Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s security

From: Antoine Riard <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 19:45:48 -0400

> BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bumping txs without the
> opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also made sure txs would
propagate to
> the above node. As of right now, it's up to 32 replacements (once per
block),
> without any of them mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at
the
> minimum possible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block
arrives
> without the tx getting mined. So that's evidence we don't have much
full-rbf
> hash power at this moment.
>
> You can see the current status at:
https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/

That's interesting. I'm not sure if we can conclude of the absence of
full-rbf hash power at this moment, as it could also be a lack of full-rbf
propagation path towards such potential hash power. I think the day we see
an opt-out replacement transaction mined, it would constitute a good hint
of full-rbf hash power (assuming the tx-relay topology stays relatively
stable across the transaction issuance...)

Anyway, if/when the `fullrbf` patch lands in Bitcoin Core, including
automatic outbound connections to few `NODE_REPLACE_BY_FEE` peers, I'm
thinking of reaching out to a few mining node operators to advocate them
with the new policy setting.

Antoine

Le lun. 20 juin 2022 à 19:49, Peter Todd <[email-masked]> a écrit :

> On Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 08:25:11PM -0400, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > For that reason, I believe it would be beneficial to the flourishing of
> > multi-party funded transactions to fix the Dos vector by seeing a subset
> of
> > the network running full-rbf and enabling propagation of honest
> multi-party
> > transactions to the interested miners, replacing potential non-signaling
> > double-spend from a malicious counterparty. Moving towards that
> direction,
> > I've submitted a small patch against Bitcoin Core enabling it to turn on
> > full-rbf as a policy, still under review [3]. The default setting stays
> > **false**, i.e keeping opt-in RBF as a default replacement policy. I've
> > started to run the patch on a public node at 146.190.224.15.
>
> BTW I changed one of my OTS calendars to issue fee-bumping txs without the
> opt-in RBF flag set as an experiment. I also made sure txs would propagate
> to
> the above node. As of right now, it's up to 32 replacements (once per
> block),
> without any of them mined; the calendars use the strategy of starting at
> the
> minimum possible fee, and bumping the fee up every time a new block arrives
> without the tx getting mined. So that's evidence we don't have much
> full-rbf
> hash power at this moment.
>
> You can see the current status at:
> https://alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org/
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>