conceptually they are the same idea, I didn't see that conversation before.
Howerver, in that conversation there seems to be a better developed scheme that is more secure as far as I can tell. I have just assumed that the chain cannot be censored profitably if the number of blocks to wait for is high enough (why: the miners are giving up fees by not including the transaction and the attacker would have to split the reward between all miners but the honest user only needs to outbid the attacker once)
That other idea seems to work even if the chain is censored for arbitrary number of blocks. In the meantime I was also thinking of a scheme that allows you to commit early and then wait for a any time you want but with the ability to detect that someone else is trying to spend it, so that you can act quickly. In some sense it was more similar but still not that good. The proposed scheme with unique decommitment is better and should be implemented instead of my idea.
Anyway, I believe even my weaker idea is still good enough to make my point given how hard it is to censor a transaction. My point wasn't saying that my specific implementation is the best but saying we can postpone the decision to implement a QR scheme to much later than what some people might think.
Have a nice day!
Martin