From: Antoine Riard <antoine.riard@gmail•com>
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists•linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Solving Multi-Party Flows Pinning with Opt-in Full-RBF Spent-nVersion Signaling
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2022 22:21:59 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALZpt+GZAd-vYMzUMicg0c9OyyWExtT5EH61Hms6NNOM19ddZA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
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Hi list,
Reading Suhas's post on mempool policy consistency rules, and the grounded
suggestion that as protocol developers we should work on special policy
rules to support each reasonable use case on the network rather to arbiter
between class of use-cases in the design of an
unified set of rules, reminded me there is another solution to solve
multi-party funding pinning rather than wide deployment of fullrbf. This
was communicated to me a while back, and it was originally dismissed
because of the privacy trade-offs (and potential slight fees overhead
cost). However, if widely adopted, they might sound acceptable to
contracting protocol developers and operators.
## The Problem: Pinning Contracting Protocols Funding Flows with Opt-out
Double-Spend
As originally laid out [0], multi-party collaborative flows
(coinjoin/dual-funding/swaps/splicing/etc), where every participant
contributes at least one input, are suffering from a low-cost and
high-success DoS vector with asymmetric damages. E.g with lightning
interactive transaction construction protocols limits of 252 inputs, 1
single input can bleed the timevalue of the remaining 251 inputs, or engage
in a MEV attack where the fee-bumping entity is lured to inflate feerate
beyond the current blockspace demand. The attack can be hidden and a
posteriori assigning blame consistently stays an open question in the lack
of a consensus mechanism between participants on the network mempools
states.
The issue lies in the fact that participants joining inputs together don't
have control, or even view, of the replacement signaling of any potential
double-spend of the other participants inputs. Indeed the opt-in fullrbf
signaling is enforced based on the nSequence field, and this one is fully
malleable by the UTXO spender. There is no current mechanism to require
replacement signaling provable to a third-party only on the knowledge of
the UTXO spents.
# The Solution: Opt-in Full-Replace-by-Fee Spent-nVersion Signaling
A new policy is specified in a new way a transaction can signal that it is
replaceable.
1. A confirmed transaction is considered to have opted in to allowing
replacement of any of its spends (or their descendants), if the last bit of
the nVersion field is set.
Rational: The future replacement status of any UTXO spend can be determined
by inspecting the nVersion, therefore protecting the collaborative
participants of a multi-party flows that the target transaction should
propagate to the miners, if the fee/feerate offered are the best ones
without opt-out based pinning. It can be required the UTXOs to have few
confirmations in case of shallow reorgs to increase DoS protection.
## Solution trade-offs
On the validation-side, there is one engineering issue, as I think there is
no access to the spent nversion fields by the mempool logic. This would
presume we add some new cache of all the confirmed UTXOs, so ~50M * 4bytes,
300 MB of additional state for policy-enforcing full-nodes. I don't know if
there is another strong drawback, even the reorg logic the replaceable
spends shouldn't be evicted if the confirmed ancestor is back to the
mempool, as mempool validity shouldn't be reevaluated before a replacement
candidate shows up. A fee penalty could be requested for nVersion-signaling
transactions to compensate for the additional state stored by full-node
operators (even if obviously they're not the ones earning the fees).
For the contracting protocols wallets, as you don't know in advance which
coins are going to be used for a collaborative flow, you're better off to
mark all your coins nVersion fields opting fullrbf. Otherwise, you will
have to go through an on-chain fee cost to change the replacement status of
the spends of your coins. However, this policy bookmarking comes as a
protocol fingerprint leak for an observer of the transaction logs. If all
the second-layers used by default, this is constituting a single anonymity
set, though it might still be the privacy gains we're harvesting from
Taproot output usage in the optimistic case (e.g in Lightning no commitment
+ HTLC transactions broadcast).
For the zeroconf operators, assuming they have access to the UTXO set, they
can inspect the receiving transactions ancestors nVersion fields, and sort
those transactions in the wider set of the replaceable ones, as they're
currently doing for BIP125 opt-in ones.
Long-term, the annoying privacy issue and the assumption that any wallet
will be a Lightning one could lead to the majority of wallets signaling RBF
for their spends. Therefore making those wallets incompatible with zeroconf
services, slowly economically outlawing them. From my perspective, though
it might be a simplification, it sounds an alternative full rbf way
forward, where rather than having miners deciding on the policy
enforcement, we let the users decide with their coins. However, this new
policy enforcement efficiency is still dependent on the existence of relay
paths and support at the endpoints that matter, the miner mempools. So in
fine we might have to realize incentive alignment with hashrate is what
matters in terms of transaction-relay rules ?
Credit to Greg Maxwell for this idea.
Cheers,
Antoine
[0]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-May/003033.html
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next reply other threads:[~2022-11-02 2:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-02 2:21 Antoine Riard [this message]
2022-11-02 13:58 ` Greg Sanders
2022-11-02 14:04 ` Peter Todd
2022-11-02 14:19 ` Greg Sanders
2022-11-02 14:33 ` Peter Todd
2022-11-02 15:00 ` Greg Sanders
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