmnSCPxj
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