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From: "/dev /fd0" <alicexbtong@gmail•com>
To: jbesraa <jbesraa@gmail•com>
Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Re: UTXO probing attack using payjoin
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2025 01:08:41 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALiT-Zrq0Nr9uNWDTMj3=VJ6TCcmeL3s+Jau+nEGHqYqFcfB+g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1c7130d4-cbac-4404-968c-9eb7b4e2e4cbn@googlegroups.com>

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Hi jbesraa,

> While the possibility of UTXO probing via Payjoin is a valid concern
regarding privacy, it's important to note that it might not always come
without cost for the attacker. The Payjoin recipient > needs to validate
the initial request, ensuring the sender's inputs are broadcastable. This
means the recipient could, in practice, broadcast the initial transaction
even if the sender aborts the > Payjoin.

> Furthermore, implementing strategies like maintaining a set of 'seen
inputs' can make such probing attempts more easily detectable and less
effective.

The original transaction can be replaced by the attacker, and it would only
cost a few hundred sats or nothing if it's payjoin transaction. I think
such attacks could still be effective if the attacker has the budget and
motivation to spy on someone's wallet.

/dev/fd0
floppy disk guy


On Wed, Mar 26, 2025 at 11:54 PM jbesraa <jbesraa@gmail•com> wrote:

> While the possibility of UTXO probing via Payjoin is a valid concern
> regarding privacy, it's important to note that it might not always come
> without cost for the attacker. The Payjoin recipient needs to validate the
> initial request, ensuring the sender's inputs are broadcastable. This means
> the recipient could, in practice, broadcast the initial transaction even if
> the sender aborts the Payjoin. Furthermore, implementing strategies like
> maintaining a set of 'seen inputs' can make such probing attempts more
> easily detectable and less effective. While these measures don't eliminate
> the privacy considerations entirely, they do highlight that recipients have
> potential defenses and that probing isn't necessarily a risk-free endeavor
> for the attacker.
>
> On Tuesday, March 25, 2025 at 1:48:15 PM UTC+2 /dev /fd0 wrote:
>
> Hi everyone,
>
> Sometimes we are curious and want to know about UTXOs in other wallets.
> Payjoin allows you to do this and the recipient would never doubt it
> because it's a privacy tool. It's possible to find UTXO in recipient's
> wallet without sending any bitcoin. It's called UTXO probing attack and
> described in BIP 77-78.
>
> I have shared a demo with all the details in this [post][0]. I have used
> bullbitcoin wallet for testing this because it was the only [wallet][1]
> which supports payjoin v2 (send, receive) and testnet3.
>
> I think users should be aware of this tradeoff and the information they
> share with the sender in payjoin. Payjoin should only be used with trusted
> senders.
>
> [0]:
> https://uncensoredtech.substack.com/p/utxo-probing-attack-using-payjoin
> [1]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/PayJoin_adoption
>
> /dev/fd0
> floppy disk guy
>
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  reply	other threads:[~2025-03-27 12:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-25 11:46 [bitcoindev] " /dev /fd0
2025-03-25 12:52 ` [bitcoindev] " jbesraa
2025-03-26 19:38   ` /dev /fd0 [this message]
2025-03-28 19:28     ` waxwing/ AdamISZ
2025-03-28 23:41       ` Yuval Kogman
2025-03-29 13:00         ` /dev /fd0
2025-03-29 12:34       ` /dev /fd0
2025-03-25 13:39 ` [bitcoindev] " Yuval Kogman
2025-03-26 19:26   ` /dev /fd0

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